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THE 



IDEAL THEOEY OP BEEKELEY, 



REAL WOELD. 



FREE THOUGHTS ON BEEKELEY, IDEALISM, AND 
METAPHYSICS. 



BY 

THOMAS HUGHES. 





PREFACE. 



About one-fourth of this volume was published 
some months since, in a small spirited Irish 
periodical. It is now given to the public not only- 
enlarged in matter, but also altered in form. I 
am not so contracted in view, and vain in expecta- 
tion, as to think that it will settle the vexed 
question between the realist and the idealist. If 
it will in any way advance knowledge, and cast a 
ray of light on any dark spot on the canvass of 
human vision, it will satisfy mj expectation and 
wish. 

The book is not intended for the advanced and 
the erudite; but for those who aspire after 
advancement and knowledge, and receive with 
gratitude any light and assistance, from whatever 
quarter they may come. The intent is, to give 
within a narrow compass, some acquaintance with 
Berkeley's theory, to those who have not studied 
his works for themselves : it aims also to help and 
encourage the student of metaphysical science, in 
his lonely and persevering efforts. 

There is one ambitional thought running 



IV PREFACE. 

through the volume, — the universal unity of 
all truth and knowledge. Though the book is on 
metaphysics, metaphysical phrases and formularies 
are avoided ; it is intended for the unsophisticated 
and unmetaphysical reader, as well as to assist 
those humble students who wish to travel forward 
in the path of truth and science. The notes are 
added to give more variety and interest to the 
ordinary reader. 

As people value things by their character and 
inherent qualities, and not by their appearance 
and what may be said of them, so books, by the 
discreet and intelligent, will be thus estimated, 
and not by what may be said of them in their 
prefaces; and a different verdict I cannot reason- 
ably wish for this volume. A book becomes a 
member of a large family, the moment it is given to 
the public, and an object of blame or praise, as its 
character is, or as the views and taste of its critics 
may be ; and, in some degree or other, without a 
doubt, this unpretending volume will share the 
same common lot. And, in common with all 
natural feeling, I cannot but wish well to my 
own : yet, if it happens to have praise, it will not 
elate ; but, if otherwise, it will not distress. 

T. H. 
February Sth, 1865. 



CONTENTS. 



iarf |. 



PAGE. 

LIFE 1 

fart Sg, 

BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY ... 33 

i^rt |J|. 

METAPHYSICS. 

CHAPTER I. 
Mistaken Views concerning Meta- 
physics 92 

CHAPTER II. 
The Advantages op Metaphysical Study 116 

CHAPTER III. 
The Necessity of Metaphysics 130 



VI CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER IV. 

PAGE. 

Metaphysics and tue Bible 140 

CHAPTER Y. 
The Relation of Metaphysics to other 

Forms of Knowledge 147 

CHAPTER YI. 
Metaphysical Dangers 167 

CHAPTER VII. 
The Encouragements and Discourage- 
ments which meet the Student of 
Metaphysics 178 



PAET I. 

LIFE. 

SECTION I. 

The hand of Supreme Providence is impartial 
in the distribution of its rich and suitable bene- 
fits. The chief blessings of that liberal and wel- 
come hand are given unto all people and countries 
alike. All countries have their beautiful spots 
and splendid sceneries, elevated hills and magnifi- 
cent mountains, rich fields and charming valleys, 
transparent rills and gigantic rivers. They have 
their Fauna and Flora, their bright summers and 
fruitful harvests ; they have their sun, moon, 
stars, and comets. There are, hovrever, spots 
where its blessings appear to have been lavished 
more copiously than they are in other parts ; yet, 
when all things are considered and compared, 
there are found palpable evidences of suitability^ 
impartiality, and equality in the whole. What 
appears to be deficient in one place to compete 
with another in beauty, value, and grandeur, is 
made up of other elements equally important, and 

B 



2 PART I. 

much more suitable and needful to answer the 
wise end of both place and circumstances. 

The physical arrangement of things, presents a 
presumptive proof of tlie impartial intention and 
blessings of God in the moral and spiritual. The 
natural is both an emblem and a proof of the 
Divine purpose in the spiritual. As the blessings 
of the natural world are distributed with an ap- 
proximate equality and unfailing suitability over 
all the face of the material, so is the inteution of 
God relative to the moral and the spiritual. There 
is this difference. The moral views man on a higher 
ground than the natural does; he is viewed on 
this higher ground of his relation as a rational 
and accountable being, capable of refusing, re- 
ceiving, using, or mis-using, the blessings given. 
Moral blessings are equally contingent and con- 
ditional in their character to the natural. Ac- 
cording to the exact degree these contingencies 
and conditions are observed or neglected, moral 
blessings increase or diminish in their value and 
usefulness to us. In the spread and distribution 
of moral blessings there are two parties to be con- 
sulted ; the agent, as the parent, the minister, or 
the tutor, and the child, the disciple, and the 
scholar. If one of theise miscarry in the discharge 
of his duties, the conditions arc violated, and the 
results will most assuredly follow. 



LIFE. 



SECTION II. 



History informs us that hitherto most nations 
and peoples have had their epochs and cycles in 
intellectual and moral excellencies. Nations, no 
more than the physical world, have not flourished all 
at once. When the light and glory of one country 
grew dim, the other country rose from obscurity 
to a higher and a nobler elevation ; as if by some 
mysterious power, the glories of oue were trans- 
mitted to the other. This we attribute in part to 
the Avrong and temporizing policies of nations, and 
not to any fate or necessity. Whilst Greece"^ 

* The ancient Grrecia, a maritime country in the south-east of 
Europe. It is in the shape of a triangle, with its base extending 
from the top of the Adriatic to the mouths of the river Danube, and 
having its two sides washed by the sea. It is bounded ou thj north 
by European Turkey, west by the Ionian Sea and islands, south by 
the Mediterranean, and east by the ^Egean Sea. In extent it is 
210 miles long, by 160 broad; aud contains an area of 15,()0U 
square miles, inclusive of its islands. It was called by its inhabit- 
ants Hellas, aud the people were called Hellenes. The name Greece 
comes to us through the Romans ; though why the Konians gave it 
this name, is not known. It is a familiar fact, that foreigners often 
call people by a diflerent appellation to what they call themselves. 
Thus, lor instance, the nation called Germans by us, bear the appel- 
lation of Deutscheu among themselves : and the people whom the 
Eomans called Etruscans, or Tuscans, were known in their own 
tongue by that of llasena. Greece, as a small portion of earth, has 
a history without a parallel, except the hilly land of Judea ; and, 
except the Jews, no people ever have made for themselves such a pro- 
minent and illustrious place in the everlasting pages of history ; 
whilst in philosophy and science they arc far superior to the Jews. 
Schlegel calls them the second people of the world, chosen of 
B 2 



^ PART I. 

floitrished in artSj science, and philosophy, other 
^arts of Europe* were uncivilized and dark. Now 
the land of science and philosophy is deserted, and 
notliing left but sacred and splendid monuments; 
as mementoes to testify to the passer-by of her 
past greatness and glory ; other parts of Europe 
flourish in science and philosophy. Whilst the 
hills and lakes of Judea t were favoured with the 

God to he the medium of fiirtlier difTnsion of revelation in the cause 
of the develo))ment of humanity. 

* That part of the globe which is now considered as one of the 
fis'e divisions of the earth, and in material size the least of them. 
It is bounded by the sea in all directions except the east, where it 
is separated from Asia by a botuidary-line, formed by the river 
Kava, the Ural mountains and river, and the Caspian Sea. It has 
the Baltic on the north, the Mediterranean, the Sea of Marmora, 
and the Black Sea, on the south, and a large e:?lent of coast, bor- 
dered on the west by the Atlantic. Its extent is about 3,'400 miles 
long:, by about 2,300 broad ; population, 265,000,000. Keli?;ioasly, 
the popnlatiou is divided between the Catholics, the Protestants, the 
Greek Church, a sn)all portion of Jews, and a smaller portion still of 
Mohammedans. The appellation Europe, ap])lied to this j)art of the 
f^lobe, has a little uncertainty about it, Bochart supposes this word 
to be composed of N3t* lin, /lur ap//a, "white face," the land of 
white peo))lc, as distinguished from the Ethiopians, black-laced people, 
or tawny inhabitants of Asia imd Africa. 

t Judea lies between Phoenicia on tlie north, and Idnmea on the 
south, separated from each by a cliaiu of lotty mountains. On the 
east it was bounded by the Dead Sea, the river Jordan, and the 
Sea of Galilee , on the west, it extended to the Mediterranean. Its 
length, from north to south, was about one hundred and eighty 
miles ; and from east to west, measuring from Jordan, about lifty 
miles. The most extraordinary country in the woi-lJ, both as to 
its religious and political history, no wonder that nothirig can efl'aee 
an afi'ection for it from tiie memory of its original inhabitants. At 
first it wub inhabited by idolatrous peoples ; it was then conquered by 



LIFE. ' 5 

saving philosophy * of God in the teaching of the 
Divine Saviour^f and the noble band of Apostles, J 
other parts of the world were feeding upon vanity, 
and enveloped in deep darkness. Now, whilst 
Judea with her sacred associations has nothing to 
boast of except her beautiful sceneries, the graves 
and dust of Prophets and Apostles, and the spots 
where the Sou of God wept,§ prayed,]] and 

the Israelites, and divided by them by lot amoug the twelve tribes. 
After the death of Solomon, it was divided into two kingdoms ; and 
finally iuto small provinces, by its several conquerors. It was con- 
quered and governed in turn by the Persians, the Egyptians, the 
Macedonians, the Romans, the Saracens, the Christians, the Turks ; 
and now is governed by the Mohammedan rule. 

* *iA.6£B, " to love," and crocpia, " wisdom," " the love of wisdom." 
As a system, religion is the revelation of Divine things in love : and, 
as an element of government in the human will and feeling, it is a 
love and a desire after Divine wisdom. 

t John iii. 16; Heb. vii. 25. 

J AnoareWcif, "to send away;" airo and trreWcj, "to send." 
An apostle is a person deputed to execute some importaut busi- 
ness ; but, appropriately, a disciple of Christ, commissioned to preach 
the Gospel. Twelve persons were selected by Christ for this end ; 
and Judas, one of the number, proving himself an apostate, his place 
was supplied by Matthias. The title Apostle is applied to Chz'ist 
Himself. (Heb. iii. 1.) In the primitive ages of the church, other 
ministers were called Apostles, as were also persons sent to carry alms 
from one church to another. (Rom. xvi. 7 ; Phil. li. 25.) This 
title was given also to those who first planted the Christian faith . 
thus Dionysius of Corinth is called the Apostle of France; hence the 
Jesuit Missionaries are called Apostles. Among the Jews, the ap- 
pellation was given to officers who were sent into distant provinces, 
to see the laws observed. Apostle, in the Greek Liturgy, is a book 
containing the Epistles of St. Paul, printed in the order in which 
they ai"e to be read in churches through the year. 

§ John xi. 35. 

II Luke xxii. 41, 42 ; John ivii. 



6 PART I. 

tauglitj"^ and wrought His numerous miraeles,t 
other parts of the globe possess, enjoy, and flourish 
under the influence of the religion established 
there. 

SECTION III. 

Every country and people have some monu- 
mental relics, either in fossils, architecture, tra- 
ditions, books, or illustrious names and characters, 
which make the past sacred and immortal in their 
remembrance. On this ground all people, in some 
way and degree or other, cleave to the past with 
sacred reverence and great tenacity. This is a natural 
and right affection in its place and prudential use. 
It is a conservative power, to preserve from sudden 
innovations and frequent revolutions in bodies, 
politic and religious. When this affection settles 
down in narrow superstition, and opposes every 
improvement and progress because they difl'er from 
the past, then it is abused, and becomes injurious 
to the interest of universal man. In common 
with all countries, Ireland J has her relics and 

• Matt. V. 2 ; John iii. 2. 

f Miracnium, from viiror, " to wonder ; " literally, a wonderfal 
ocenrrciice. Theologically, an act al)ove the ordinary laws and order 
of things, yet subject to the law of Infinite Wisdom, as to its sonrce 
;ind end. "We have a record, in the Gospels, of thiity-three miracles 
being wrought by Christ. 

J An island in the Atlantic Ocean, separated from Great Britain 
by the Irish Sea, or St. George'sf'hannel, varying in breadth from 
12 to 130 miles. It is fertile, and capable of great and various de- 



LIFE. 7 

monuments, which make the past dear and great 
to her feeling and conception ; and, most assuredly, 

velopment. It varies iu length from 235 to 290 miles, and ia 
breadtk from 110 to 182 miles. The whole comprises aa area of 
32,513 square miles. 

The Irisli, doubtless, are of Celtic ori5;in. This is seen in the names 
of their rivers, towns, momitaiiis, and other objects of common and 
historical interest. This is proved, equally clearly and indelibly, in the 
remaining i-elics of antiquity, the tumuli, the cairus, the cromlechs, 
and the draidical circles. The name of the island confirms the same 
thing. Eri, or Erin, its most ancient appellation, to which the na- 
tives still cling with the fondness of veneration, is derived from the 
Celtic lor, or Eir, whicli signifies " western." jM%st of its more recent 
names may be traced to this source. By the Grecians it was called 
lerue, being honoured by them as the third island of the ocean ; 
yielding precedence only to Taprobane and Britain. It is named 
by Ptolemy, louerna; by Juvenal and Mela, Juveraa. Diodorus 
Siculus calls it Iris. By the Britons it was called Iverdon ; and the 
Saxons, attaching to the original name an epithet from their own 
language, called it lerland, or Ireland. Its later name, Hibernia, 
has caused much diversity of opinion, but possibly may be traced to 
the same original source. Some derive it from an adjective of climate, 
hibernal, on account of its wintry temperature; others from Iberus, 
a Spaniard, or a river in Spain. Another writer goes still further. 
PosteUus, in his strictures on Mela, deduces it from the Hebrew, 
Irin quasi Jitrin, " the land of the Hebrews," who, believing that 
the empire of the world would be established in a strong place in the 
north-west, made themselves masters, as soon as possible, of those 
parts, and of Ireland. Bochart traces it again to the Phenician : 
Hibernia, according to him, or lerne, being nothing more than 
Ibernse, or the furthest habitation ; because, beyond Ireland, west- 
ward, all was ocean, according to the ancients. 

All this may have a dim trace in it, that the Celtic Irish and the 
Phenician proceed originally from the same common eastern stem. 
Other appellations, of later date, as Scotia, and Ogygia, mean, ac- 
cording to their several adopters, different things. It was not con- 
sidered by the Greeks and Romans as the country inhabited by any 
one nation ; on the contrary, its coasts sire described by Ptolemy as 



8 PART I. 

tlie liistory of Ireland is rich with great events 
and most illustrious and worthy characters. Ac- 
cording to tliC magnitude of her area, and the 
political advantages she has had, perhaps no 
country is richer in events, traditions, and illus- 
trious names and characters, which will ever ren- 
der her past history, to her own children, very 
dear and saercd. If much of her history is stained 
with cruelty, injustice, and oppression, these make 
the impression all the more deep and lasting. 
Whether the history of Ireland be viewed religi- 
ously, politically, philosophically, or scliolastically, 
it is very attractive and instructive, and mixed 
with melancholy and pleasurable interest. In all 
these classes, Ireland has given birth to some of 
the most memorable and illustrious men and 
things that chronicles can record. Even in this 
day she is behind none in proportion to her means, 
advantages, and magnitude. In abstract and in- 
tellectual science she is behind none.* Her sons 

inhabited by a ruiniber of tribes, of varions names. In common with 
all people dtlijchtiiig in the antiquity of their land and race, the 
hards and historians of Ireland trace the origin of its popnlatioo to 
the family of Noah. Much of its history, iu comMion with all his- 
tories of the long past, is buried in the tanjjltd mystery of years and 
romai.ce. 

* Tl;e scicncfs of pnre thought are those of metaphysics, pure 
iiiathemalies, ontology, and that of mind generally. 1. It is an 
abstraction from sense and objective nature ; or a kind of an effort to 
separate from them in thought and consciousness. 2. An abstract 
science is so named, because it is the hi-i.hcst and purest exercise of 



LIFE. 9 

are found useful and illustrious in every depart- 
ment of intellect and religion, and that in every 
part of the globe. 

SECTION IV. 

The famous George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne,"^ 
was born on the soil of Ireland. I shall only give 
an epitome of his life within a small compass. My 
business chiefly at present is to examine and, so 
far as I can, within a limited compass, give an 
impartial view of his ideal philosophy. The editor 
of his Works f gives us only a short sketch of his 
life, just extending it over some fi^'teen pages. 
Whether this arose from want of materials, or the 
monotony and dearth of his life, in those incidents 
and circumstances which make a memoir palatable 
to the many, or that Berkeley failed to form a 
numerous and influential school, either in theology, 
politics, or philosophy, and for these reasons his 
life was not written more extensively, we cannot 
tell. It is possible that an analytical biography of 
his life, containing the developments of his mind 
in connexion with his difierent philosophical theo- 

thought, a science of pure thought. 3. As coutrasted with and 
ditl'erent from the complex. 4. It aims at the knowledge of beings 
and things in their Zeal nature, condition, and relations. 

* Cloyue is a town of Ireland, in the county of Cork, twelve 
miles from Cork. Its populatiou is under 2,00u. 

t Berkeley's Life and Works, by the Bev. G. N. Wright, M. A., 
in two volumes. 



10 PART I. 

ries, TTOuld have been both interesting and in- 
structive. But it has been the portion of only few 
good and great men, to leave behind them faithful 
and able biographers. An Agrieola* had an 
efficient and lucid biographer in his son-in-law, 
Tacitus.f Not many Newtons J leave behind 

* Cneius Julius Agricola was a Roman commander, whose father, 
Julius Grfecinus, was an orator, and put to death by Caligula, for 
refusing to plead against Silanus. He was carefully brought up by 
his mother, Julia Procilla, and sent to Massilia, (Marseilles,) the 
chief seat of learning in Gaul, to pursue his studies. He was sent to 
Britain, where he was at the time of the insurrection of Boadicea, in 
A.D. 61. After holding various positions, and performing many great 
and active services in ]5ritain, Gaul, Asia, and Kome, it is asserted 
that he fell a sacrifice by poison to the cruel jealousy of Doniitian. 
He was born at Forum Julii, now called Frejus, in Provence, a.d. 
37, and died at Rome, a.d. 93. 

t Caius Cornelius Tacitus, a celebrated Roman historian, of whose 
family and early life hardly anything is known. Piiny the Younger 
declares him to be the first orator of his day. He is known chiefly 
by posterity through his histories, many of which are lost. His 
Annals were thr most important of his works ; but of these we have 
lost a part. His Treatise on the Manners of the Germans, and his 
Life of Agricola, his father-in-law, are both pure in style, and lofty 
in sentiment ; but his History of the Reign of Tiberius is considered 
as his master-piece. It is supposed that this great and noble cha- 
racter was born about a.d. 54, and died about a.d. 130. 
' X Sir Isaae Newton, one of the greatest mathematical geniuses 
and natural philosophers that ever existed. No name so familiar and 
more respected in all civilized lands than his. He was born at 
^Voo]sthor[)e, near Grantham, in Lincolnshire, 1642, and died at 
Kensington, 1727. On the mantelpiece in the room where 
Newton was born at Woolslhorpe, is placed 'a marble tablet, com- 
memorative of the past, beneath which are the well-known lines of 
Pope : — 

" Nature, and nature's laws, lay hid in night ; 
God baid, ' Let Newtou be ! ' and all was light." 



LIFE. 11 

them a Brewster,* able and faithful, and full of 
sympathy with his great subject; and so giving 
unto us a philosophical detail of the inward and 
outward life of the great philosopher. No one but 
Johnson f left behind him a Boswell,J to write 

* A living experimental philosopher, and the author of Sir Isaac 
Newton's Life, with several other works on material scien(:e. His 
discoveries relative to the properties of light have led to great im- 
provements in the illumination of lighthouses. In 1815, he received 
the Copley medal for his paper on the polarization of light by re- 
flection ; and in the following year, for his discoveries in physics, 
received from the Institute of France 1,500 francs, which was tlie 
half of the prize. In 1816, he invented the kaleidoscope ; in 1818, 
received the Rumford medal of the Royal Society; and, in 1830, 
was presented with the medal of the Royal Society, for his further 
researches on the properties of light. In the same year, with Davy, 
Herschel, and Babbage, he originated the British Association, the 
first meeting of which was held at York, in 1831. He was knighted 
by "William I\'., and decorated with the Hanoverian Guelphic Order. 
In 1841, he became Principal of St. Leonard's College, at St. An- 
drews. In 1849, he was elected President of the British Association ; 
and, the same year, had the honour of being chosen in the place of 
Berzelius one of the eight foreign associates of the French Academy 
of Sciences. For twenty-two years he edited the Edinburgh Ency- 
clopajdia : he was also one of the editors of the Edinburgh Philo- 
sophical J ournal, as well as of the Edinburgh Journal of Science. 
He was born at Jedburgh, Scotland, in 1781. 

t Johnson has left a fame in criticism, lexicography, and miscella- ' 
neous writing, that few cau hope to acquire ; which will last as long 
as the literature of the English language. He was born at Lichfield, 
1709, and died in London, 1784. 

J James Boswell, the author of the Life of Dr. Johnson, has 
secured himself immortality, in connexion with his great subject. 
Though not possessing vigorous intellectual powers, he has written 
one of the most attractive and instructive memoirs in English or any 
other language Macaulay says of it, as to its accurate detail: — 
" His coat, his wig, his figure, his face, his scrolula, his St. Vitus' 



13 PART I. 

adoringly the life of his friend and master ; 
coming to his work after many years of perpetu- 
ally studying his unwieldy subject in all his capa- 
ble bearings, and diligently collecting materials for 
it from all resources about the living man, both 
wliilst his subject was awake, and whilst he was 
asleep. Few theologians, if any at all, have, or 
ever will leave behind a Hanna,"^ to hand faith- 
fully down their lives to generations to come, as 
was the fortune of Chalmers.t The loss is that of 
future humanity, and not to themselves ; for the 

dauce, his rolling walk, his blinking eye, the outward signs which too 
clearly marked the approbation of his dinner ; his insatiable appetite 
for fish-sauce and veal-pie, with plums; his inextinguishable thirst 
for tea; his trick of touching the posts as he walked ; his mysterious 
practice of treasm-ing up scraps of orange-peel ; his morning slum- 
bers ; his midnight disputations ; his contortions ; his mutterings ; 
his gruntings ; his puffings ; his vigorous, acute, and ready eloquence ; 
his sarcastic wit; his vehemence; his insolence; liis fits of tempes- 
tuous rage; his queer inmates, old Mr. Levett and blind Mrs. 
Williams, the cat Hodge, and the Negro Frank, all are as familiar to 
us as the objects by which we have been surrounded from childhood." 
During more than twenty years of friendship and familiar intercourse 
between Boswell and Johnson, they did not spend more than two 
hundred and seventy-six days together. He was born at Edinburgh, 
1740, and died, 1790. 

* Hanna is a living minister of tlie Free Presbyterian Church, an 
able preacher, a discriminative theologian, and an elegant writer. 
He is a son-in-law of the late Dr. Chalmers, and has been for many 
years a colleague, in pastoral charge, with Dr. Guthrie. He has 
written a most able but somewhat too voluminous memoir of Dr. 
Chalmers, with some other theological works. 

t Dr. Chalmers was one of the most ])owerful ])reachcrs and 
writers that Scotland, or any other laud, ever produced. He has 
done more towards the unity and harmony of theology and science. 



LIFE. 13 

life of the great and good is written above ; it has 
done its service below, and is in an indestructible 
keeping, and on imperishable records. 

The 12th of March, 1684, at Killcarn, near 
Thomastown,* were the time and place that wit- 
nessed and recorded the birth of a little child, 
afterwards called the " philosophical Doctor Berke- 
ley," and the " metaphysical Bishop." He re- 
ceived the first rudiments of his education at Kil- 
kenny School,t under Dr. Hinton, and was re- 
ceived a pensioner of Trinity College, Dublin, at 
the age of fifteen, under the instruction of Dr. 
Hall ; but was received a fellow of that college in 
the year 1707. 

SECTION V. 

In 1713 he came to London, and, at the close 
of the same year, went, in the capacity of a chap- 
lain, in the train of the Earl of Peterborough into 

than any other theologian. lie was born at Anstruther, Fifeshire, 
17S0, and died at Edinburgh, 1847. 

* Thomastown is a borough town of Ireland, in the county of 
Kilkenny, ou the river Nore ; with population about 2,200. It 
was formerly enclosed with walls. 

t Kilkenny is the capital of the cuunty called under that name. 
It contains many elegant buildings, and its streets are paved with 
black marble. The venerable ruins of its clinrches, monasteries, and 
abbeys, still remain to prove its former importance. Its college, or 
free school, is still one of its celebrated buildings and establishments. 
Its population is about 20,000. 



14 PART I. 

Italy.* The editor relates a verj' ludicrous iuci- 
deiit that transpired at Leghorn ; t we shall 
transcribe it for the reader, in the words of the 
learned editor. " It may not be amiss," says the 
biographer, " to record a little incident tliat befel 
Mr. Berkeley in this city, with the relation of 
which he used sometimes to make himself merry 
among his friends. Basil Kennett, the author of 
the * Roman Antiquities,^ was the chaplain to 
the English factory at Leghorn, the only place in 
Italy where the English Service is tolerated by 
the Government; which favour had been lately 
obtained from the Grand Duke, at the particular 
instance of Queen Anne. J This gentleman rc- 

* Charles Mordaiint, Earl of Pcterborotigli, a great Eu'ilisb 
general who entered the navy, and distinguished hinisell" at Tangiers, 
when it was besieged by the Moors. He was created the Earl of 
Monmouth ; and, on the death of his unele, succeeded to the 
title — the Earl of Peterborough. Some of his letters are printed in 
the works of I'ope, with whom he was iutimate. It was said of liim, 
that he had seen more Kings and more postilions than any man in 
Europe. He was born in 1658, and died 1733. 

t Leghorn is a celebrated seaport-town of Italy, the Italian 
I,ivorno. In the sixteenth century, it was made a free port by Cosmo 
de Medici ; and to this its advancement and prosperity may be 
greatly attributed. Among other tilings, its lighthouse is noted. 
Its population is about 85,000. 

^ Queen Anne was the second daughter of James II., by Lady 
Anne Hyde, daughter of the great Earl of Clarendon. In 1668, she 
married Prince George of Denmark, by whom she had several chil- 
dren, but all of whom died young. In 1702, on tiie death of Wil- 
liam III., she succeeded to the crown. One of the greatest events 
of this rcigu was tiie union of Scotland with England. Ou account 



LIFE. 15 

quested Mr. Berkeley to preach for him one Sun- 
day. The day following, as Berkeley was sitting 
in his chamber, a procession of priests, in surplices, 
and with all other formalities, entered the room ; 
and, without taking the least notice of the wonder- 
ing inhabitant, marched quite round, muttering 
certain prayers. His fears immediately suggested 
to him that this could be no other than a visit 
from the Inquisition, who had heard of his offici- 
ating before heretics without licence the day before. 
As soon as they were gone, he ventured, with 
much caution, to inquire into the cause of this ex- 
traordinary appearance ; and was happy to be in- 
formed, that this was the season appointed by the 
Bomish Calendar for solemnly blessing the houses 
of all good Catholics, from rats and other vermin ; 
a piece of intelligence which changed his terror 
into mirth." 

In August, 1714, he returned fi'om the Conti- 
nent. The fall of Queen Anne's ministry having 
put an end to his hope of preferment, he accepted 
an offer from Dr. Ashe, the Bishop of Clogher,* 
to accompany his son on a tour through Europe. 

of the number of eminent literary characters who flourished in her 
reign, it has beea called the Augustan age of Britain. Though too 
much the dupe of her ministers and favourites, she will ever be re- 
spected for the general excellency of her private character. She was 
horn, 1664, and died, 1714. 

* Clogher is an ancient, small, episcopal city of Ireland, 82 miles 
from Dublin. 



16 PART I. 

He travelled, in addition, to places move coDraon, 
over Apulia, Calabria, and the Island of Sicily. 
He was on the Continent in this tour about four 
years. When at Paris he paid a visit to Pere 
Malebranche,* the author of an ingenious system 
of philosophical idealism, M'hich teaches that we 
perceive all ideas in God, which is known under 
the name of occasional causes. This theory has 
points of resemblance and sympathy with that of 
Berkeley; yet they are widely different in their 

* Pere Xicliolas Jlalebrariche was the ablest disciple of the philoso- 
phy of Descartes. lie has been derided by the superficial, and neglected 
almost by all Protestant thinkers: partly ou account of his ideal 
theory, and partly from the notion that he was a Jesnit. It is true that 
his theory is considered as exploded among almost all thinkers, yet 
the thinker himself is worthy of the highest regard both as to hi3 
character and as a profound thinker. It is a mistake to think him 
a Jesuit ; he was a priest of the Oratory. Sir ^V. Hamilton, in 
speaking of him, says: — "As a thinker he is, perhaps, the most 
profound that France has ever produced ; and as a \vri;cr on philo- 
sophical subjects, there is not another European author who can be 
placed before him. His style is a model at once of dignity and 
of natural ease ; and no metaphysician has been able to express him- 
self so clearly and precisely without resorting to doctrinal and scho- 
lastic terms. That he was the author of a celebrated but exploded 
hypothesis, is, perhaps, the reason why he is far less studied than he 
otherwise deserves. His works are of principal value for the admi- 
rable observations ou human nature which they embody ; and were 
everything to be expunged from them connected with the vision of 
nil things in f/ia Deiti/, and even with the (Cartesian hypotheses in 
general, they would still remain an iucstinmble treasury of the ablest 
analysis, expressed in the most appropriate and, therefore, the most 
admirable eloquence. In the last respect, he is only a|iproacbed, 
certainly not surjiassed, by Hume and Mendelssohn." He was born 
at Paris in 1C38, and died at Paris in 1715. 



LIFE. 17 

teacliing and conclusion. Berkeley found this phi- 
losophical father in his cell, preparing a medicine 
in a pipkin for a disorder he was suffering under, 
— an inflammation on the lungs. The conversa- 
tion was naturally led to their peculiar philoso- 
phical sympathies and theories. It grew so 
earnest and warm that the ingenious father raised 
his voice so high, and became subject at the 
time to so intense and deep emotions, that his 
disorder increased and carried him off in a few 
days. So great and grave a reality the idealism 
of Berkeley proved to poor jNIalebranche. What- 
ever edification and interest this visit gave to the 
visitor, according to report, it proved a dear and a 
mortal one to the visited. 

SECTION VI. 

In July, 1717, he was elected a Senior Fellow 
of his college ; and on the 14th of November, 
1721, he took degrees of Bachelor and Doctor in 
Divinity. The year following increased his for- 
tune considerably ; a lady that was no relation left 
the sum of £8,000 between himself and another 
gentleman. In the year 1724, he was presented, 
by the Duke of Grafton, to the deanery of 
Derry,"^ worth £1,100 per annum. At this time 

* Derry, a city and a county of Ireland, now called liOndon- 
derry, because given to twelve London companies by James I., 

C 



18 PART I. 

he conceived a scheme for the conversion of the 
aborigines of America to Christianity^ and the 
building of a college in the Somers Islands ; * 
and in 1725 published his purpose, and offered to 
resign his opalent preferment, and dedicate him- 
self the remainder of his days to this noble and 
Christian enterprise, for the paltry sum of ,£100 
per annum. In August, 1728, the enterprising 
philosopher entered the marriage condition ; and 
in the following month of the same year, after 
much delay and trouble, he set sail, for his very 
sanguine mission, to America. He took up his 
residence at Newport, and laboured indefatigably 
in the discharge of the duties of his clerical func- 
tions. After being there two years, he returned 
home, grieved and disappointed that his sanguine 
wishes and confident expectations were not met 
and fulfilled by the Government and men in 
power. He trusted too much in political schemes 
and Avorldly men ; so his darling project fell 
unrealized. In this scheme Berkeley's confidence 
was on a wrong basis, as were his motives not the 

after the rebellion of its chiefs ; and now almost the whole comity 
is owned by their successors. 

* Somers Islands, or the Bermudas, a cluster of small islands 
belonging to Great Britain, in the Atlantic Ocean, in number about 
three hundred. These Islands were discovered in 1522 by Juan 
Bermudas, a Spaniard; and in 1609, George Somers, an English- 
man, was wrecked there, and soon after the English formed a settle- 
ment there. 



LIFE. 19 

loftiest and diviaest. He trusted in the efficiency 
and faithfulness of worldly patronage and enact- 
ments, instead of confiding his cause to the sym- 
pathy and feeling of the good and the religious, 
and the immutable power of truth. This ground 
failed him, as he might well have expected. His 
motive, in a great measure, was to make religion 
subservient to the State. We cannot but look on 
this as one of the great failures of his life. We 
are ready to believe that this was the natural 
result of a system that depends upon worldly 
patronage for preferments, rather than of want 
of principle and high view in the amiable 
philosopher. 

SECTION VII, 

Queen Caroline* was peculiarly fond of philo- 
sophical conversation between learned and ingeni- 
ous men, and had one day in the week set apart 
for that purpose whilst she was the Princess of 
Wales. Among those who attended, and took an 
active part in the conversation in this illustrious 
and select company, were Drs. Sherlock,t Hoad- 

* Princess Caroline, tke wife of George II., and daughter of 
Braudenburgh-Anspach, who died in 1737- 

t Sherlock, Thomas, an eminent prelate of the Anglican Church, 
and a son of Richard Sherlock, an able divine and a chaplain of the 
army of Charles I. ; he was born in Loudon, 1678, and died near 
London, 1761. 

n O. 



20 PART I. 

lev,* Clarke,! and Berkeley. Drs. Clarke and 
Berkeley were the two leading antagonists ; 
Hoadley sided with Clarke, and Sherlock with 
Berkeley. In this select intelligent company, 
Berkeley's idealism, and other philosophical the- 
ories, were made the chief subjects of conversa- 
tion. In Dr. Clarke it met a gigantic opponent, 
and, Ave should think, in point of mental strength 
and severe logic, superior to Berkeley : but 
Berkeley, in expertness of movements, clever and 
skilful handling of his tools, and amiable temper, 
was equal to him. We should think that Berke- 
ley's idealism tottered, and was blown down to 
the ground, before the heavy calibre and gigantic 
reasoning of the author of the a p7'wri evidence. 
But Berkeley, doubtless, was so enamoured with 
his darling theory, and at the same time so expert 
in building up his fortification after it fell, that 
he was blind and indifferent to his own condi- 
tion. It is said that Addison J made it his 

* Iloacllcy, Benjamin, a bishoj) of the Anglican Church. His 
controversy witli Atterbury is familiar to most readers ; and by 
reason of his doctrine of non-resistance, he was noticed by the 
House of Commons, who pressed the Queen te confer preferment 
upon him. He was born at Westcrham, Kent, 1G76 ; died, 1761. 

t Clarke, Dr. Samuel, was one of the profoundest men that the 
Anglican (.'hurch or any other Church ever produced, lie was at 
once a scholar, a mathematician, a metaphysician, and a theologian. 
He was born in Norwich, 1C75 ; died in London, 1729. 

j Josnjjh Addison was the sou of the Rev. Lancelot Addison, a 
divine and an author of some eminence. Joseph Addison was the 



LIFE. 21 

purpose and work to have the two philosophers 
together; and that Berkeley complained of the 
unfairness of Clarke. We should think that 
Clarke's artillery would be awfully heavy upon his 
antagonist ; and his opponent would feel that he 
met with a giant^ however matters would ulti- 
mately end. But, so far as we know, neither of 
the parties were convinced, which is mostly the 
result. A man must be met sideways generally 
to be convinced. If he is conscious that he meets 
an antagonist, he prepares his instruments, for- 
tifies his ground, searches for arguments, and so 
confirms and roots himself in his own views more 
and more- 
After the return of Berkeley from Pohode 
Island, the Queen often commanded his attend- 
ance to communicate unto her what he witnessed 
on the other side of the water. Apart from all 
he saw in America, his conversation must have 
been exquisitely instructive and interesting. In 

most elegant writer of his age ; so much so, as to secui-e the admira- 
tion aud imitatioa of iSIacaulay. Johnson speaks of his style, — 
" Whoever wishes to attain an English style, familiar but not coarse 
and elegant but unostentatious, must give his days and nights to 
Addison." It may be said, however, that his style is wanting in 
masculine energy, and forceful expression. When he found r.nat the 
hand of death was upon hini, he sent for Lord Warwick, aud, affec- 
tionately pressing his hands, whispered, " See in what peace a 
Christian can die." He was born at Milston, Wilts, 107:^ i and 
died at Holland House, 1719. 



22 PART I. 

him met all the qualifications to charm and 
instruct : — his classical taste ; his knowledge of 
the modern languages and manners of Europe ; 
his philosophical insight, analysis, and quick 
apprehension; and his rich variety of mental 
treasures ; — for his range of study covered theo- 
logy, politics, and philosophy, in their widest 
acceptation. His sweet temperament, polished 
manners, and his religious views and feelings, 
mellowed and sweetened the whole. It is the 
portion of but few, to be adorned with so nume- 
rous mental and moral qualifications, and that in 
so high a proportion, as met in the Bishop of 
Cloyne. Religion and philosophy, refined and 
adorned, by their combined teaching and influence, 
the soil that was naturally rich and fertile. 

After the deanery of Down became vacant. Dr. 
Berkeley, at the request of Queen Caroline, was 
named to it ; and the letter of the King went over 
to Ireland to that effect. But through the neglect 
of Lord Burlington to notify the royal intention 
to the Duke of Dorset, who was then Lord Lieu- 
tenant of Ireland, his excellency was offended that 
the richest deanery in Ireland was thus disposed 
of without his concurrence, and the matter was 
not pressed further ; so Berkeley lost the rich 
deanery of Down. Her INIajcsty now declared, 
that since they would not allow Berkeley to be 



LIFE. 23 

Dean in Ireland, he should be a Bishop ; so in this 
case, as in thousands more, one misfortune leads 
to a higher honour and advantage. According to 
the determination of the Queen, he was, on the 
]9th of May, consecrated the Bishop of Cloyne, 
in the splendid edifice of St. Paul, Dublin. Fond 
of study and retirement, susceptible to the beau- 
ties and charms of nature and romantic sceneries, 
this secluded spot would be most agreeable to his 
taste. He formed such an attachment to it, that 
when Lord Chesterfield* offered him the vacant 
bishopric of Clogher, the value of which was 
double that of Cloyne, he modestly refused it. 

SECTION VIIT. 

It was his habit to rise between three and four 
in the morning during the whole of the time he 
was at Cloyne. In 1752 he removed to Oxford, 
in order to superintend the education of his son. 
Being convinced of the evil of non-residence, he 
tried to exchange his high preferment for some 

* Chesterfield, Philip Dormer Stauhope, the fourth Earl of, was 
considered the greatest wit and most accomplished in manners 
of his day. He associated much with literary men ; and partly 
from that, and partly from some productions of his own, he enjoys 
still a degree of literary reputation. In 1742, he received the 
appointment of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland: in this capacity he 
greatly distinguished himself by reducing the country into a state of 
tranquillity, such as it did not enjoy before. He was born in 
London, 1694; and died, 1773. 



24 I'AllT I. 

canonry or headsliip at Oxford. Failing in this, 
he wrote to the Secretary of State, to request that 
he might have permission to resign his bishopric, 
worth at the time j8 1,400 per annum. Such an 
uncommon petition excited His Majesty's curi- 
osity to inquire who was the extraordinary man 
that sent it : being informed that he was his old 
friend Dr. Berkeley, the King declared that he 
should die a Bishop in spite of himself, but gave 
liira liberty to live where he pleased. On Sunday 
evening, 14th of January'', 1753, as he was sitting 
surrounded with his family, listening to a sermon 
of Dr. Sherlock's read by his lady, he was seized 
with palsy in the heart ; and so instantaneously 
expired, that his body was quite stiff and cold 
before his death was discovered. 

SECTION IX. 

I differ greatly from Berkeley in theology, 
politics, and philosophy ; yet I wish to do him full 
justice. My difference from him does not hide 
from ray view his high qualities and excellencies, 
and my admiration of his character and powers. 
No one, therefore, it is to be hoped, can accuse 
me of partiality on the one hand, or ignorant pre- 
judice on the other. His character was made up 
of varied, rich, and high qualities. He was an 
accomplished scholar, all his days a devested stu- 



LIFE. 25 

dent; his powers of philosophical analysis were 
very acute ; his powers of conversation were 
graphic and various ; and his rich store of know- 
ledge, both ancient and modern, was almost 
boundless. His moral character was very rich in 
clusters of the highest excellencies ; his charity 
to others who differed from him in religious views, 
was witnessed and testified of by the many 
Roman Catholics who lived around him ; his 
beneficence was experienced by the poor, not only 
in the tar-water''^ system, but in his care for them 
and gifts unto them. His zeal for the spread of 
Christianity was seen in his sanguine and self- 
denying mission to Bermuda ; and his disinterest- 

* Berkeley published a large treatise, called Siris, on the efficacy 
of Tar water. He thus speaks of it himself : " Every step that I 
advanced in discovering the virtues of tar water, my own wonder 
and surprise increased as much as theirs to whom I mentioned 
them : nor could I, without great variety and evidence of facts, ever 
have been induced to suspect, that, in all sorts of ailments whatso- 
ever, it might relieve or cure, which at first sight- may seem incredi- 
ble and unaccountable ; but, on maturer thought, will perhaps appear 
to agree with, and follow from, the nature of things. For it is to be 
noted that the general notion of a disease seems to consist in this, 
that what is taken in, is not duly assimilated by the force of the 
animal economy ; therefore, it should seem, whatever assists the 
vis vita may be of general use in all diseases, enabling Nature either 
to assimilate or discharge all unsubdued humours and particles what- 
soever. But the light or ether detained on the volatile oil which 
impregnates tar water being of the same nature with the animal 
spirit, is an accession of so much strength to the constitution, which 
it assists to assimilate or expel whatever is alien or noxious." 
—Works, vol. ii., p. 432. Edit., 1843. 



26 PART I. 

edness was evinced repeatedly, as in the giving up 
of the deanery of Derry, refusing the bishopric of 
Clogher, and his wish to resign his preferment 
when he removed to Oxford. After allowing 
much to the friendship and warmth of Pope, 
there is enough still in his poetical praise 
of Berkeley to sustain him on the ground of 
virtue : — 

" To Ikrlxcley every virtae under heaven." 

We do not take and recommend him as an 
absolute pattern in all things, because no finite 
dependent nature can be an absolute model in 
all matters ; and in common with the best in 
this life, he had some things which it would 
have been better to be without, and other things 
which it would have been better to have possessed. 

SECTION X. 

The life of Berkeley will be estimated differ- 
ently by different minds. By a small class in the 
different departments of science he will be always 
honoured and estimated to his full worth, but the 
larger class by far will refuse him the meed of 
honour and praise he is worthy of. His sympa- 
thies and application of his powers were universal. 
He viewed man in all the capability and suscepti- 
bility of his nature ; he viewed him as having 



LIFE. 27 

raind and heart ; as susceptible to misery and 
happiness ; as a creature of time and eternity : so he 
directed his skill and energy to these varied forms 
of his relations and wants. By some he will be 
treated as an enthusiastic ignoramus in physics^ by 
others as a dangerous empiric in politics ; by many, 
as a delusive, soft-brained philosopher, and not a 
few will consider him an unsafe and an unsound 
theologian. The wider the ramification any man 
takes, and in proportion to his genius and origin- 
ality, the more he comes in collision with other 
theories and views ; and in proportion to these 
things will be the diversity of views concerning 
him ; and for a time, at least, the number of his 
opponents. Whilst the tame and the common- 
place man passes through this life in quietude and 
happiness without almost any opposing forces; the 
superior man who tries to benefit his fellows has 
difficulties and opposing powers without number. 
Such is the reward of genius and greatness in this 
life. 

SECTION XI. 

One accusation against Berkeley is, that he 
went so much beyond the boundary of his own 
profession. In the premiss itself there is much 
truth, but we cannot grant the conclusion which 
is drawn from it. We cannot allow all this to be 



28 PART I. 

wrong. "We see no reason that a man should 
never give advice and exert his influence in other 
matters besides what directly belongs to his pro- 
fession. This would be tantamount to a prohibi- 
tion not to think of other things ; for to know is 
of little use, if it is never put in practice when 
that is convenient and needful. According to this 
narrow theory, ignorance in all matters except the 
direct profession of a man is an advantage. Ac- 
cording to this, no one but a svirgeon must try to 
save life ; no one but an attorney must give any 
advice in legal matters ; no one but a statesman 
must talk about the state of the country; and 
no one but the theologian must say anything 
of the Bible. 

SECTION XII. 

There is nothing in the economy of Christian- 
ity which prohibits a minister of religion from 
doing all the good he can in all ways, and exert- 
ing his influence and powers in every direction, 
against every form of evil and error. He cannot 
do all his work in the pulpit and by the sick bed ; 
for all wrong, misery, and darkness are not 
around them; moreover, wisdom and discretion 
would teach not to bring all there. Christianity 
leaves all the legitimate relations, duties, and 
liberties of man intact in this respect, only it 



LIFE. 29 

enforces upon Lim motives and conditions. 
Every body, every day of his life, goes beyond the 
direct sphere of his calling. There is not an indi- 
vidual to be found who never thinks, speaks, or 
acts about anything but what belongs to his 
actual sphere of action. It cannot be ; for it 
would be contrary to the intuition of man's 
nature, and at war in numberless instances with 
the best and noblest feelings of his being. It 
would at once erase from existence genius, and 
every superior talent and profundity. A man of 
high genius must not be confined to a common- 
place route, or his nature will be degraded, his 
spirit imprisoned, his heart broken, and the world 
robbed. Whilst the narrow common-place path 
will satisfy and be wide enough to the common- 
place spirit, not so with one of the superior class of 
spirits. He must have his meandering turns in 
all directions, and have full liberty of turning in 
and out, according to the eccentricities of his 
nature ; to observe and reflect ; to make new dis- 
coveries and experiments ; and, perhaps, he will 
find a new, nearer, and better path ; at least the 
world will be benefitted in having new facts and 
experiments. 

SECTION Xlll. 

Let us not be misinterpreted. We do not 
recommend a neglect of one's profession, to 



30 PART I. 

attend to other matters wliicli do not belong 
immediately to one's chosen sphere of action. 
On the contrary, we think that the duties which 
belong directly to every one's call, should have the 
preponderate weight and influence Avith all. No 
one should neglect the functions of his own pro- 
fession to attend to others of less importance. 
All should aim at raising their own profession in 
eflFectiveness and usefulness, by aiming to excel 
themselves in it. Every man, on moral and 
rational ground, is responsible to do this. What 
we maintain is, that there is no righteous reason 
to prohibit from man of any profession to do all 
he can to benefit man in all ways, provided he 
does it on enlightened ground and sincere motive, 
according to the conditions of truth. We cannot, 
therefore, condemn Berkeley in the abstract, for 
his varied ramifications into the different paths of 
science, in politics, in mathematics. At one time 
he writes about the laws of nature ; at another 
time, about the theory of vision ; now on mental 
philosophy, and not the least in political and philo- 
sophical theology. In all this he benefitted man; 
and, so far as human reason can see, he violated 
no law of religion or reason. But viewing 
things relatively, it is possible, nevertheless, that 
many of his friends may say that the bishop was 
not entirely faultless so far as his labours and 



LIFE. 31 

works are known. It must be confessed that the 
taste for science, philosophy, and politics, appa- 
rently, preponderated in influence over the direct 
important duties of his profession. It must be 
confessed, also, that the purely theological por- 
tion of his works, compared with other depart- 
ments, is both meagre and small. The absence of 
theological literature we do not commend and 
admire; but this is not an argument against his 
other writings.^ It may be that he had sufficient 
reasons in his own mind, not to write more exten- 
sively in theology. We should not like to say to 
a bishop or a minister, " Now you must not study 
science and philosophy; neither politics nor 
classics must be thought of by you ; and surely 
you must write nothing upon any of these 
things." This we should rebel against ; but on 

* All the works of Berkeley, if not what is called directly reli- 
gious, were written for the good of men, and from religious 
sympathy and motive. If he did not always treat of the human 
heart and conscience and the first great duties of religion, he fed the 
minds and tried to cure the bodies and ameliorate the conditions of 
men ; and unless these are done, religion itself cannot be enjoyed, 
practised, nor be developed. He who does these things from a reli- 
gious motive, is a Divine messenger to men, and a great benefactor 
to his race. He went further than the strait theologian and nervous 
religionist, but was as religious in aim and conviction as any of 
them ; and far grander in conception and feeling of human want and 
duty, consecrating himself and all his powers to the honoui' of his 
God, the advancement of His truth and goodness, and the happiness 
of mankind. 



32 PART I. 

the other hand, it may be said, for a bishop to 
write more on every thing than on the subject- 
matter of his own profession, is, perhaps, both 
unwise and out of place. It must be mentioned 
as a palHation of Berkeley's case, that he wrote 
most of his philosophical works during the time 
that he had no responsible ministerial charge; 
and neither after, nor before he was made a 
bishop, has it ever been brought to his charge 
that he neglected any of the duties of his high 
vocation. 



33 



PAET II. 

BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY: 

SECTION XIV. 

Bishop Berkeley is best kriowii by the system 
of idealism developed by liim. This theory is 
unfolded in two works, called ''The Principles of 
Human Knowledge,""^ and " Three Dialogues be- 
tween Hylas and Philonous/'f If it were not 
for this system, the name and works of Berkeley, 
like many more good and great men, would have 
fallen into a state of entire obscurity. But so 
long as the various systems of mental science will 
be studied, the name of Berkeley will be men- 
tioned and his works studied. As yet his theory 
of idealism, and works in general, have not been 
so generally read and digested, as they have been 

* The book called. The Principles of Human Knowledcje, was 
published in 1710, by Aaron Ilhonies, for Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller 
in Skinner Row, Dublin ; and was the only edition published in Dr. 
Berkeley's life. 

t His Three Dialogues letween Hi/las and Philonous was pub- 
lished in London in 1713. It shows much acuteness, grer.t pre- 
cision and elegance of expression, bat considerable repetition, and 
often appears as one turning in a circle. 
D 



34 PART II. 

ignorantly referred to and flippantly. treated with 
a smile. The demonstration of the great lexi- 
cographer, Dr. Johnson, against the idealism of 
Berkeley, kicking a stone, is as faithfully and 
generally copied as it is familiarly known.^ His 
system of idealism is considered, generally, so 
absurd, and contrary to common sense and 
universal experience, that the best answer it is 
worthy of is to treat it lightly and indifferently, as 
the production of one whose brain was not sound . 
at the time in all its organs and powers.f On this 
ground the philosopher has just reason to com- 
plain, and appeal against his critics and judges. 
We think that the views and sincere convictions 
of all men should be treated respectfully and cha- 

* " After we came out of the church," says Boswcll, " we stood 
talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingeuious 
sophistry to prove the non-existeuce of matter, and that everything 
in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are 
satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I 
never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, 
striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone till he 
rebounded from it, — '/ refute it thus.'" — Boswell's Life of 
Johnson, vol. i., pp. 303, 304. 

t There is another instance in the Life of Johnson by Boswell, 
where the fi;rcat critic treats Berkeley's idealism liglitly. Being ia 
company with a gentleman who thought tit to maintain Dr. Berke- 
ley's ingenious philosophy, — that nothing exists but as perceived by 
some mind ; when the gentleman was going away, Johnson said to 
him, " Pray, Sir, don't leave us ; for we may, perhaps, forget to 
think of you, and then you will cease to exist ! " — Boswell's Life of 
Johison, vol. iv., p. 20. 



Berkeley's philosophy. 35 

ritably, and that however novel and peculiar they 
may be, provided tliey are believed and stated 
uprightly and fairly. And this is peculiarly 
rational and righteous on the ground of philo- 
sophy. This concession should be made to 
Berkeley ; and we are prepared to give him a full, 
fair, and just hearing. This we state, not from 
any partiality to the idealism of Berkeley, but on 
the ground of rational, impartial justice. 

SECTION XV. 

On every side it is confessed that he has pro- 
pounded his system without a method, and often 
is very ambiguous ; so much so sometimes, that 
his views and theory are so obscure, that both the 
Healist and the Idealist may refer to it for support 
and proof."^ He appears as one under a sudden 

* The Realists and the Idealists are the two great common classes 
of believers aud unbelievers in material substance, which may be snb- 
divided according to the various grades of their belief. The Realists 
are called sometimes the Substantialists : they are commonly divided 
into natural Realists, and hypothetical Rfcalists. They are again 
divided into Dualists, and Unitarians or Monists, according as they 
view the testimony of coasciousness as to subject and object to our 
ultimate perception. The Idealists are classed into two great 
and common classes ; the cosmotketic and the absolute Idealists. 
The Ck)smothetic are divided into two : those who view the ideal or 
representative object to be a tertium quid different from the percipi- 
ent mind as from the represented object ; aud others who regard the 
ethereal world as only a modification of the mind itself. And the 
former of these views, again, is divided into various subdivisions ; — 
as theories may differ as to the nature and origin of the vicarious 

D 2 



36 



PART ir. 



impnlse of discovery and conviction ; he runs 
hastily to make his philosophical panacea known 
to the world, and that without studying method 
or perspicuity. He opened his bag, and threw his 
varied materials down at the foot of men, without 
any form or classification. He appears frequently 
as one anxious to make some concession, especi- 
ally to the "vulgar," as if he were afraid of 
launching too far, or being thought of doing so at 
least, or that he might gain for his theory more 
disciples and favour. He walks as one without a 
track. He had only two points before him, — the 
starting ground and the concluding spot; but he 
had no straight line between these extrem.e points, 
— he must make that himself. His starting-point 

object, as. Is it material or immaterial? Does it come from without, 
or rise from within ? Does it emanate from external reality, or from 
a higher source? Is it produced by God, or by some higher intelli- 
gence, or a representation in the Deity Himself ? Is it innate, or 
produced by the mind on the occasion of the presence of matter? 
Such are some of tliese subtle aud puzzling theories. Absolute 
Idealism is again divided into two principal species; — the theistic, 
and the egoistic. The first supposes that the Deity represents to 
the mind what we mistake for an external world ; the second sup- 
poses that these appearances are manifested to consciousness, in con- 
formity with some unknown laws, by the mind itself. The Theistic 
is again subdivided into three theories : according as God is sup- 
posed to exhibit the phenomena in question in His own nature, or 
to infuse into the percipient mind representative entities different 
from its own modification, or to determine the effo itself to an allu- 
sive representation of the non-ego. See Sir \V. Hamilton's Dis- 
courses on Philosophy and Literature, pp. 54-00, l'J3-200. Also 
his Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i., pp. 2'J 1-297. 



Berkeley's philosophy. 37 

was a conviction of the non-existence of matter 
â– without the perceiving being ; his ultimate object 
was the making of this theory known unto others, 
and convincing them of its truth and advantage. 
In both he was earnest and sincere. All his skill, 
learning, and acuteness, are summoned simulta- 
neously to prepare their varied logical arrows 
against a material world, and completely annihi- 
late it from existence, or to prove that it never 
did exist, which, to the common sense of short- 
sighted mortals, would be the same thing. 
Everything exists in the mind that perceives it ; 
and apart from the perceiving mind nothing 
exists. The real place and form of existence is in 
the idea. The desk I write upon, the paper I feel 
— they exist in my ideas, and nowhere else ; and 
they may exist in the ideas of all others, if they 
only saw and felt them, at the same time. If the 
perceiving ego did not exist, the desk and the 
paper before me could not have existed. Ideas 
are objects of perception, and their existence is in 
the fact that they are perceived. Ideas are difter- 
ent from the mind, and yet they exist in the 
mind. He tells us that all the material things 
around us, and all the objects of our senses, are 
nothing more than ideas ; and all these exist in 
the mind, and nowhere else. Hence, using the 
thought of Dr. Brown, this system rather materi- 



38 PART II. 

alizes mind, than spiritualizes matter.* Though 
it denies the material outside, yet it creates some- 
thing that is not purely mental inside ; it denies 
the old world, that has been always intuitively 
believed in, yet it calls into being another world 
of ideas. This may be small or large, just as it is 
perceived ; if it is not perceived by anybody, it 
dees not exist ; for its real existence is in the fact 
that it is perceived by some intelligent mind. It 
may exist to one without existing to the other; 
for one may perceive it whilst the other does not 
perceive it. A thing existing and not existing at 
the same time, according to the logic of common 
reasoning, is a contradiction. f 



* Dt. Thomas Brovru, an elegant philosopher. Never any works 
on metaphysics have been so popular and captivating as his Leetures 
were, when they were fust published. It may be said, however, 
notwithstanding liis great philosophical genins, that it is very doubt- 
ful Avhether bis style is not too flowery to suit serious and deep 
metaphysical thought. The philosopher was born at Kirkmabreck, 
Kirkcudbrightshire, in 1778 ; and, after an illustrious career as a 
medical practitioner, lecturer on metaphysics, and an author, died at 
Eromptou, Loudon, whither he had gone for his health, m 1826. 

t The logical "law of identity or contradiction" is the general 
expression and criterion of all necessary truth. The law is that a 
thing must be what it is. A is A. This law vindicates itself; and 
shows at least one necessary truth or law of reason. In itself it is 
of little value ; but as an abbreviated expression for the criterion of 
truth, it is of high importance and of great value. The primary laws 
of thought, or the conditions of the thinkable, are four : — 1. The law 
of identity. 2. The law of contradiction. 3. The law of exclusion; 
or excluded middle. 4. The law of sufficient reason. 



Berkeley's philosophy. 39 

section xvi. 

ISow, according to this idealism, ideas are not 
part of the thinking ego, neither are they material 
substance; therefore, they must be something 
different from both, or possess the qualities of 
both. According to this, this theory calls into 
existence a new class of entities, or ideas must be 
either spiritual or material. If ideas are material, 
Berkeley will be no further on his way, than he 
was before the thought of his theory ; the name 
is the only difference, — matter still exists under 
the name idea. If ideas are spiritual, this would 
be directly against his theory. If ideas were 
made up of mind and matter, this would be 
against him ; for then matter and mind would be 
the synthesis. If different from both, this would 
not help him ; but involve him and all in greater 
perplexity. We cannot see how Berkeley can 
avoid the dilemma of the preceding conclusions, 
without giving up his theory of idealism. Let 
the ingenious philosopher be heard in his own 
words : " This perceiving, active being is what I 
call mind, spirit, soul, or myself: by which words 
I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing 
entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, 
or, which is the same thing, whereby they are 
perceived ; for the existence of an idea consists in 



40 PAllT II. 

being perceived/^* He unfolds Lis views further 
in the following words : " The table I write on, I 
say exists, that is, I see and feel it ; and if I were 
out of my study I should say it existed, meaning 
thereby that if I was in my study I might per- 
ceive it, or that some other spirit actually does 
perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was 
smelled ; there was a sound, that is to say, it was 
heard ; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by 
sight or touch. This is all I can understand by 
these and the like expressions ; for as to what is 
said of the absolute existence of unthinking things 
•>vithout any relation to their being perceived, that 
seems perfectly unintelligible. Their es»e is per- 
cipi, nor is it possible they should have any 
existence out of the minds or thinking things 
which perceive them." " The vulgar opinion 
involves a contradiction. It is, indeed, an opinion 
strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, 
mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible 
objects, have an existence natural or real distinct 
from their being perceived by the understanding. 
But with how great an assurance and acquiescence 
souver this principle may be entertained in the 
world, yet whoever shall find it in his heart to call 
it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it 
to involve a manifest contradiction ; for what are 

* Prlnciijh's of II inn an KnuwIeJye, j). 87, sect. ii. 



Berkeley's philosophy. 41 

the foreraentioned objects but the things we per- 
ceive by sense ? and is it not plainly repugnant 
that* any one of them, or any combination of 
them, exist unperceived ? " 

To make it more clear and explicit, we shall 
quote once more : " From what has been said/' 
says the author, " it follows there is not any other 
substance than spirit, or that which perceives. 
But for the fuller proof of this point, let it be con- 
sidered the sensible qualities are colour, figure, 
motion, smell, taste, and such like ; that is, the 
ideas perceived by sense. Now, for any idea to 
exist in an unperceiving thing, is a manifest con- 
tradiction ; for, to have an idea is all one as to 
perceive ; that, therefore, wherein colour, figure, 
and the like qualities exist, must perceive them ; 
hence it is clear there can be no unthinking 
substance or substratum of those ideas." * 

SECTION XVII. 

It is clear, from the quotations made, that 
Berkeley denies, virtually and actually, the exist- 
ence of the external world. The external world 
is nothing but subjective ideas. Whatever his 
disciples and apologizers ingeniously say to screen 
or modify his theory, his language is clear, and 
his meaning cannot be mistaken. In fact, he is 

* Principles of Human Kitowledi/e, pp. 88, 89, sects. 3, 4, 7. 



42 PART 11. 

clearer, and not so disingenuous, as his apolo- 
gizers and expounders. It makes no difference 
as to the way he proceeds, and the ingenuity he 
displays; the end aimed at is, the total denial of 
matter. This is the only interpretation which the 
letter and spirit of his philosophy will furnish us 
with. To put another construction upon his phi- 
losophy would be to do injustice to the author, 
and violation to his system. The material uni- 
verse, in its ten thousand classes of beings, and 
numberless tangible objects, is reduced to ideas or 
sensations. If such a theory could be proved 
true, we should think it a most marvellous thing, 
that universal humanity has been deceived so 
long. It would have been the most amazing dis- 
covery that human reason ever made ; and the 
genius which made it would be the most extraor- 
dinary. The external world, according to this 
amazing discovery, has no true existence but in 
the compass of man's ideas. Not only the cata- 
logue of material objects are ideal in conception, 
but the real things themselves ; he carries them 
all with him in his ideas. The sun he sees is not 
above him, but in his idea ; the moon he beholds 
by night is not many miles distant, but in his 
sensatiou ; the ten thousand stars he sees 
through his magnifying telescope, are not actually 
in the different constellations of heaven, but in 



Berkeley's philosophy. 43 

hinij in his ideas ; for the real existence of things 
is in perceiving them ; the mind perceives 
nothing but ideas, and ideas exist in the mind. 
He maintains that the rivers, the trees, the fields, 
the houses, beasts, and men, have no real exist- 
ence, but in the mere sensations of man. And, 
sure enough, if they existed within man, they 
could not be real ; for no finite space and power 
could find place for them all. 

SECTION XVIII. 

It is true, that he does not deny external phe- 
nomena, as presenting themselves to the senses. 
Mr. Lewes tells us, in his " Biographical History 
of Philosophy," ^ that this is an unfortunate affair 
for his critics. Berkeley could not deny the 
cognizance of certain objects by the senses, with- 
out being considered a maniac ; yet, he denies 
the external reality of all material substance, inde- 

* " Uufortunately for the critics," writes ]Mr. Lewes, " Berkeley 
did not contradict the evidence of the senses ; did not propound a 
theory at variance in this point with the ordinary belief of mankind. 
His peculiarity is, that he confined himself exclusively to the evi- 
dence of the senses. What the senses informed him of, that, and 
t/iat onlij, would he accept. He held fast to the facts of conscious- 
ness ; he placed himself resolutely in the centre of the instinctive 
belief of mankind ; there he took up his stand, leaving to philoso- 
phers the region of supposition, inference, and of occult substances." 
— Leioess Bioffrajihical History of Pkilosophi/, vol. iv., p. 9. 
Knight's Edition. 



44 PART T.I. 

pendent of the perceiving being ; and this leads to 
the same conclusion as the denial of the pheno- 
mena of matter, and less consistent. He denies 
the final and simple credence to the testimony of 
his senses. His senses informed him of certain 
material objects, external and independent of 
himself; but he comes forward and corrects their 
testimony, and says, " O dear ! you misinform 
me; all those things which you inform me to 
be without me, material in nature and independ- 
ent of me in existence and relation, are within 
me ; they are as essential parts of me as my 
ideas; they are as spiritual as my ideas; they 
are nothing but my ideas or sensations." 

SECTION XIX. 

I see an external object, a tree, a field, or 
some other material thing, and in these as quali- 
ties there are extension and figure. My sense 
would intuitively inform me that these objects 
are external and different from myself; but Berke- 
ley says. No; they are in my mind; they are 
nothing but inward sensations. There is bread on 
the table; I feel, see, and taste it. Here we have 
the testimony of three senses that this bread is 
something external and independent of the eyes 
that see it, the mouths that eat it, and the hands 



Berkeley's philosophy. 45 

which handle it : it is clear that it has extension, 
figure, coloui% weight, and certain taste. But 
according to this ideal philosophy, this bread is 
nothing but an idea in the mind. Pity that such 
ideas cannot be produced in the mind of many 
hungry ones ; it would be a convenient and cheap 
way to supply their wants. I carry a heavy bur- 
den ; mj^ feelings inform me of the time I took it 
up and put it down ; but here, as well as in other 
matters of which the senses inform us, the good 
bishop steps forward and stoutly maintains that 
feeling is inherent in the mind, and that all is 
nothing but an inward sensation. We believe 
that in such circumstances very few would believe 
the good Doctor. This is the plain logic of his 
philosophy. It is amazing if ever he himself was 
a satisfied convert to its reasoning and conclusion. 

SECTION XX. 

My senses inform me of something tangible; 
they inform me also that this tangible thing is 
without me and quite independent of me. They 
inform me, moreover, that this tangible thing, 
external and independent of me, has certain quali- 
ties, as length and breadth, colour, and caloric. 
But this philosophy will not accept of such evi- 
dence, but at once refuses it wholesale, and says^ 



46 PART II. 

all is a mistake ; all these are nothing but per- 
ceptions of the mind, and the mind perceives 
nothing but ideas, and these ideas are in the mind. 
This idealism accuses the senses of deceiving us; 
it disbelieves and denies their primordial and final 
testimony. The very root of the theory must be 
traced to the want of confidence in the simple 
testimony of the senses. It vrould have been, 
therefore, more candid and unambiguous, as well 
as better for the theory itself, to have declared an 
open war against the testimony of the senses. 
That Berkeley thus accepts in the first instance 
the testimony of the senses, and yet denies them 
final credence, we think it an unfortunate thing 
for him and his philosophy; and not, as Mr. 
Lewes thinks, for his critics. If the testimony of 
the senses is to be accepted as to the phenomenon 
of matter, what consistency is there in denying 
their testimony that matter is what it appears to 
be, a real external substance independent of ideas ? 
If this evidence is to be accepted in one, why 
refuse it in the other? This is accepting and 
refusing the testimony of the same witness, and 
that relative to the same thing. It appears to us 
that this involves both inconsistency and contra- 
diction. 



BERKELEY S PHILOSOPHY. 47 

SECTION XXI. 

And yet this philosophy claims a sympathy 
and coincidence with the view of the vulgar. Mr. 
LeweSj in the work we have already mentioned, 
says, " He thought with the vulgar that matter 
was that of whjch his senses informed him, not an 
occult something of which he could have no 
information," In our humble opinion Mr. Lewes 
did not rightly inform himself of the view of the 
vulgar, or has mistaken Berkeley, or was not sin- 
cere in this assertion. We are ready to ask in 
reference to him, as he did in reference to Reid's^ 
and Beattie's,t " Where was ]\Ir. Lewes^ usual 
acuteness?" If we were to ask Mr. Lewes in a 
straightforward manner. Did Dr. Berkeley deny 
the external existence of matter, as it is conceived 
and believed in by the generality of men, or did he 
not? we must have a straightforward answer to 

* Dr. Thomas Reid was a divine, and one of the greatest philo- 
sophers that Scotland ever produced. His chief works are, "An 
Inquiry into the Human i\Iind," and "Essays on the Intellectual and 
Active Powers of Man." He was born at Strachan, Kincardineshire, 
in the year 1710 ; and died in 1790. 

t Dr. James Beattie was both a poet and a philosopher. He was 
the author of many works of considerable popularity in his day; but 
his " Minstrel," and " Essay on Truth," are tlie works by which he 
is most generally and lastingly known. He was the Professor of 
Moral Philosophy for many years in the Marischal College of Aber- 
deen, an office which he retained till nearly the close of life. He 
was born at Lawreucekirk, Scotland, in 1735 ; and died, 1803. 



48 PART II. 

this simple and plain question. We shall accept 
of no metaphysical quibbling. Mr. Lewes wiU 
not object to this, being such a faithful disciple 
and advocate of Comte's positive philosophy.* 

* Aua;uste Comte, a late French pliilosoplicr. He commenced 
hi? public life as a follower of Saint Simon, and, in 1820, prepared 
a work explanatory of (he sy-Ntem of that extraordinary man. He 
subsequently became a Mathematical Professor at the Polytechnic 
School ; but on the accession of l;0uis Napoleon to the Empire, he 
was deprived of that position. Between 1830 and 1842, he jmb- 
lished, in six large volumes, his " Course of Positive Philosophy," 
the purpose of which is (o prove that the human mind passes 
through three different stages in its meditations upon all subjects. 
The lirst is the theological ; the second, the metaphysical ; and the 
third, the positive ; in which, it is supposed, the mind has acquired 
a positive knowledge of things, according to their comprehension, 
relation, and harmony with the laws of the universe, lu 1843, he 
published a mathematical work ; and, in the following year, a " Dis- 
course " intended to enforce and make clearer his larger work. His 
theories attracted a large number of ardcut disciples and admirers; 
especially among the disciples of Saiut Simon and Fourier. Not only 
he found many followers in France, but in England and Europe he has 
many disciples and admirers: and Mr. Lewes appears to be one 
of them. At Paris, an Institution was established, of which 
Comte himself was a kind of high priest ; and all its members used 
all means and the greatest activity to promulgate the views of their 
admired and great master. There are several causes which have 
greatly enhanced the influence and popularity of his system. The 
'' Course of Positive Philosophy " is undeniably a very great work ; and 
no one but the very first intellect and genius could have produced it ; 
and every great work by a master spirit is sure to make many dis- 
ciples. But there are other reasons, wliich are to be found in the 
state of men's views and sympathies, which helped greatly its 
popularity. 

The author had a high name and position ; the work has an 
luazing amount of science in it; there is a tendency in the European 
mind to materialism, especially in the English mind ; and, above all, 



Berkeley's philosophy. • 49 

We think that Mr. Lewes must answer in the 
positive. Let us quote a few sentences from 
Berkeley himself. " It will be urged/' says the 
author^ " that this much at least is true ; to wit, 
that we take away all corporeal substances. To 
this my answer is, that if the word substance be 
taken in the vulgar sense for a conviction of 
sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, 
weight, and the like; this we cannot be advised 
of taking away. But if it be taken in a philo- 
sophical sense for the support of accidents or 
qualities without the mind, then indeed I acknow- 
ledge that we take it away, if one may be said to 
take away that which never had any existence, not 
even in the imagination/' * This passage might 
mislead any one who is not familiar with his sys- 
tem. He does not deny " sensible qualities, as 

in the matter-of-fact students of material science. There is a com- 
mon dislike among many formal scientific men to metaphysics ; 
and, above all, it is very acceptable to the wish and feeling of men, 
to believe themselves in possession of positive and infallible know- 
ledge about all objects of anxious inquiry. It is the dogma of 
infallibility introduced into philosophy ; and the lofty questions of 
metaphysics reduced to the limit of human mechanism, and positive 
knowledge. It limits human thought, and paralyses intellectual 
energy ; and no doubt its tendency is material and sceptical. Comte's 
" Positive Philosophy " has been translated into English by Miss 
Martineau. He was born at Montpelier, 1795, and, after an illus- 
trious, active, and earnest life, died in Paris, in the year 1857, loved 
and regretted by a large nimiber in Prance, Europe, and America. 
* Prindijles of Human Knowledge, p. IGO. 
E 



50 PART 11. 

extension, solidity," and so on. But what does he 
mean by these qualities? Notliing more than 
qualities in the form of ideas existing in the mind. 
Let this be known once more in the words of 
Berkeley himself, on the same page as the above : 
— " The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, 
warmth, frjure, or such like qualities, which, com- 
bined together, constitute the several sorts of vic- 
tuals and apparel, have been known to exist only 
in the mind that perceives them; and this is all 
that is meant by calling them ideas, which word, 
if it was ordinarily used as thing, would sound no 
harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not 
for disputing about the propriety, but the truth 
of the expression." If the reader will compare 
these quotations with those we have made in 
former pages from Berkeley, it will show that we 
interpret him fairly. 

SECTION XXII. 

But this theory does not coincide with the view 
of the vulgar, relative to material substance. 
Berkeley appears to contradict himself on this 
ground. In one of the quotations we have given, 
he asserts that the vulgar view of matter is wrong; 
in another place he states that he coincided with 
the vulgar. "We cannot account for this as well as 



Berkeley's riiiT.osoniY. 51 

for other things in his idealism; except the autlior 
was in a dilemma, and knew not how to extricate 
himself. Prima facie, it might be thonght that 
Berkeley coincides with the vulgar ; but a short 
consideration and few interrogations will soon 
convince that he docs not. His material subjifa7ict', 
&c., resolves itself into ideas ; these ideas are iu 
the mind, and in the perception of them consists 
their existence. This is all Berkeley understands 
to be matter. Berkeley and the vulgar would go 
only a short distance together. They would agree 
as to the phenomena which present themselves to 
the senses; but the moment he would say, " These 
material objects which present themselves to our 
senses, are nothing but ideas perceived b^'^ the 
mind," they would part company Avith him imme- 
diately. The vulgar would ask him, " Do you see 
that splendid field covered with beautiful daisies, 
fine horses, sheep, and cattle? We think them to 
be real things without us, independent of us, and 
if we never saw them, they would exist just the 
same; what do you mean by this?" lie would 
answer, " They are ideas in my mind." Ideas of 
daisies, horses, sheep, and cattle ! Tiiis view is 
diametrically opposed to the common sense of the 
vulgar. Such is our confidence in this, that avc 
should willingly venture it upon the examination 
of the view of the vulvar. Such idealism never 



53 PART II. 

entered the view of ordinary men. They take 
material substance to be what it presents itself to 
the senses, intuition, and consciousness ; and never 
dream of solving it to a mere inward idealism. 
It never has been^ nor can it be, the conclusion of 
common sense; and the vulgar are governed by 
common sense and intuition. It is the theory of 
aben'ant genius, tired with the common route, and 
anxious for a more novel path, more congenial with 
their predisposed feelings, desires, and purposes. 
Only a few restless spirits have landed on this 
naked shore of ideal philosophy. The intuition 
and consciousness of men have preserved them 
from it, and ever will. 

SECTION XXIII. 

Neither is there that difference between the 
vulgar and philosophers, as to the nature and laws 
of matter. Philosophers, and the vulgar, believe 
cordially that matter has certain properties ; as, 
'extension, impenetrability, divisibility, porosity, 
compressibility, elasticity, mobility, and inertia. 
They both believe in other properties, which are 
not found invariably in universal matter ; as hard- 
ness, softness, heavy, light, rough, smooth, bitter, 
sweet, red, brown, green, large, small, and many 
more of such kinds. They both believe that 



Berkeley's philosophy. 53 

matter is found in different forms, as solid, liquid, 
or gaseous. They both believe that matter is a 
tangible substance, apprehended by its contact 
with the senses. Their belief in all the properties 
and laws of matter, in the main, is the samej 
only the vulgar are not capable of going so far, 
and of defining so accurately, its laws and quali- 
ties, scholastically and precisely, as philosophers. 
The vulgar did believe that the sun, moon, and all 
the solar planets, turned around this globe ; but 
now they believe with philosophers. The vulgar 
at length follow and adopt the tested views of 
philosophers ; as one advances, the other follows. 
In many points of natural science, the vulgar are 
now higher than philosophers were in times past. 

SECTION XXIV. 

If it were granted to the idealist, that the vul- 
gar have no conception of a substratum in which 
the qualities of matter inhere, it would not follow 
that they disbelieve in the existence of an external 
world on that account. Whether the first is 
rightly understood or not, the latter will be always 
believed in, because it is a matter of conscious in- 
tuition. Neither does it follow, as a necessary 
conclusion, if such a thing as a substratum, as a 
metaphenomenal underlying matter, cannot be 



54 PART II. 

clearly defined and proved, that the non-existence 
of matter is demonstrable, and to believe in its 
reality inconsistent. The denial of universal 
material substances would be a very rash and un- 
vrarrantable conclusion to arrive at, because such 
a thing as a substratum of matter cannot be de- 
fined and proved. The want of proof and denial 
of one, can never destroy the other. In this we 
think Bei'keley very inaccurate in his reasoning 
and conclusion. He denies the existence of mat- 
ter, which presents itself as an indubitable pheno- 
menon to his senses, because the substratum of it 
cannot be clearly defined and proved. He sacri- 
fices a thing that has clear evidence, because 
another thing cannot be clearly pointed out ; and 
the proof of the existence of matter does not de- 
pend upon and require the proof of that thing. 
He is guilty of drawing a positive conclusion from 
an uncertain premiss, and from a postulate that 
the conclusion does not necessarily depend upon. 

SECTION XXV. 

The idealist is not able to prove that a sub- 
stratum does not exist, and yet draws a conclusion 
of affirmation, that matter cannot be what it ap- 
pears to be to all the minds of men. Would it be 
safe and right to use this logic in all departments 



BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY. 55 

of knowledge ? Is it needful to be able to define 
all things about the objects of our credence, before 
we believe in their existence ? Does it not 
happen frequently, that there is something per- 
taining to the most simple objects of faith, beyond 
our definition ? Do not the idealists themselves 
believe in innumerable things that they cannot 
explain all about ? This is a highway to uni- 
versal scepticism : man is conscious of a spi- 
ritual influence, and yet, according to this, he 
must not believe in it, because he cannot define 
the course and the agent of it. There are evi- 
dences of intelligence in men, and yet, because 
mind cannot infallibly be defined, we must not 
believe in it. Many think that they have evi- 
dence of the Divinity of the Messiah ; yet, because 
the hypostatic union cannot be defined, we must 
deny His Divinity ! If this is the rule of certi- 
tude and credence, we have not sufficient evi- 
dence to believe anything; stubborn unbelief 
must universally reign ; and, the more ignorant 
man is, the more rational his unbelief. These 
conclusions would have been deprecated by Berke- 
ley, yet we think that they follow naturally from 
his position. 

SECTION XXVI. 

Though we may not be able to define a sub- 
stratum, or material substance, in which inhere 



56 PART II. 

sensible qualities, yet one involves the other. 
Material substance must have some qualities ; so 
cognizable sensible qualities must inhere in the 
same substance. A clear proof, therefore, against 
the existence of one, would end in the negation of 
the other. If Berkeley could have proved the 
non-existence of material substance, or of the sub- 
stratum of matter, which is the same thing, then, 
as a matter of simple sequence, nothing would 
remain but airy and empty ideas ; but, as he could 
not prove either of these, his reasoning, in our 
opinion, is illogical and most inconclusive. It 
follows that whoever has a perception of one, 
must have a belief in the other, for one is a corre- 
lative of the other; and the mind, by natural 
logical order, and intuitive conviction, leads us 
from one to the other. 

SECTION XXVII. 

That it cannot ibe defined, is not the least evi- 
dence against its existence, must be clear, from 
the fact that an exact knowledge of things is 
never in this world of imperfection to be either 
the test of truth, the evidence of conviction, the 
ground of belief, the rule of action, or the final 
test of things. If this is conclusive, the vulgar, 
as well as the philosopher, believes in the sub- 



BERKELEY S PHILOSOPHY. 5/ 

stratum of matter. Would any one believe in 
colour, figure, weight, extension, caloric, sweet, 
bitter, and all other sensible qualities, without a 
substance in which they inhere ? Can a motion 
exist without some moving body? One is the 
accident or the property of the other. It could 
not have existed without. We could not, orderly 
and logically, conceive of one without the other. 
Here is a book. This book has figure, extension, 
weight, and colour. These qualities are not the 
book, and yet we cannot conceive of a book with- 
out them. The book is not figure, nor is it exten- 
sion, nor weight, neither is it colour, nor all these 
put together ; it is something that has all these as 
its properties, yet in itself it is none of them. 

SECTION XXVIII. 

The legitimate force of this is applicable to the 
mind as well as matter. Mind is a unity ; so 
matter is a unity ; yet both have their powers or 
properties. If the substratum of one is denied, is 
it consistent to believe in that of the other ? We 
cannot think it is. If it will be said that we are 
conscious of one, so are we of the other. Per- 
ception, conception, reflection, remembrance, ab- 
straction, and calculation; love, hate, fear, grief, joy, 
confidence, and hope, and many more, are powers 



58 PART II. 

and acts of the mind. Though the mind cannot 
be what it is without thcse^ yet the mind itself is 
not one or several of these ; it is something in 
which these exist, and are the expressive powers of 
it. On the same ground, as this ideal philosophy- 
denies the substratum of matter, it does away 
with that of the mind, too. In this, also, we 
consider the theory inconsistent and self-contra- 
dictory. 

SECTION XXIX. 

The immediate question at issue is, — Are the 
things which come in contact with our senses, 
material qualities? This is the gist of the whole 
question. If this were settled, as a matter of sure 
consequence, the whole matter would rest. If 
they are material properties, matter must exist, 
and they inhere in that material reality ; but, if 
they are not material properties, so far as we know, 
matter does not exist. This is the goal where 
both sides must unite or separate ; in this place 
must the first premiss of negation or affirmation 
be proclaimed ; without this understanding all 
will be fighting without arms and order, and com- 
pletely in the dark. In this, we think that Berke- 
ley and the idealists appear as if they wished to 
evade the question. Instead of declaring at once 
that extension, hardness, softness, and other pro- 



Berkeley's philosophy. 59 

perties presenting tlieraselves to the senses, are 
nothing but ideality, they say, — " We believe our 
senses, that all these are really what they appear 
to be." Yet, according to the system of Berke- 
ley, they are nothing but ideas in the brain. This 
appears like quibbling and evading, rather than 
fairly defining and reasoning. Truth fares always 
best when it is stated fairly and fully; and, if 
idealism is true, it needs fear nothing as to its 
aim and consequences. The misfortune of truth 
is, that it is concealed, misunderstood, and denied ; 
whilst it is the fortune of error to be misconstrued, 
and clothed and mixed Avith truth. 

SECTION XXX. 

Berkeley rests his idealism upon the ground of 
consciousness, and Mr. Lewes says that he is in- 
controvertibly safe here. On this ground Hume 
used to say of his philosophy, that it is uncontro- 
verted, but convinces nobody.^ The original 
datum, and primordial truth and testimony of 
consciousness, are the same everywhere, and in 
everybody. It cannot be a predicate of the nega- 
tive and of the affirmative, relative to the same 
thing, and in the same sense ; therefore, it cannot 

* Hume, David, a historian, and a philosopher of great power 
and acuteness. Bora at Edinburgh, I7II; died in the same city, 
1776. 



60 PART II. 

deny and affirm the existence of matter. The 
testimony of consciousness is not contradictory 
and changeable. It is the same in every age and 
breast. The only difficulty is to solve and under- 
stand it rightly. Both the realist and the idealist 
appeal for proof to the ground of consciousness. 
The two it cannot support^ or its evidence is con- 
tradictory ; if so, its worth and veracity are gone. 
The veracity and the efficiency of the fact of con- 
sciousness must be preserved in their integrity. If 
the veracity and uniformity of its evidence are not 
accepted, it cannot be the court of final appeal ; 
but this must always be the final and absolute 
court relative to all that belong to the individual 
€ffO, because it is the only power of test in the 
possession of all. It is an instinct in the nature 
of man to fall back upon his own consciousness ; 
and whatever contradicts its testimony is not be- 
lieved. Here, where landed Descartes,"^ after all 
his doubts and anxieties, Cogito, ergo sum, was his 
resting-place; and here where all philosophers 
finally seek a safe landing. "Whatever is not im- 

* Descartes, a celebrated French mathematiciau and i)liilosopher. 
He was tlie first to reduce the science of optics to the command of 
mathematics. He was an extensive author. The following are 
some of the principal works which perpetuate the philosophical 
power of the eminent philosopher : — Principia Philosophia ; Bisser- 
tatio deMethodoredereyendaPaiioms ; I)iojptrica ; Meditationes; 
Geometry ; Letters. He was born at La Haye, in Touraine, 1596, 
and died at Stockholm, 1650. 



Berkeley's philosophy. 61 

mediately the fact of consciousness, must be a 
matter of revelation or testimony ; but the cogni- 
tion of the senses, the emotions, and the state and 
acts of the mind, are directly under the jurispru- 
dence of consciousness, which Berkeley falls back 
upon as a testing-ground of his theory. 

SECTION XXXI. 

To a certain point the idealist and the realist 
agree, and walk together in unity. The two ac- 
knowledge the testimony of consciousness, para- 
mount as to the ego, or the mind itself; so far 
goes the idealism of Fichte,"^ which resolves all 
the external objectives into pure thought ; so far 
goes the idealism of Berkeley, which resolves all 
into ideas ; and so far goes the belief in the ex- 
ternal world together. At this point Berkeley, 
and his friend the realist, (not Hylas,) differ, and 
finally separate company. Berkeley asserts the 
fact of consciousness further than this : he says 
that he is conscious of certain ideas as objects of 
perception, but these were not external and inde- 

* Johann Gottlieb Kchte, a subtle metaphysician, and a lofty 
pure character. One of the ablest expounders of Kaut's philosophy ; 
and father of J. Hermann Fichte, who has caught the metaphysical 
tendency, views, and ability of his father. The story of his life and 
death is most touching ; and, whether his system of philosophy is 
received or not, all will admire the felicitous purity of his life. 
He was bom at Eammenon, in Upper Lusatia, 1762 ; and died, 1814. 



62 PAUT IT. 

pendent objects. Ficlite asserted that he was 
conscious of nothing but of his own thoughts; 
Berkeley says that he was conscious of his own 
perception, or the perceiving being, and also the 
idea perceived, but this idea is nothing. The 
idealism of Fichte is more simple and consistent 
than that of Berkeley."^ The realist differs 
from the two as to the cognition of the non 
ego, and its real identical existence, apart from 
the perceiving ego. This philosophy is both 
more simple and more consistent than that of 
idealism. 

SECTION XXXII. 

The fact of consciousness in its present view 
and relation, resolves itself into different inquiries. 
First, how far does consciousness take cognizance 
of things? Does it include something external 
with the perceiving ego ? This we answer in the 

* Fichte's was a more spiritual and pure idealism than Berke- 
ley's ; though they possess much in common, yet they have 
their features of diifereuce. Berkeley claims identity of belief with 
the vulgar ; Fichte boldly declares that the vulgar are deluded. 
Berkeley says that he perceives ideas and nothing else ; Fichte 
knows nothing beyond his immediate and absolute consciousness. 
Berkeley would say, " The world is as if it were real to me, it presents 
itself to my senses ; " Fichte would say, " I know nothing about it, I 
know of nothing but of my own consciousness." Berkeley quibbles 
more than Fichte ; but both end in the same conclusion, — a complete 
negation of our external world. 



Berkeley's philosophy. 63 

affirmative. It takes cognition of the subjective 
and of the objective; consciousness testifies to the 
ego and the non ego, as a natural and necessary 
synthesis. It is impossible to think of self, with- 
out thinking of something that is not self. The 
ego is conscious of the perceiving being ; it is also 
at the same time conscious of the external reality 
perceived ; and, in the concept, these are con- 
trasted and separated from each other. This 
almost all philosophers believe to be the incon- 
testable deliverance of consciousness. Many of 
the ancient philosophers believed in certain images 
or representations made to the mind. Eeid was 
the first, in this country at least, to exalt con- 
sciousness to its proper place and function ; and 
yet Eeid is not very explicit and comprehensive in 
all his statements ; but Sir William Hamilton, 
with consummate learning, and lavish criticism, 
and most acute and exact definitions and analysis, 
has established the fact beyond the power at pre- 
sent of an attack, or perhaps improvement.* 

* Sir William Hamilton was one of the greatest philosopliers, if not 
the very greatest, of his age ; and the first even Scotland ever pro- 
duced. He was educated at Balliol College, Oxford, and was brought 
up to the bar ; but, his philosophical tendency being too strong, he 
never courted much practice. In 1836, he became the Professor of 
Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, which he 
retained till his death. He greatly advanced the literature of philo- 
sophy, logic, and metaphysics. His powers, both of generalization 
and analysis, were extraordinarily great. There have been as great 



64 PART II. 

That the non ego is different and external to the 
ego that perceives it, is, and has been, the con- 
thinkers, and perhaps greater than he ; hut few, if any, ever united 
such extensive and various learning, wondrous reading, and wonder- 
ful intellectual resources, with great thinking, as the late Sir W. 
Hamilton. ]\I. Cousin calls him, " le plus grand critique de notre 
Steele;" and M. Braudis, " le grand maitre du Peripatctisme." 
His chief works are, his "Discussion on Philosophy," &c., fii'st 
chieily published in the " Edinburgh Review," afterwards collected 
into a large volume ; his edition of Reid's Works, with many notes, 
and long supplementary dissertations ; and he was engaged upon the 
Works of Dugald Stewart, when the message of death came. His 
Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, which he delivered to his Uni- 
versity class, have been published in four volumes, edited, and givea 
to the public, and at once are worthy of the illustrious Professor, and 
of the distinguished editors, so that his most tenacious disciple can- 
not wish anything more. 

Without a doubt. Sir W. Hamilton was a disciple of Kant, and 
the fundamental principles of his philosophy are of the Kantian 
school; and his acceptance and defence of the common-sense philo- 
sophy accorded fully with these principles. It has been said of 
him, that he was destructive and not constructive. Philosophy in 
its very nature is controversial, testing, and destructive ; its business 
and aim is, to correct the inadvertencies of thought, belief, and life. 
Before a philosopher can become constructive, he must destroy the 
systems of dogmas, and mouutaius of opinions and prejudices, which 
stand in his way. After this is done, and a clear way opened, the 
work of construction begins ; and he who can destroy right well, has 
also the power to construct right well. Sir W. Hamilton was not 
only a powerful destructive critic, he was also a discoverer both in 
logic and metajihysics ; though he has done more than any one man 
for a long period, it is possible, but for the lamentable stroke of 
death, that he would have done more, in constructing a system of 
philosophy, which he was not permitted to do. He devoted 
all his powers and resources to teach, elucidate, and establish 
the fundamental principles in the common-sense philosophy of 
Keid ; and has put it on a ground not easily attacked. These 
just and high eulogiums do not necessitate our acceptance 



Berkeley's philosophy. 65 

sciousuess of universal man. This cannot be 
doubted, Arithout coming into collision with the 
universal conduct and actions of men. 1. The 
emotions of the mind are different to these enti- 
ties : love, hatred, hope, joy, with others of the 
same nature. These emotions have thinr real 
subjectives and objectives, and all are conscious of 
their different modifications towards their different 
objects. 2. The actual habits and actions of all 
men show this universal consciousness ; all men 
avoid falling into the water, going into the fire, 
precipitating over a rock, taking poison ; all men 
fear the lion, the mad dog, fire instruments, the 
terrific thunderbolt, and numberless things beside. 
The fact of consciousness alone accounts for these 
universal conducts. Berkeley himself, in per- 
petual and numberless instances, obeyed this law 
of his nature, whilst he tried to reason it away in 
his theory of idealism. This is not the production 

of all in his views; for thei-e are some matters as to wliich we 
cannot as:ree all in all witli Sir W. Hamilton. 

In purging and establishing the philosophy of common sense, he 
lays down the following canons as his touch-stone, which regulated 
all his philosophical inquiries: — "1. That we admit nothing, not 
either au original datum of consciousness, or the legitimate con- 
sequence of such a datum. 2. That we embrace all the original 
data of consciousness, and all their legitimate consequences : and, 3. 
That we exhibit each of these in its individual integrity, neither dis- 
torted nor mutilated, aud in its relative place, -whether of pre- 
eminence or subordination." — Hamilton's Eeid, Note A., p. 747. 
Sir \\. Hamilton was born at Glasgow, 1788 : and, after a laborious, 
illustrious, and glorious life, died at Edinburgh, 1856. 
F 



66 PART II. 

of a mere plicuoraenal phantom, but of the real 
consciousness of the mind, of an external reality. 
This is seen in children in every class and condi- 
tion, and that without distinction of time and 
place, which shows it to be original and uniform. 

SECTION XXXIII. 

The veracity of consciousness cannot be doubted. 
If tills were doubted, and called in question on 
one ground, it must be doubted on every ground, 
and in every form. This would be suicidal 
and destructive, for the same consciousness 
testifies everywhere. And if its testimony is not 
believed relative to the external, what ground have 
we to believe its evidence relative to the existence 
of the ego himself? If the veracity of the testi- 
mony ot consciousness were denied, universal 
scepticism, as a matter of necessity, would follow. 
The/acr of consciousness cannot be doubted, with- 
out doubting doubt itself; which would be a con- 
tradiction and annihilation. Every man must be 
conscious of his own doubt ; and yet, if the fact of 
consciousness is denied, it is a simple impossi- 
bility. The fact of consciousness must ever stand 
as firm as the existence of man. 

SECTION XXXIT. 

Secondly, Dees consciousness become familiar 
with external reality mediately, or immediately ? 



BERKELEY S PHILOSOPHY. C7 

These two theories have been held, and yet are 
held, by many. They xvho hold that the mind 
becomes familiar with the external world, through 
the medium of an ideal medium, are called repre- 
sentationists ; and the believers in the theory that 
the mind becomes familiar with the external 
reality, without any teriium quid, or immediately, 
are called presentationists. Ancient philosophers, 
down to Locke,"^ and, indeed, Locke himself, be- 

* John Lucke is a familiar name to the veriest tyro in mental 
science, and excites feelings of love and admiration in the profound- 
est thinkers of every land, nationality, and age. He is cue of the 
first that taught me to think, and lead my boyish sympathies and re- 
flections into the lofty and delightful regions of higher thought. I 
revere him as a master ; I respect him as an independent and un- 
affected thinker ; and never will cease to admire his lofty, upright, 
and noljle demeanour as a man; and I love him as a father of the 
noblest heritage, which a man can leave to his race. It would be 
one of the most gloomy and distressing thoughts and feelings of my 
soul, if such characters were gone for ever, without a hope to meet 
and hold commuuion wilh them iu a happier and brighter world. 
Hence, it is a part of the brightest thoughts, and happiest hopes and 
feelings my mind is capable of, that such lights are not extinguished 
from tlie universe of God ; and that it will be in my power and 
privilege to liold intercourse and associate with them in another life. 

Thinkers difier as to the quality of his philosophy, but all agree 
in acknowledging both his greatness and power. No one has 
wielded, since the time of Aristotle, such great and universal sway 
over the thinking portion of Europe, as John Locke. He produced 
an epoch in the intellectualism of England and Europe. Never a 
more unaffected and natural thinker; never a more homely and 
familiar thinker; but never a more honest and earnest thinker. 

It is the portion of a great man often to be opposed and persecuted, 
becpuse he removes venerable and fashionable landmarks in thought 
and habits, and settles the future destiny of men and nations. No 

P 2 



68 PART II. 

licved tliat the mind perceived the external medi- 
citehj:-^ They bcheved that the mind was too 

mail was more persc(!utcd iu his time and persoOj than John Locke; 
and no one has been more opposed, and more severely handled and 
tested in his philosophy, than he. But it is the portion of the 
great and good, to ba greatly loved and admired as men. No one 
has had a larger meed of jiraise and admiration than John Locke ; 
and at this very time he has readers and admirers throughout 
Europe and America, and all parts of the globe where philosophy is 
loved and studied. He was born at Wrington, Somersetshire, on the 
29th of August, 1632, and died in the arms of his friend, Lady 
Masham, on the 28th of October, 1704. 

* This is a matter of great debate and disagreement among the 
critics of Locke. Reid brought upon himself the severe criticism of 
Dr. Priestley, Dr. Brown, and others, for his criticism upon Locke, 
that he held ideas as media between the external world and the per- 
ceiving mind. Sir W. Hamilton decides in favour of Dr. Reid, and 
severely handles the opponents of Reid. See Hamilton's " Dis- 
cussions," p. 77, &c. ; "Lectures," vol. ii., p. 53, &c. ; Dr. Brown's 
" Lectures," p. 170, &c.; " Dr. Reid," by Hamilton, p. 256, &c. 

From the want of greater preciscncss and unity in diction, and his 
extensive, familiar, and lively pictorial figures, there is a diliiculty to 
get at the real view of Locke on this controversial point. Yet, any 
one in studying the works of Locke unprejudiced, without the know- 
ledge of the comments and criticism of his admirers and deprecators, 
will arrive like myself at the conclusion, that he holds ideas as repre- 
sentations to the mind, of external objects. The mind, according to 
him, perceives ideas ; the external meets the mind iu its ideas ; ideas 
are the place of meeting and imity between the mind and all its per- 
ceiving objects. " To ask, at what time a man has first any ideas ? " 
says Locke, "is to ask when he begins to perceive? having ideas, 
and perceptions, being the same thing. 1 know it is an opinion that 
the soul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas 
in itself constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is 
as inseparable from the soul, as actual extension is from the body ; 
which, if true, to inquire after the beginning of man's ideas is the 
same, ns to incpiire after tiie beginning of his soul. For, by this 
account, soul and its iJi as, as body and its extension, will begin to 



Berkeley's philosophy. G9 

refined to come immediately into contact with 
matter. According to this theory of representa- 
tion, the material reality was something beyond 
the thing perceived ; and so, nothing but a matter 
of inference. This view throws the material 
reality, from the ground of absolute certainty, to 
the ground of logical probability. On this ground 
material and external substance cannot be proved, 
directly by the fact and veracity of consciousness ; 
for the simple reason, that the mind is not con- 
scious of anything directly but the ego, and the 
representation made to it. It would be a hard 
matter, on this ground, to prove external reality. 
But the common -sense philosophy of Scotland 
has delivered the fact of consciousness in this 

exist both at tlie same time." — Human Understanding, Tegg's Edi- 
tion, sect. 9, p. 53. la another place he says : — " Fire may bui'n 
our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet, unless the mo- 
tion be continued to the brain ; and then the sense of heat, or idea 
of pain, be produced in the mind, wherein consists actual perception." 
— Ibid., sect, iii., p. 81. 

I shall quote once more: — "Idea is the object of thinking. 
Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which 
his mind is applied about whilst thinking, being the ideas that are 
there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas, 
such as are tliose expressed by the words, whiteness, hardness, sweet- 
ness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and 
others : it is in the first place then to be inquired, how he conies by 
them ? " — Ibid., sect, i., p. 50. 

These quotations might be easily increased to a great extent; from 
these and others it appears, that Locke considered a knowledge of 
external objects possible through the medium of ideas. 



70 PART II. 

respect. This philosophy of rcpresentationisrn 
was the iijnis fat mis that first misled, and at last 
confirmed, Berkeley in his ideal materialism. 
Idealism is a direct and natural conclusion of the 
representation philosophy. 

SECTION XXXV. 

The wonder is not that any have fallen into 
idealism, but that any who have believed in this 
tertium quid, have been preserved from it. If it 
were not that the iutviitive conviction of men is 
stronger than the teaching and tendency of this 
theory and its deductions, all would have landed 
in idealism that believed the representative philo- 
sophy. It required only a simple conclusion, and a 
bold spirit to have made it, and this representation 
would land in idealism. This step Berkeley was 
bold enough to make. Reality is converted into 
representation ; he is conscious of this, and of 
nothing beyond this. If all this were true, the 
simple conclusion would be, so far as conscious- 
ness goes, nothing but a mere representation 
exists. This Berkeley called ideas; and he main- 
tained he was conscious of this, and nothing more. 
This conclusion was natural and right, but his 
premiss was a wrong assumption. His radical 
error was that the mind ])erccives mediately, and 



beukeley's philosophy. 71 

not immediately. If lie could have established the 
tertium quid of the representation made to the 
mind, then, so far as consciousness goes, his ground 
would have been invulnerable. But this he never 
could ; in fact he never tried, for the reason, it 
could not be done. Indeed, Berkeley appears as 
if the thought never struck him, that the mind 
was capable of conversing with the external reality 
without a medium. 



SECTION XXXVI. 

This is the only ground upon which dualism 
and idealism must fight out their quarrel about 
the reality or non-reality of an external world. 
The victory must be gained here. If the mind 
perceives immediately external reality, then we are 
conscious of it, consequently must believe that 
materiality exists. Once this is allowed, the exter- 
nal world cannot be denied more than the fact of 
consciousness. On the other hand, if the miiid 
perceives, through images or representations, the 
material world cannot be proved from conscious- 
ness to exist, it is thrown to the ground of infe- 
rential conclusion. Berkeley thought he answered 
this triumphantly when he said, " An idea can be 
like nothing but an idea.^^ This is to say, — blue 
cannot be green, red cannot be scarlet, white can- 



t'i PART II. 

not be blacky round cannot be square, small cannot 
be large, extension caunot be like solidity, moun- 
tains cannot be like rivers, trees are not like 
flowers, horses are not like cattle and sheep. In 
this every tyro will agree with the philosopher. 
The idea of an effect is like nothing but 
effect. Is there no likeness of the cause in the 
effect ? Is the idea not like its archetype ? Is 
the idea self-created ? Is there no preceding 
cause to it, and that according to the representa- 
tionists themselves ? For aught this contains, it 
is an argument on the side of the reality of matter, 
and the immediate perception of it by the mind, 
as much as it serves the idealist. J\Iy hand which 
I hold before my eyes is like nothing but my 
hand ; the book upon the table before me is like 
nothing but a book. These objects, I am con- 
scious, are external to the perceiving being, and 
at the same time am not conscious of any mediate 
representation between me and the non ego. The 
mind sees things as they are immediately, and, in 
appearance and reality, they are not like other 
things. It would be impossible to persuade and 
convince the consciousness of men contrary to the 
way things are perceived ; for man is not conscious 
of any teriium quid that might deceive him. No 
power could persuade the mind that red is blue, or 
a flower is a stone ; and the same with all other 



Berkeley's philosophy. 73 

objects, because the mind is infallibly confident 
and conscious of the immediate objects of its 
perception. 

SECTION XXXVII. 

We think, therefore, that the ground of con- 
sciousness not only fails Berkeley, but, so far as 
its evidence can be canvassed, is completely against 
his position. Any one can test it if he will but 
fall back upon his own consciousness, and examine 
its simple and decided testimony. I have a stone 
in my hand ; I am conscious that this stone is cold, 
round, of certain weight, and of a brownish colour. 
Some of these deductions are facts of intuitive con- 
sciousness relative to this stone. As to its mineral 
qualities, they are as yet, perhaps, not determined 
to my understanding, consequently my belief is 
suspended relative to them ; therefore they are not 
within the reach of the fact of consciousness. 
Now, am I conscious of any representation made 
to my mind of this stone? is it by something be- 
tween it and my mind I know it? is it an image 
of a stone, or is it the stone itself, my mind per- 
ceives ? My own consciousness informs me that 
I perceive the stone immediately, and nothing 
else. Another question rises, — Is it possible for my 
consciousness to inform me of other qualities be- 
longing to this stone besides those I actually per- 



74 PART II. 

ceive, and so deceive me in the matter? Is it 
possible for me to be conscious of a square whilst I 
perceive a round object? and so with all the rest. 
If this were possible, it would make the testimony 
of consciousness a medley of contradictions. This 
would be the same as to be conscious and not to 
be conscious at the same time, relative to the same 
thing; the same as to be and not to be, which 
would be self-destructive : consciousness, there- 
fore, informs me of the immediate percei^dng of 
the object, and indubitably testifies of the thing 
as it is perceived. 

SECTION XXXVIII. 

The editor of the present edition of Berkeley's 
^Yorks says, in his prefatory remarks, " It will not, 
however, be misplaced to observe that Dr. Rcid, 
the only adversary who has assailed ' The Prin- 
ciples of Human Knowledge' with any degree of 
plausibility, has not gone deep enough in the 
investigation. He imagined that when he should 
have overthrown the philosophic scheme of ideas, 
Berkeley's theory would necessarily become in- 
volved in the general ruin. But Berkeley's theory 
does not depend on the truth or falsehood of that 
ancient hypothesis, but ou this fact, that ' there is 
no necessaiy connexion in reason and language 



Berkeley's philosophy. 75 

between our perceptions and the existence of ex- 
ternal objects, since we know it not unfrequently 
happens that objects appear to be present to the 
senses when disordered, altliough we know they 
are not present.' Reid has not refuted Berkeley," 
continues the editor, "not even struck at the 
leading root of his system. No other antagonist 
has assailed his doctrines with equal ability or 
success. Berkeley, therefore, remains unanswered." 

SECTION XXXIX. 

We think that there is an absolute relation 
between external objects and perception. As for 
things appearing to disordered senses, this is beg- 
ging the question. The things which so appear to 
the imagination of such persons are faint recollec- 
tions or deductions from something in the memory 
or in their former knowledge. It is possible to 
imagine of things that have no real existence ; but 
even that has a reference to something in exist- 
ence Avhich we saw, heard of, or are familiar with 
in some way or other. All our imaginations are 
relative, not to the mind only, but to something 
without it. All dreams, spectres, and imagina- 
tions are nothing but modifications or reproduc- 
tions in a meaner or in a nobler form of the 
things which have been made known unto us, 



76 PART II. 

either tlirougli our senses^ reflections^ or revela- 
tion. According to tins hypothesis the mind could 
perceive things as they are, if they never existed, 
nor were heard of, nor made known in any way. So 
the objects themselves are of no use ; equally useless 
are the senses, for one is made for the other. Thus 
it is possible to perceive in cold that wc get warm 
without fire, quench our thirst without liquid, 
satisfy our hunger without bread, clothe our naked- 
ness without garments : our common experience, 
and that of all men, show most incontestably the 
utter impossibility of perceiving things without 
their existence. 

SECTION XL. 

We have shown that the mind perceives material 
objects immediately and not mediately. This view 
of the case is an absolute destruction to the ideal- 
ism of Berkeley. If Dr. Keid lost it anywhere, it 
was here. His attack upon the hypothesis of ideas 
was the opening of the gate to this route and con- 
clusion. He should have established his battery 
of attack firmly on this ground, that the mind per- 
ceives thiugs immediately. This ground shuts 
idealism up ; it is left without power and argu- 
ment. The preceding quotations of the editor and 
Berkeley assume the ground, that the mind per- 
ceives things mediately : destroy this assumption — 



BERKELEY S PHILOSOPHY. 77 

they are left groundless ; or it must be shown tliat 
our position is wrong, which cannot be done upon 
the ground of consciousness ; and this is the only 
direct witness in the matter. 



SECTION XLI. 

If external objects are not necessary to the per- 
ception of thera^ how are ideas produced ? what 
produces them ? If ideas are representations^ the 
real things must exist. Thus reasoned the repre- 
sentationists and dualists. But Berkeley says 
these representations are the real things them- 
selves. If it will be answered, " The mind pro- 
duces or creates them," we are none the more 
enlightened. The mind cannot create ideas out of 
nothing. The mind creates nothing; it only 
perceives things as they are, and moulds them into 
classification and order. This appears to us as 
effect without a cause— a something without any- 
thing. The mind, according to this, creates and 
destroys all, and that without any real elements 
without itself. There is a phenomenon to the 
sense, but it is nothing but an idea perceived by 
the miud."^ 

* We are roLbcd of the material universe witliout a compensation. 
Our faith is disturbed without another element of satisfactioa. We 
are unsettled without a reason and a promise. It is hard to choose 
between this hypothesis and that of Pere ilalebrancbe. The hypo- 



78 PART II. 



SECTION XLir. 

This idealism is only a natural and maturer 
development of other systems which preceded it. 
Berkeley made only one step of advance- 
ment. Everything has its natural tendency, and 
reaches its ultimatum sooner or later. Berkeley 

thesis of Malebranche holds that we see all in Rod. It is called the 
philosophy of occasional causes. Both Berkeley and ilalebranche 
treat the testimony of the senses as false : the two declare the expe- 
rience and testimony of mankind as false : the two end in the same 
conclusion, namely, the denial of the material world; both arc sup- 
ported by pious motives, and expected their systems to result greatly 
to the advantage of religion. The authors had much in common, as 
to their superior religious character and motives. Their philoso- 
phical character, cleverness, and style, have a likeness. The chief 
difTcrences in their hypotheses are more of accideuts and circum- 
stances, than real and fundamental. Most likely, if ilalebranche 
were a Protestant, his idealism would be that of Berkeley ; and if 
Berkeley were a Catholic, his .=ystem would be like that of Male- 
branche. The system of Malebranche needed but to be purged of its 
Catholic external excrescences, to become an absolute idealism ; and 
almost all the reasons for such a system are found in his " Inquiry 
after Truth." "Whether B( rkeley availed himself of this system and 
the reasons used by Malebranche in its support, or not, this is cer- 
tain, — he had everything for his idealism made ready to his hand. 
The conversation which they had before Malebranche's death, makes it 
probable that Berkeley was indebted to him for his system. The 
system of Malebranche, in its peculiar features, was a triumph of 
Catliolic dogma to philosophy, in accounting how disembodied saints can 
beacquaiiited with luuiian invocation, and the affairs of earth generally. 
They 'perceivr, they say, all thinr/s in God ; and Malebranche trans- 
ferred this Catholic theology, relative to saints in heaven, to men in 
the ilesh on earth ; and Berkeley stripped it of its Catholic features, 
and gave it a Protestant colour, and thus gained for himself the 
fame of being the author of a profound original system. 



I 



BERKELEY S PIIirOSOPIIY. 79 

accepted certain premises, and drew certain natural 
conclusions from them ; and he was landed on the 
quicksands of idealism. The first thing he accepted 
was, that ideas were representations of things. 
On this ground one of these conclusions was left 
hira^ — either there are three kinds of real entities, 
the mind, ideas, and external objects ; or the mind 
perceives things immediately, or all external phe- 
nomena are ideas. He chose the last. He made 
all things ideas; these are the absolute objects of 
perception ; and after persuading himself of this, 
it was easy to throw himself back upon the ground 
of consciousness for a kind of defence and shelter. 
We have shown that this was a delusive premiss. 
The second thing he accepted was the primary and 
secondary qualities, and that the secondary quali- 
ties of things are sensibilities in the mind rather 
than real qualities in the objects themselves. This 
he accepted from the hand of Locke, though he was 
not the first to advance this creed."^ When once 

* " These I call original or primary qualities of body," says Locke ; 
"which, I think, we may observe to produce simple ideas in us; 
namely, solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number." 
Speaking again of secondary qualities, — " Secondly, such qualities, 
which, in truth, are nothing in the objects themselves, bat powers to 
produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i. e., by 
the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of Iheir ihsensible parts, as 
colours, sounds, tastes, &c., — these I call secondary qualities." — 
"Human Understanding," book ii., eliap. viii., p. 7o. The classifi- 
cation was in Descartes' philosophy and others before Locke; but the 
nomenclature into primary and secondary qualities belongs to Locke. 



80 PART II. 

he believed that colour, heat, and other seeondary 
qualities, were nothing but sensations in the mind ; 
it was only a small step further to conelude that 
the primary qualities were only sensations too. 
This was a direct natural and easy deduction. 
Upon these two pillars Berkeley built his hypo- 
thesis of idealism. If the foundation were right, 
there would be a chance for the upper structure. 
He should have examined the premises well before 
drawing his conclusions, and not accepted them as 
safe postulata. 

SECTION XLIII. 

Berkeley considered the theory of abstraction 
detrimental to his hypothesis of idealism ; so he 
directed all his energy against it. Locke main- 
tained that abstraction was the chief difl'erence 
between man and the inferior brute creation ; also, 
to this source he attributed general ideas, and most 
of our present knowledge. Hume took up the 
side of Berkeley, and applauded him highly, and 
made good use of this theory to support his uni- 
versal scepticism. We think that the doctrine of 
abstraction has been overstated, as to its import- 
ance and utility, by both the dualists and the 
idealists. Our limits will not allow us to state 
our analysis and view of this theory of abstraction ; 
and this we think the less needful, 1. Because wc 



Berkeley's philosophy. 81 

cannot see that it determines the existence or non- 
existence of matter at all. If Berkeley could have 
established his position, he would have been none 
the neai'er to prove the non-existence of matter. 
If he could not abstract motion from a bodj^ mov- 
ing, — a square body from a round one, — this was 
no reason that matter did not possess an independ- 
ent reality, and these qualities inhered in it. 2. 
Berkeley confesses himself almost all that is want- 
ing to establish the doctrine of abstraction. He 
brings all his powers to bear against the doctrine, 
and yet it appears to us that he abstracted himself 
all along. " I own myself able to abstract in one 
sense," says he, " as when I consider some par- 
ticular parts or qualities separated from others, 
with which, though they are united in some 
object, yet it is possible they may really exist 
Aviihout them.'^ We shall give in his own words 
an instance more : "And here it must be acknow- 
ledged that a man may consider a figure merely as 
triangular, without attending to the particular 
qualicies of the angles, or relations of the sides. 
So far he may abstract ; but this wiil never [)rove 
that he can frame an abstract general inconsistent 
idea of a triangle.'" If any one will take the 
trouble to analyse the quotations just made, it will 
be seen that Berkeley has granted the possibility 
of abstraction. (Yol. i., pp. 77, 81.) 

G 



82 PART ir. 

SECTION XLW. 

Berkeley, like other kind, indulgent parents, 
loved and thought highly of this child of idealism, 
which he had begotten. He thought that it was 
a kind of universal panacea to purify philosophy 
and theology from all possible error and unbelief. 
It would put an end to Deism, Atheism, Material- 
ism, and finally settle the immortality of the soul, 
and put an end to all doubtful theories about 
matter for ever, for it is taken out of the Avay.^ 
So near a relation as a parent is not always the 
best and most impartial judge relative to his own 
child. Sometimes, also, a parent is much disap- 
pointed in the future history and results of his 
own darling child. We think that something like 
this was the condition of Berkeley. After so much 
promise and anticipation, he was much disap- 
pointed that his philosophy was so much neglected 
and despised, and brought so little of that fruit 
which he so abundantly promised to himself and 
his disciples. 

SECTION XLV. 

Yet, Berkeley was a great genius, and a no ble 
character. He has made an impression of his 

* " "What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous 
iri([uiry, seemed to me evidently true, and not unuseful to be known, 
j)articularly to those who are tainted with scepticism, or want a 
demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the 
natural innuurL.ility of the soul." — Prclace to the "Principles of 
Ifumun Kuowledge." 



Berkeley's philosophy. 83 

name, in the uuiversal field of pliilosophy, tlirougli- 
out tlie world of enlightened letters. Since his 
system made its appearance, he has been thought 
of, spoken of, written of; and, in his turn, praised, 
scolded, and puzzled many a smatterer in mental 
science. Such a character must have been, in 
power and genius, above the ordinary class of 
his fellows. But even tliis is no argument for the 
truth of his theory. Truth and genius are not 
always synonymous things : they are not conver- 
tible terms. Many wrong theories often have 
much genius and greatness, as to their authors 
aud defenders; and truth may frequently have 
only feeble and dull advocates. This is not the 
ground for testing either truth or falsehood. This 
ideal philo .' phy has failed to establish its claims 
on our credence for any good results for mankind : 
a desideratum so much wished and wanted. It 
has failed, not for Avant of genius and power in the 
propounder of it, but from its own radical incon- 
gruity with the fundamental laws of man's nature. 
The mass of human beings who follow the intuitive 
and primordial laws of their nature, will for ever 
refuse allegiance to this ideal philosophy. Its 
chief place will be on the shelves, and in the select 
society of philosophers. It will be used by the 
clever and the sceptic, more to puzzle and confuse, 
than to convince and edify. 
G 2 



84 PART II. 



SECTION' XLVl. 

Berkeley anticipated and answered many of tlie 
most common objections which would be made to 
his system. Most of these answers are not equal 
to his other departments in thought, power, or 
genius. ]Most of them are meagre and unsatis- 
factory. We think also, that to test any contro- 
versial thing in a conversational way, as he did in 
his " Ilylas and Philonous,^' is not the best and 
fairest way. In this mode there are several ad- 
vantages, v.liich are generally greatly abused. It 
puts the opponent in a very insignificant light ; 
whilst the writer himself is in a v.-rcng position, 
for he himself is the opponent. — It is radically a 
false representation. The author puts the objections 
of his antagonist in the form he pleases, in order to 
shoot him dead, and then smile at his own clever- 
ness : no one can play the two sides fairly. Every 
one should establish his own views as well as he 
can, but should leave the test of tliem to others ; 
and not make their bullets and direct their hands to 
shoot as they please. We think that Berkeley was 
as fair and candid as anybody would be; but we 
cannot think the mode unobjectionable. This is 
a Platonic and Ciceronian mode, and Berkeley 
excelled much in it. This mode of treatment is so 



BERKELEY S PHILOSOPHY. 85 

susceptible of abuse, that it is a difficult matter to 
avoid it, and hardly any body who adopts that 
style runs clear of it. 

SECTION XLVII. 

Now,"we must say a few words categorically upon 
those points, in our view, in which Berkeley's sys- 
tem fails. We have shown that it is a development 
of an antecedent philosophy. It is not independent 
and complete in itself; it is a part of another 
philosophy, which preceded it. It is a natural 
conclusion, from premises which he accepted from 
the hands of others. We view this system as too 
short to solve the problem of human nature ; it 
goes too far in other directions, — in its attack upon 
innocent matter ; so it is not true and suitable in 
either. 

I. It fails to account for the correspondence 
with, and application of, the powers of the human 
mind. There is an exact correspondence between 
the objective and the subjective throughout the 
universe. Both are the workmanship of infi- 
nite and infallible Wisdom ; and all in the work of 
infinite Wisdom are equal. The one is made for 
the other. The philosophy that does not corre- 
spond with this, cannot be true and faithful. This 
is the chief end of all philosophy. JMatter itself is 
not the ultimate point, — it is the human mind. 



8G PART II. 

The material world is a pheuomeuoii to test, de- 
velope, and explain tlie problems of the human 
raind. We consider this ideal system of Berke- 
ley to have failed completely on this ground. In- 
stead of giving full play to the human mind, it 
contracts it ; instead of extricating from diffi- 
culties, it creates more ; instead of clearing and 
simplifying the problems of the mind, it mystifies 
the whole. 

SECTION XLVIII. 

II. It is contrary to the general conviction of 
mankind. Human depravity has nothing to do 
with the question. It is a question of sense and 
consciousness. It is within the jurisdiction of all 
men ; yet, the common verdict is against Berkeley. 
It cannot be that falsehood is the root of our na- 
ture. It cannot be that our senses and conscious- 
ness are unfit to judge in matters of common and 
direct cognition ; it cannot be that our Creator has 
a design to deceive us, by playing some mysterious 
sleight-of-hand with us. There must be some 
primordial principles of truth in the nature of man 
somewhere. The Author of our nature has not 
left us without some criteria of truth. It matters 
not whether this is called " intuition," " natural 
reason," " common sense," or " pure reason," — 
this does exist. Sir William Hamilton, with his 



Berkeley's philosophy. 87 

usual learning and penetration, has shown, in one 
hundred and six examples from every age and 
country, that all acknowledge this principle of 
common sense, and ultimately fall back upon it for 
proof and refuge. Such is the case now in Ger- 
many ; after a wide and long tossing by the 
billows of speculation, they return to this rock, — 
the primordial conviction of humanity. These 
principles must not be violated ; they must be the 
basis of all true philosophy. No philosophy which 
violates these things at its very base can be ac- 
cepted, without falsifying this general condition. 
And this, we believe, is another of the deficiencies 
of Berkeley's philosophy. 

SECTION XLIX. 

III. Berkeley's philosophy is sceptical in its 
tendency. It begins on the ground of discredit- 
ing the testimony of sense, mankind, and con- 
sciousness. Hume, with his usual subtlety and 
aptness, took hold on this hypothesis, and made 
good use of it to support his consummate system 
of scepticism, and wound his antagonists. If con- 
sciousness is discredited on one side, what reason 
have we for trusting it on the other? Men must 
be as conscious of material substance without 
themselves, as they are of the thinking being in 



88 PART II. 

themselves. If one is believed, the other must he 
accepted too ; if one is rejected, the other is discre- 
dited. If a man could be persuaded that objects 
of sense are not external and real, as they appear 
to be, he might believe that his body is not what 
he is conscious of it to be what it is ; and when 
once a man reaches this ground, he discredits con- 
sciousness, and will ultimately refuse its testimony 
altogether. This would be universal scepticism. 
Men generally think they have clearer evidences 
of the reality of things material and external, than 
of things mental and spiritual ; and, if they were 
persuaded to discredit the reality of these, would 
they believe the reality of any thing that would be 
to them less clear "^ If they believed that fields, 
trees, rivers, and all beasts, clouds, stars, though 
apparently so many real objects, yet are nothing 
but ideas in the mind ; tliey would easily believe 
that the first cause, and themselves, are ideas too. 
In this, Berkeley sacrificed certainty, to establish 
an uncertain hypothesis. There was but a small 
step from the primary and secondary qualities of 
Locke to idealism : this idealism has the same rela- 
tion to universal scepticism. It is only a step 
further to discredit the whole evidence of consci- 
ousness, and that very easily made. It will be 
seen that this idealism is responsible for opening 
the door to much scepticism. 



Berkeley's philosophy. 89 



SECTION L. 



IV. Auotlier deficiency in this ideal pliilosophy 
is, it fails to correspond with the evidence of con- 
sciousness. 'This philosophy does not rightly can- 
vass the natural and the simple testimony of 
consciousness. It is violated, and made to utter 
a language that is not natural. Whilst the lan- 
guage of my natural consciousness would assure 
nie that the tiling I feel and see is tangible, mate- 
rial, and outside me ; this idealism says. No, they 
are nothing but ideas perceived by the mind, and 
you are conscious of nothing but of ideas. The 
natural consciousness of man, in the first place, 
does not say they are ideas ; the philosopher must 
come forward with his theory of idealism, to 
change things into ideas, before consciousness 
recognises them as ideas : so the evidence of con- 
sciousness is bribed or deceived into the matter. 
It is not the unadulterated language of conscious- 
ness : the ground of consciousness is the same ; 
but the objects are converted from real things into 
ideal things. It is a deception, and a violation of 
consciousness. In this, it violates the first trutli 
in philosophy ; for if the fact and evidence of con- 
sciousness are violated, there remaineth no longer 
a test and a foundation for philosophy. 



90 PAllT II. 

SECTION LI. 

V. It violates universal language, both natural 
and conventional. According to this philosophy, 
the words matter, external substance, body, tan- 
gible, and many similar terms, which are found in 
every language known, must be expunged. Terms 
for matter and mind are found in every language, 
and more for the first than for the last. These 
are not mere conventional words, but most of 
them natural. It shows that the belief in matter 
is as natural as it is universal. Idealism obliter- 
ates all these words ; it has no meaning for them ; 
it cannot receive them to her vocabulary ; they 
are in her way. It comes in collision, also, with 
the terms and facts of the Scriptures. The fact 
of creation, the deluge, the fire of the plains, and 
the conversion of Lot's wife into a pillar of salt, — 
creation of ideas, — deluge of ideas, — ideal burning 
of Sodom and Gomorrah, — and ideal pillar of salt. 
Harmless things enough ! The miraculous gene- 
ration of Christ^s human nature, and His body, 
were ideas in the mind. This is the ground, the 
Bishop thought, of annihilating Socinianism. We 
think it would be also a mortal blow to Christian- 
ity. Gnosticism itself would be grateful for this 
idealism.* If this philosophy could be proved to 

* Gnosticism was that system of pliilosopliy taught by the Gnostics ; 
yvoxTTiKos, from yivuiaKw, " to know." The Gnostics were a sect of 



Berkeley's philosophy. 91 

be true, it would be a good argument against 
Transubstantiation. Does it not equally deny us 
the fact and possibility of the resurrection of the 
material body? If body is matter, and matter a 
mere idea in the mind, a resurrection is impossible 
in the sense in which it is scripturally understood. 
There is nothing left but ideas; it cannot be a 
resurrection of ideas. Such, very briefly, is our 
examination of the result of this idealism. 

philosophers which arose a short time before the Christian era, and 
in the first ages of Cliristianity accepted some of the truths of Chris- 
tianity, explained them by the spirit and light of their philosophy, 
and made them subservient to the support and aid of their system. 
Their system of theology was agreeable to the Pythagorean and the 
Platonic philosophy, to which they accommodated very much the 
interpretation of Scripture. They held that all nature, intelligible, in- 
tellectual, and material, is derived by successive emanations from 
the infinite fountain of Deity. These emanations they called seons, 
auDves. Tliey held matter to be intrinsically evil, of which the 
Supreme God could not be the Author. Hence arose their funda- 
mental tenet, that the Creator of the world, or the Demiurgus, was 
not the same with the Supreme God, the Soiu'cc and Author of all 
good, and the Father of Clirist. It was a kind of an eclectic system 
of absolute mystery, whose purpose and aim was to purify mankind 
from the corruption and death of the evil of matter. 



92 



PAET III. 

METAPHYSICS. 

CHAPTER I. 

MISTAKF,N VIEWS CONCERNING METAPHYSICS. 

Different minds view the same things widely 
at variance from one another. They stand on 
different stand-points of spectation, they view 
things through different mediums, they bring with 
them different sympathies, predilections, motives, 
and desires : — with all these things, it would be a 
marvel if all thought the same. The different 
states and relations of the mind to the objects pre- 
sented to it, change their colour, form, and value. 
Thus, often the true is made false, and the false 
true, in human opinion and practice ; the inferior 
is put in the place of the superior, and the supe- 
rior reduced to the worthless and the mean. 

The common fortune of other objects of thought, 
is that of metaphysics; only, perhaps it is judged 
more hardly and unfairly than most things. JNIeta- 
physics are further from the common thoughts 
of men, than most objects of thought ; hence, men 
judge of them in ignorance, which, upon the 



METAPHYSICS. 93 

â– whole, is falsCj and can never be fair, safe, and 
virtuous. To judge of things ignorantly, is unsafe 
and beraeaning to the judge himself, and wrong 
and capricious relative to the object of judgment. 
And yet this is the case whh. those who judge and 
condemn metaphysics general I3' ; they speak in 
the dark, they have never made them their study ; 
they follow the common custom, or some acquired 
and superficial feelings and views in their minds. 
The student of metaphysics, the more he studies 
them, the more interested he becomes in them ; 
and scarcely, if ever, is there found am.oug her 
disciples a recre^int. The science has a bewitch- 
ing tendency; it draws to itself, it strengtliens 
and aspires the soul of her disciples to follow after 
her deep and lofty objects, with increasing avidity 
and pleasure. Hence, in most cases, it is the 
stranger, the superficial, and the would-be-infalli- 
ble, that speak disparagingly of her; and not her 
disciple, the profound and the earnest inquirer. 

Metaphysics are misconceived and judged of 
wrongly and harshly, by certain classes and tem- 
peraments of mind. It is easj- to tell, from the 
common pursuit, sympathies, and associations of 
men, whether they are favourable or unfavourable 
to metaphysics. It is too broad and liberal in its 
inquiries for the narrow and illiberal; it is too 
profound in its spirit and problems for the light 



94 PART III. 

and superficial ; it is too careful in its analysis, 
and uncertain in its conclusions, for the matter-of- 
fact men ; it is too free, catholic, and antagonistic 
to simple human opinion, for the narrow dog- 
matist ; it is too elastic and universal in its 
reasonings and aims, for the stiff and the formal. 
A science that refuses to be governed and tested 
by common opinion, and opposes the common 
views and feelings of mankind, will be always mis- 
judged and opposed. 

For obvious reasons, the science of metaphysics 
will always be misrepresented by different tastes 
and classes of mind. Some will affect to despise 
it, because they have no courage and perseverance 
to understand it, or no powers and means to do 
so. Others misunderstand and misinterpret it, 
because their habits of thought, and sympathies, 
are in different directions ; hence, they have con- 
tracted a deep antipathy to its teaching, and even 
to its high aim and object matter. The spiritual- 
ity of its sympathies and objects, makes it unpala- 
table to the materialist ; because its results are in 
the spiritual and the mental, it is misunderstood 
and condemned by the physicist and the worldling 
as useless, and considered even pretentious and 
dangerous. It demands the greatest efforts and 
perseverance of the human mind, and the super- 
ficial and those who expect to have all in the old 



METAPHYSICS. 95 

and easy common-beaten path, dislike it and turn 
aside from it. So varied and different are the 
reasons and feelings against metaphysics, that it is 
not easy to find and mention them all. There are 
many who object to and oppose metaphysics, yet 
never put their opposition in tangible forms, be- 
cause the real cause of it is beyond their under- 
standing ; and the reason is as much a matter of 
indifference to them, as it is beyond their concep- 
tion. It is not unfrequently the case, many think, 
that by opposing a superior thing, they become 
clever and great ; and that, however ignorant the 
opposition, and blind the cause. Whilst it is easy 
to find faults and oppose, it is not always so easy 
to find reasons to justify an opposition, and defend 
the same before the bar of truth, and enlightened 
witnesses. 

Even misconception and wrong accusation have 
the effect of leading to a higher court of justice, and 
more tested examination ; and often the wrongly- 
condemned comes out brighter and more 
attractive. As gold comes out of every furnace of 
test brighter, so truth comes out of every court 
of impartial justice with advantage and triumph. 
This is a kind of balance compensation, for the 
treatment which truth and right have frequently 
at the hands of men in this v.orld. The true car- 
ries an incomparable advantage over the false in 



96 PART III. 

the superiority of its natux'e ; find the Divine order 
» is such, that it always sides with and defends the 
true, that it has always a fair chance, even in a 
world of wrong, to get the true verdict, and prove 
victorious, if rightly presented and defended. 

The study of metaphysics is viewed by some as 
labour lost, because it cannot count upon any real 
results. Perhaps nothing is less understood, than 
the relation between causes and results ; and about 
which so much of ignorant talk and cant is heard, 
and especially relative to metaphysics and religion. 
Nothing is more common than the misapprehen- 
sion of the character and degree of results. Many 
expect to have difierent results from the character 
of the causes, and different in degree from the 
forces or powers which cause them. 

It is an universal lav/, running through the 
whole constitution of the universe, that results 
bear au exact proportion in quality and degree to 
the causes which produce them. It is a contradic- 
tion to the universal order of nature, to say that 
things have no results : and if metaphysics bore 
no results, they would be an anomaly in the uni- 
verse. Metaphysics, in common with other things, 
bear results, and that in proportion with the power 
they exert, and the same in quality with their 
nature. 

Nothing is less understood by the mass of 



METAPHYSICS. 97 

uninetapliysical minds, than the results of meta- 
physics. The mechanist, the artist, and the 
labourer in the field of science, have the pleasure 
of beholding the results of their toil, presented to 
their outward senses. But he who labours in the 
field of mind must labour on by faith, encouraged 
by the importance and superiority of his work, 
and confiding in the faithfulness and immutable- 
ness of law and order. And he is as sure of 
results as those who labour on the other side of 
the field, and far superior in need and importance. 
The results of metaphysics are subtle and deep 
in their platform and influence ; they are slow and 
unobtrusive in their appearance. The results are 
felt on the minds of those who become true 
students, rnd, through them, on society in its 
ramified forms and features. The results are 
various and important, which might be shown at 
a far greater length than I can do here. INIeta- 
physics impart vigour to the mind, superior to any 
other educational influence; they give point and 
acuteness peculiar to themselves ; they revive the 
sympathies, by raising them from the material to 
the mental, and lead them from the sensational 
to the spiritual. They liberalize the thoughts and 
views, by raising the sympathies of the soul above 
the limited to the illimitable; and open infinite 
resources before the mind in every direction. 

H 



98 PART III. 

There is not a department in the economy of 
knoTileclge but what is under obligation to meta- 
physics. Ethics, politics, painting, poetry, sculp- 
tiu'e, and theology, are under peculiar obligation 
to mental science ,• and no one can be a master in 
these without being educated in the school of 
metaphysics. If those who affect to despise and 
cry down metaphysics, were required to point out 
theologians or politicians who greatly excelled, 
who were not brought up under their dialectics, 
they would find it a hard task to fill their list with 
illustrious names. Often the metaphysical sways 
much power, when denied in word, and frowned at 
in external expression. Its fruits are seen often 
when no confessions are made ; and its results 
are palpable where condemned and prohibited. 

Metaphysics are viewed by many as made up of 
useless theories, and inimical to the practical in 
life. It is difficult to know the precise meaning 
of the word " practical,^' as used in the common 
parley of the present generation. It is a favourite 
word with orators in the pulpit, on the platform, 
and on the rostrum ; with commercial men in all 
transactions of business; with utilitarians in all 
their talk of useful doings, and beneficial results ; 
and with all pursuers of material science in all the 
ramification of their walks, and boasted emptiness 
of their advancement and discoveries. It is one 



METAPHYSICS. 99 

of those unfortunate vrords wliicb almost every- 
body uses ; and on that account is in danger of 
being despised by the thoughtful, and in the long 
run worn out by its too frequent use, even with 
those who carry on with it such an extensive 
business. It is one of those delusive words which 
everybody who uses it thinks he understands the 
meaning of; yet, when it comes to the test, it is 
seen that with those who use it most frequently it 
has no meaning beyond a vague delusive fancy. 
It is a cant word, carrying with it to the minds of 
those who use it an infallible evidence, of the 
wrong of the thing which is supposed to be 
impracticable, and the absolute right of the thing 
which is thought to be practicable. Its meaning 
is never examined ; its truth is never suspected. 
It is an old favourite word, and taken for granted 
to be understood, and infallible in its truth and 
test. 

The term practical is almost always partial and 
one-sided in meaning and application. The thing 
that is practicable to the one, is impracticable to 
the other. Walking, running, climbing, leaping, 
swimming, are practicable to many, but not to all. 
Speaking, reading, ciphering, writing, painting, 
are easy things with a large portion of mankind, 
but there are many who know nothing about them. 
To make poetry is practicable to the poet, but quite 
H 2 



100 PART III. 

impracticable to the dull prose soul. The musician 
can plaVj or sing ; but to a large number both 
these exercises are impracticable. One can read 
the classics^ and delight himself in the wealth of 
the poet. One can solve difficult mathematical 
problems; to the other it is a dark mystery. The 
arts of life, science in its various developments, 
philosophy in its deep truths and lessons, are 
practical both in themselves, and to many minds, 
yet not to all. It is practicable for the rich to live 
in mansions, buy estates, enjoy the luxuries of life, 
ride in first-class carriages, and do many other 
things which the poor cannot. Are things to be 
despised, because all cannot do, possess, or enjoy 
them ? Are things wrong, or to be blamed, 
because I cannot do them? There may be a 
thousand things good and practical in themselves, 
which are not known nor appreciated by the one 
nor the many. It may often be for want of 
powers, or perseverance, they are not practicable. 
It would be a common loss and calamity to society 
if they were neglected, and allowed to go into dis- 
use. When men speak of the practical and the 
impractical, relative to superior forms of reasoning 
and knowledge, these expressions are used from mis- 
taken notions, or often as excuses for weakness, 
slothfulness, and want of taste and perseverance. 
Doubtless, there are some things not practicable 



METAPHYSICS. 101 

for all men alike : there are also things not prac- 
ticable for any human beings. The luxuries of 
life are only practicable for the affluent ; but it is 
impracticable for all alike to live without eating 
and drinking those things which are essential for 
the sustenance of life. The idiot cannot reason 
consecutively, the child cannot analyse and 
generalize extensively, whilst the strong-minded 
philosopher can do both : but to fly is equally 
impracticable for the philosopher^ as it is for the 
idiot and the child. The tall may do some things 
which the short in stature cannot ; the strong can 
accomplish many feats which are impracticable for 
the weak; the wealthy, the learned, the success- 
ful, the happy, and the true, can do things which 
the poor, the ignorant, the unsuccessful, the 
miserable, and the false, cannot do : but it is 
equally impracticable to all alike to transcend 
their powers and resources, and successfully 
oppose and destroy the laws of their being. 

If it is objected to the science of abstruse rea- 
soning, on the ground that certain grades of intellect 
cannot master and understand it; the same objec- 
tion may be raised against poetry, painting, 
sculpture, politics, and many of the arts of 
common life. What is impracticable to one, is 
quite easy to the other ; what is not possible to 
one condition, is natural to others. Every thing 



102 PART III. 

possible to one finite being, is possible to another 
finite being, though not in the same degree of 
facility and perfection, because men differ greatly 
in power, means, conditions, and perseverance. 
Everybody of intelligence, with perseverance, could 
make some kind of poetry, though only few, of the 
highest powers and other conditional qualities, can 
carry it to the greatest possible excellency. So in 
philosophy and other branches of lofty acquisition, 
all may philosophize to the degree of their powers 
and means, though only few of the first spirits can 
rise and live in the highest regions of thought as 
their natural and true element. 

There are two classes of things impracticable for 
finite beings as men. 1. Those things which are 
in themselves beyond the limits of finite capa- 
cities, which all alike cannot do or know. 2. 
Those things which in themselves are within the 
reach of human knowledge, but, for certain known 
or unknown reasons, only some can accomplish or 
know. The first of these is absolute, the other is 
conditional ; the first is impossible from the law 
and nature of things, the other from some condi- 
tions and circumstances in the relations and influ- 
•ences of human life, as it is in its accidental or 
circumstantial relations. 

Every product of intelligence must have a plan 
or a theory in thought, at least j and thought 



METAPHYSICS. 103 

expressed is a theory revealed to the notice and 
thinking of others. Hence, all thoughts in them- 
selves and first expression are kinds of theories. 

When thought is found to be possible in action, 
then it loses its theoretical class and character, 
and becomes a practical reality. Every true 
theory is practical ; it is nothing but a correct 
conception of things in plan as they are, or ought 
to be. It may indeed be that the thought as well as 
the practice is above the power of the mass : but, if 
true, practicable withal. As the thought of a thing 
is possible and true, the practice cannot be other- 
wise than possible within its legitimate laws and 
conditions. If our right thoughts were impracti- 
cable, we should always be deceived even by our 
true thoughts, which would be a contradiction. 
Our true thoughts would be the means to delude 
and mislead us : our true conceptions would lead 
us astray in conception. All true things are 
equal; and if any plan or theory in thought is 
impracticable in action, there is something wrong 
or unequal in it to the laws and conditions of 
things. Truth is consistent in all its steps ; what 
is true in action is first true in thought ; aud what 
is true in thought, is practical in action. 

To admit that there are metaphysical false 
theories, is only saying that man is liable to err in 
this field of pursuit as well as in others. There is 



104 PART III. 

no defence made of the false theories in meta- 
physics, but of the true ; and to separate the primal 
principles and ends from those of human errors 
and mistakes. The false and the fanciful in meta- 
physics are impracticable as well as everywhere else ; 
but all true in thought are practicable in action 
there as well as elsewhere. 

I defend not the fanciful theories of many 
metaphysical writers, though many of these are 
innocent and even of advantage to the human 
mind. My aim is higher and on a safer founda- 
tion : it is to defend metaphysics in their natural 
and primal purpose, and shield them from the 
charge of foolish and useless theories ; and to show 
that they accord with the law of thought, of reason, 
and of practice. Metaphysical science is not 
responsible for the wild theories of some of her 
disciples, more than many good parents are to be 
blamed for the prodigality of their children. The 
argument of abuse is no legitimate argument at 
all against right use ; but rather supposes some 
practical good use, before there could be any 
abuse. In order to judge correctly of any thing, 
its true principles and character must be judged of 
apart from the opinions and the use men make of 
it ; the same common law of judgment is claimed 
for metaphysics. 
The end and aim of metaphysics, as I under- 



METAPHYSICS. 105 

stand them, may be stated in few sentences. 
1, It is to trace things to the nature and laws of 
their final causes. 2. To inquire into the laws, 
conditions, and relations of mind. 3. To test the 
limit of the human thought. 4. The strengthen- 
ing and cultivation of the mental powers to their 
highest capability. 5. The removal of every 
human, fanciful, and prejudicial obstruction from 
the way of human advancement. 6. The restora- 
tion of thought, hence of human life, into inde- 
pendent, solid, and true condition. 7. Philosophy 
aims also at the correction of the inadvertencies of 
ordinary thinking. 8. In a word the aim is, 
truth all in all, so far as it is the possible pos- 
session of man in this world. All human 
opinions and testimonies in the high pursuit after 
truth are discarded, and viewed rather as an 
impediment, than help to find the great object. 
Nothing is to be taken for granted ; nothing to be 
refused without a sufficient reason. Every step 
in advance must be scrutinized ; every thing must 
be accompanied with a reason and a cause. The 
metaphysician, from the necessity of his high aim 
and aspiration, and the way in which these are to 
reach their objects, will be controversial ; he accepts 
truth directly at the hand of no one ; it must pass 
through the crucible of hard thought and reason- 
ing before he can accept of it. On this account, 



106 PART III. 

lie is often in danger of being considered by tlie 
superficial, the feeble polite, and all the credulous 
ones, as unpleasant, and to be avoided rather 
than courted. Yet he is the true friend of 
society ; he aims at truth more than pleasing 
others, and self-gratification ; he is severe with 
the views of others, because he is earnest in his 
pursuit, and a master over himself. 

Metaphysics are often suspected and charged of 
being adverse to religious spirit and advancement, 
in their character and results. It is as hard to 
define what many people mean by religion, as it 
is to explain their conception of metaphysics. It 
happens often that the things which are most 
common to men are worst understood, and spoken 
of most loosely and unmeaningly. Familiar and 
common things are not examined and tested so 
severely as the novel and the uncommon; their 
age and familiarity give them an easy reception 
and a willing place in the mind without doubt or 
suspicion. All take for granted they understand 
all about them ; but when it comes to a close test, 
their thoughts and expressions are alike loose, 
meaningless, and undefined. The fact of the uni- 
versality of religion, makes it necessarily, in some 
degree a loose object of thought and refiection. 
All claim its blessings, all talk about it; but will 
not, and, perhaps, cannot, think calmly and intel- 



METAPHYSICS. 107 

ligently about it, so as to give them power to 
define and express it rationally and intelligently. 
IMen generally accept of religion from the reli- 
gious tendency of their couviction^ thinking it 
either too great a task, or a needless work, or a 
presumption, to examine its claims and require- 
ments. All feel its need and reason in some way 
or other; only few accept of it on the ground 
of light, and can present it as a reasonable 
thing. 

Religion is an infinite mystery in its source, 
object, influences, processes, and blessings; which 
may be another reason why it is a thing so vague 
and undefined in the minds of men. Though pre- 
sented to human reason for test and acceptance, 
yet in all points it leads to the infinite and the 
mysterious. It is a circle which is touched in all 
points by awful mystery: but it is a mystery 
which never contradicts the true and the real 
in the finite. We test the infinite, not by 
the infinite, that we have no means and power 
of doing ; we test it by the laws and means 
of the finite ; and if we use and read these 
aright, our conclusion is always right, because the 
infinite, and the finite always agree. Men should 
be able to examine and read rightly themselves 
and their condition and relations : this is what is 
required and demanded at their hands ; this done 



108 I'ART III. 

rightly will land them safely and happily into full 
harmony with the thoughts and laws of God. 

Some view religion as a chain of infallible 
dogmas, holding its empire chiefly over passive 
human belief; others look at it as a matter of 
feeling more than belief, holding its power over 
the sentimental nature of man ; others consider it 
as a formal law governing, directing, and polish- 
ing the actions and relations of men's outward 
life. There is something true in all these views ; 
their great wrong is in their exclusiveness and the 
extreme into which they are carried. 

The dogmatist is opposed to calm inquiry and 
advancement ; the sentimentalist has an avei'sion 
to intellectual analysis and searching logic; and 
the formal is an antagonist to any elasticity and 
the least deviation from conventional custom and 
rule. Hence metaphysical science is often con- 
sidered as an enemy to religion. If the views of 
parties, conventional life and habits of men, and 
customs of times and places, are taken for religion, 
doubtless the tendencies and the results of meta- 
physics will be found to be against them. But the 
religion of truth, of harmony with right order, 
and of God, is a different, and incomparably loftier 
and happier thing, to that of parties and opinions ; 
and it is possible that metaphysics harmonize witli 
that. Men take party views, sectarian narrow- 



METAPHYSICS. 109 

ness, and conventional customs for religion ; and 
make every body and means impious and infidel 
that oppose them ; and all the while religion is 
neither opposed nor defended, but human opinions 
and groundless hypotheses. No wonder that the 
narrow, the partisan, and the sectarian cry down 
metaphysics as dangerous, because their theories 
are sandy and human in their foundation, and 
they are brought to a test, their nakedness re- 
vealed, and their principles examined, found 
wanting, and condemned. 

But what has this to do with religion? and in 
what way is the science of causes, of forces, and 
of mind, in any way prejudicial to religion, 
that is based in truth and reason? How the 
science which aims at the investigation of truth, 
and throws aside prejudice, human opinion, and 
all superficial and fallible guides in its search, can 
oppose the religion that is rooted in truth, is hard 
to say. Philosophy opposes nothing without suffi- 
cient reason ; it accepts of nothing without evi- 
dence. If religion is based on reason, and sup- 
ported by sufficient evidence, it cannot be injured 
by metaphysics. To deny religion, is neither the 
work nor the condition of metaphysics; it is 
neither its starting point, nor its culminating 
task ; the business of philosophy is to trace things 
to their final causes, test and examine them on the 



110 PART III. 

ground of tlic clearest and most impartial evi- 
dence, and things are refused or accepted accord- 
ing as they are found on these high grounds of 
test. There are questions so deep and subtle, at 
the root and in the surroundings of religion, that 
no one but the keen metaphysician can feel and 
unravel. Hence the greatest metaphysicians in 
every age and country, have been its greatest 
expounders and defenders. Metaphysics have 
been the friend of religion, and metaphysicians 
her defenders. Her rich and lasting literature is 
that of theological metaphysicians ; and it would 
have gone badly with h«ir often, but for meta- 
physics. Her chief battles will be of necessity on 
metaphysical ground ; and if her friends cannot 
handle their tools rigliLly, it will suffer for want 
of skill and power in her professed friends. It 
will be found in times of darkness and distress, 
that out of the Galilee of metaphysics, light, 
support, and deliverance will come. 

Metaphysical pursuits are viewed by some as 
adverse to truth. The name of truth is very 
convenient, and much abused ; it is often substi- 
tuted for false dogmas, party and one-sided views, 
and superficial fanciful opinions. It is the com- 
mon motto on all party banners ; in the hand of 
jiarties it is often a sign which leads to delusion, 
ends in darkness and error, and settles down 



METAPHYSICS. 1 ] 1 

in blindness and hopeless hardness. Truth is 
broader than human dogmas, loftier than party 
motives, purer than human designs, freer than 
human custom, and more catholic than the creeds 
and sectarianism of men. He who uses the best 
means within his reach, in seeking the truest 
views and convictions^ and faithfully carries them 
out, is true both to himself and all higher 
demands. To be true, are required the harmony 
and unity of various elements in the conscious 
conviction of the soul; hence it is possible that 
he who is less correct in judgment concerning 
objects, may be incomparably more true than his 
more infallible brother. To be true is not to be 
infallible; it is not one dull monotonous uni- 
formity. Nonconformity with human views and 
customs is generally truth in consciousness and 
practice ; and what men often call heretical and 
heterodox, in the sight of a higher tribunal are true 
and orthodox. Truth is harmony with the laws 
and conditions of being ; and he Avho fulfils these 
most genuinely and universally, is most true. 
Truth in its real character is very diflferent from 
what it is in human opinions; it is quite another 
thing in the presence of a higher light and juster 
balance tlian it appears to be to human fancy and 
custom. Truth is a thing which concerns the 
judgment, the feelings, the motives, the consist- 



112 PART III. 

ence, and the outward expressions of human life. 
It is the highest development and exercise of these 
individually and unitedly. 

If truth be viewed in itself, and in its true 
relations, apart from human opinion and custom, 
it is difficult to make out a case, how metaphysical 
study is adverse to its apprehension and progress. 
The chief business of metaphysic in its final aim 
and results is the possession of truth. It discards 
human creeds and opinions, human customs and 
habits, unsupported by indubitable evidence ; and 
if these are meant instead of truth, then most 
assuredly in this sense it is an adverse power; 
but in most cases these contain more falsehood 
than truth. But it refuses not even human 
opinion, only so far as it cannot be substantiated 
by clear and substantial evidence. Its aim and 
effort is, to separate the real from the conventional, 
the fanciful from the solid, the right from the 
wrong, the primordial from the customary. There 
is a distinction to be kept in view, which must not 
be forgotten, — the metaphysical power in its true 
aim and end, and metaphysical theories. There 
are sects and parties among metaphysicians as 
well as in Christianity ; there are false and narrow 
theories in her ranks, as well as in religion. 
Christianity is not blamed and refused on account 
of sects and parties ; neither is religion considered 



METAPHYSICS. 113 

worthless and dangerous, because of false theories, 
by theologians and her disciples; why, then, 
should metaphysics be blamed and refused on this 
ground? It is impossible to conceive an intelli- 
gent ground to condemn and exclude it. Meta- 
physics in itself has no human theory to propound, 
no party to support, no personal and selfish aim 
to seek. It is based upon no fallible maxim, it is 
governed by no customary prejudice. It aims to 
please and satisfy no party nor earthly power. In 
itself it is a power, given and cultivated ; and no one 
of her disciples cultivates such a power to oppose 
truth, but rather to seek and support it ; and no 
one can do it effectually but the metaphysician. 

Metaphysics is conceived by many as being 
inimical to the ordinary duties of life. This is 
an old charge, which, in its turn, has been used 
against religion, education, avt, and science in 
general. The metaphysician enjoys the innocent 
pleasure, and can perform the relative duties of 
life as other men, when he pleases to throw aside 
his metaphysical cap ; and he is all the more 
accomplished by his deeper and larger power and 
knowledge. 

The business of life will take care of itself; 

it fits the ordinary capacities of men; it brings 

its immediate and palpable results ; men are 

driven to it both by want, pleasure, and interest. 

I 



114 PART III. 

There is never a reason to fear that the vast 
majority will become so metaphysical as to neg- 
lect the common relations of life. "What for want 
of aptitude, and the sacrifice demanded, most men 
will always be prevented from becoming profound 
metaphysicians. 

Directly, metaphysics has nothing to do with 
the ordinary duties, transactions, and pleasures of 
common life. The metaphysician is oiten both blind 
and indifferent to the small things of common 
life, because absorbed in higher and more im- 
portant things; things of vaster interest and 
claim, in the higher relations of men. But let any 
important crisis or question arise, and the man 
who is careless to the small things of life, can 
grapple with, solve, conquer, and settle. And 
when needful, he can act his part, or give courisel 
in the common things of life, and that in a way 
that no one but a superior spirit can. It is easy to 
descend at pleasure, but not so easy to ascend at 
will. The difficult being conquered, the easy can 
be done without doubt and uneasiness. 

Rather than interfering with the duties of com- 
mon life, it tends to facilitate them, and arrest 
their foibles and follies, by correcting, directing, and 
strengthening the thoughts of men, and pointing 
out common errors and dangers. It aims to make 
life safe, by pointing out its errors; make it 



METAPHYSICS. 115 

easy, by removing all obstructions from the Avay 
of its advancement ; make it strong and complete, 
by strengthening its powers; make it noble and 
true, by purifying and restoring it ; and make it 
happy and harmonious, by destroying its evils: 
it restores the good, and unites human affections, 
thoughts, motives, conscience, and life, with God 
and the universe. 

It is not possible that a science whose aim and 
business is to purify, strengthen, and rightly 
guide the human mind, and find out the laws and 
right relations of beings and things, should be 
without results, indulge in foolish theories, be 
irreligious in tendency, adverse to truth, and 
inimical to common life. If it were, either these 
were Avrong, or our conceptions and convictions 
of metaphysics are incorrect. It wields an unseen 
power, inasmuch as it has to do directly with the 
main spring of action. Its influence is universal, 
though unacknowledged; and destined to be 
greater and mightier still, and to be acknowledged 
as a friend, and not a foe. 



I 2 



IIG 



CHAPTER II. 

THE ADYAKTxVGES OF METAPHYSICAL STUDY. 

It is not correct to say that every thing has 
some advantages; neither is it true that every 
thing has disadvantages. If it can be proved that 
there is an absohite wrong, there can be no real 
good in that. It is possible that in the govern- 
ment of Infinite Goodness^ there is nothing so 
bad as to have no trace of truth and goodness in 
it at all, and nothing — in this world, at least — so 
good as to have nothing bad in it. Hence, in 
that sense, there is nothing without its advantages 
and disadvantages. But if we can conceive of 
perfect goodness, and also of perfect evil, there 
can be no disadvantasje in the one, nor advantage 
in the other. 

Advantage and disadvantage are terms loosely 
used, and variout-ly applied. They are not used 
on the high ground of truth and real goodness ; 
but in their application to the conventional and 
selfish views and feelings of those who use them. 
In the loose sense the words are used, the best 
things have their disadvantage, and the worst 



METAPHYSICS. 117 

their advantages. Right is a disadvantage to wrong, 
trnth is an impediment in the way of false- 
hood, and may prevent the false from advancing. 
In this sense it may be a disadvantage, according 
to the selfish and earthy opinion and feeling of 
men. It may occur circumstantially under certain 
conditions that the unjust may enrich himself, 
and the false advance the superficial interest of 
men in this world. But the thing advanced by 
injustice, and defended by the false, is not a solid 
and a real advantage; neither is any impediment 
or result of truth a real disadvantage. The super- 
ficial and the transient are not advantageous; 
such are the results of the wrong and the false. 
The solid, the lasting, the safe, and the happy, 
are no disadvantage ; these are followers of the 
just and the true. In this superficial state of 
partial knowledge and justice, truth is at a dis- 
count, and the untrue at a premium. But there 
is no real advantage in the premium of one, nor 
disadvantage in the discount of the other. 

The same thing often is considered an advantage 
to one, but a disadvantage to the other ; and fre- 
quently things ara thus viewed, in the life of the 
same person, under different conditions and periods 
of life. In the relation of things to the super- 
ficial things of this world, they are tested and 
solved from different stand-points, as they agree 



118 PART III. 

with different sympathies, and involve their inter- 
ests. So long as men will be governed by different 
motives, influenced by different powers, and view 
their interests as adverse to one another, such will 
be the case. 

If the order of God is based in equity, truth 
and right can be of no disadvantage to any thing 
in His order. If goodness is the end of His 
order, evil and wrong can be of no real advantage 
to any one. The statement that the wrong, either 
in itself or in experience, is advantageous, leads to 
a monstrous pantheism, destroys the distinction be- 
tween the nature and end of things, or implies that 
the great sovereign Mind has failed in His design 
and government. Either of these conclusions 
would be dishonourable to God, perplexing to 
reason, and destructive of religion. Such a con- 
clusion would be adverse both to reason and 
revelation ; for both declare the disadvantage of 
the wrong, and the advantage of the right; both 
recommend and reward the seeker after the good 
and the avoider of the wrong. 

The tests by which people weigh and conclude 
the advantage and disadvantage of things, are both 
l)artial and imperfect ; the elemental premises being 
incorrect, and it is but natural the final findings 
s^hould be wrong. 

1. One wrong test, is, to estimate things intel- 



METAPHYSICS. 119 

lectual and religious, according to the degree of 
earthly and individual selfish advantage or dis- 
advantage, they confer upon their possessors. 
The views and feelings of men are so low and 
contradictory, relative to material advantages and 
disadvantages, that this ground is unequal as a 
faithful test, and the law of equity demands that 
all should he tried by equals. 

2. The advantage and disadvantage of things 
are often tested by the partiality and prejudice of 
human view and desire ; so often the really useful 
is refused, and the useless accepted and applauded. 

3. The tests are often as numerous as the 
opinions and tastes of people ; hence there is no 
higher ground of judgment relative to the advantage 
or disadvantage of many things, than human dog- 
mas and opinions. In such conditions the test is as 
varied as parties and one-sided interests ; as change- 
able as accidental circumstances. In fact, according 
to this, there is no real true test at all. If things 
have a reality in themselves and relations, there 
must be somewhere a test of their truth and utility 
apart from human opinion, prejudice, and selfishness. 

4. In the present state of things, matters are 
brought to an imperfect court to be judged, and 
the verdict often goes against the true and advan- 
tageous, and in favour of the wrong and the 
disadvantageous. 



120 PART 111. 

It is tlie fate of all things alike, to be judged 
according to these imperfect tests ; and always 
will be more or less, in this state of being at least. 
For the reason of the shortcomings of the human 
judgment, things are never all in all correctly- 
judged and estimated according to their real 
intrinsic and relative value. And metaphysics 
come for a full share in this erroneous judgment 
of mankind ; and all the more, because the ob- 
jects either transcend the comraon walk of men, 
or tlie mode of procedure demands a toil and 
attention that all are not willing to give ; perhaps, 
under ordinary conditions of life, all are not able 
to give. 

To judge of the advantages of metaphysics, we 
must raise the ground of test above the common 
opinion of mankind. If this cannot be done fully 
and perfectly, there must be an honest aim and 
strife to accomplish it. In order to accomplish it 
justly, all human predilections and opinions must 
be viewed as insufficient for final decision : human 
consciousness must be attentively and patiently 
read. Evidence must be carefully sifted and 
examined ; nothing must be refused or accepted 
but on the ground of clear and convincing evi- 
dence. It is not proposed to do all this in this 
place, only within a narrow limit ; more time and 
space are demanded^ than can be here spared. 



METAPHYSICS. 121 

There are two reasons which hide the advan- 
tages of metaphysical study from the view of ordi- 
nary thinkers. 1. As an intellectual science, its 
influence directly is upon the mind ; hence, its 
advantages are indirect, and not seen and felt at 
once. This is the case also with religion and edu- 
cation in general, yet many of those who believe 
and appreciate the advantages of religion and edu- 
cation, deny those of metaphysics ; while the same 
reason in this respect may be used against them 
alike. 2. The advantages in themselves are not 
seen; they are like seed in the depths of the 
mind, giving fruit in the lives of men, of various 
kinds and of diflFerent degrees. Though unseen 
and indirect, yet, like the seed in the ground, 
there would have been no such happy and abun- 
dant harvest without them. The work is done 
deep in the mind, but the results are in the very 
external circles of life, and in the extremity of 
human activity, 

1. Metaphysical study strengthens and expands 
the human mind. All the gifts of God are 
capable of being increased and expanded ; they are 
given us for high and common service ; the 
stronger and more expanded they are, the more 
service they are capable of doing. It is a com- 
mon and an universal advantage to improve every 
thing good ; and all increase in importance in 



12.2 PART III. 

the ratio they are valuable in themselves^ and 
capable of high and great service. It is a 
higher matter to cultivate health and strengthen 
the body, tlian to increase riches ; but it is of 
higher importance still to the individual himself 
and to society at large, to cultivate and strengthen 
the resources and powers of the liuman mind. 

Those who speak of the fruitlessness of meta- 
physical study, acknowledge the vigour and 
expansion it gives to the mind, and their own 
tacit confession is a sufficient answer to their 
objection : for whatever renders such service to 
the mind, does not exist in vain. It cannot do 
otherwise than expand and strengthen, for it leads 
the mind to do battle with high and lofty 
questions ; it opens before the mind the gate 
which leads to the infinite and the unknown. 
Men become massive and intellectual giants, not 
by dealing and amusing themselves with small and 
common thoughts ; but by grappling and wrestling 
with the deeper and greater questions of being. 

2. The study of metaphysics imparts quickness 
and insighting ability to the perceptive powers, 
and sharpness to the logical faculty of man. The 
saying of Robert Hall, that the chief use of meta- 
physics is to make men clever at the art of gia- 
diatorship, has made many disciples ; and is taken 
as a shelter by many to deride metaphysical study. 



METAPHYSICS. 123 

Robert Hall was not adverse to metaphysical 
study ; there is a vein of metaphysical sympathies 
and probings running through the whole of his 
works : a friend and admirer of John Foster could 
not be otherwise than fond of metaphysics, though 
he never studied it as a science from the lips or 
works of its great masters. Putting the most 
severe construction on Mr. Hall's sally, it bears 
out our position that the study gives quickness 
and edge to the intellectual powers and the 
logical faculty of the mind. Skill in the use of 
instruments and elements is an essential neces- 
sity for the defence, the development, and the pre- 
servation of things. If such skill is abused, it is 
neither the fault of the instrument, nor the 
acquired skill by which it is so used ; but that of 
the agent, and the powers which influence him in 
such a conduct. Whatever is bad in the abuse, is 
good in the use; whatever is capable of doing 
much harm, is also, if it be differently and rightly 
used, capable of doing much good. 

Metaphysical science brings her students con- 
stantly into contact with deep and subtle pro- 
blems ; hence their tools must be well edged and 
kept bright, and a skill and quickness to use them 
above the ordinary walk of life. It is a kind of ana- 
tomical science of mind, thought, and existence, in 
their laws and mystery ; advancement is made by 



124 FART III. 

the most careful and minute dissection ; and in 
order to do it with pleasure and effect, the instru- 
ment must be precise, delicate, and sharp. 

It fits the mind to expose and attack the sophis- 
tries of religion and coraraoa life, Avhich often 
would disturb and baffle ordinary minds. By its 
aid the wrong, in thought, creed, and practice, is 
brought to light, weighed, and found wanting. 
By its assistance often truth and religion have 
been defended and exalted, when other powers 
were feeble and helpless, and always in extreme 
difficulty her aid will be asked, and thankfully 
acknowledged, 

3. Metaphysical study disturbs the stagnation 
of ordinary thinking, and opens before the mind a 
new and a loftier region. Common-place men 
can never advance society ; in the hands of such 
men, in the long run, society would stagnate, 
recede into feeble mechanism, and mentally, 
morally, and religiously die. Men of talent, of 
power, of originality, and genius, are the life and 
power of society ; they deliver it from stagnation 
and sluggish torpor; they raise the platform of 
thought and sympathy, and lead it to new fields 
of rich pasture, and aspiring hope. 

As men of genius and power disturb the common 
torpor, and raise and move society ; metaphysics 
disturbs, moves, and advances the science of com- 



METAPHYSICS. 125 

mon thought and knowledge. Even if it leads occa- 
sionally into a doubtful speculation, that carries 
with it a kind of compensation; it stimulates 
thought, and leads men to examine the root and 
principles of their common belief: it awakes them 
from their slumber, arouses new powers, and deve- 
lopes resources not known befoi*e. Inactive torpor 
gives neither hope, usefulness, nor happiness : con- 
scious wakefulness and activity, is an attitude of 
hope and advancement. 

Metaphysics has repeatedly disturbed the com- 
mon torpor of society, raised it to a higher region, 
and given a new direction to its thought and life. 
And if it had done no more, its visit has not been in 
vain, and deserves an immortal memento of grati- 
tude. 

4. Metaphysical study tends to free and liberalize 
human thinking, and make it independent of hu- 
man custom and opinion. One of the canons of 
metaphysics is, not to take any thing for granted. 
No human authority must be considered infallible; 
no name, nor creed, nor earthly source whatever, 
must be accepted without being weighed and mea- 
sured by thought and argument. Every thing 
must be sifted and tested, before it can be received 
into the vocabulary of philosophical belief; hence 
its collisions with common opinion, and its oppo- 
sition to a test that would be infallible and easy. 



126 PART IIT. 

No one can advance an inch in philosophy without 
a full exercise of his higher powers, and a com- 
plete freedom from the custom, the prejudice, 
and all human opinions. Things must be looked 
at as they are, and followed to their real true 
source; the mind is obliged to exercise all its 
powers, and use all resources in its possession to 
accomplish the task proposed. The philosopher 
ever has three things in view and aim. 1. Free- 
dom from human opinion and the false. 2. Know- 
ledge of the truth. 3. The invigoration and 
perfect development of his own powers, and that 
by independent thinking and action. In every 
step in philosophy there is a necessity which can- 
not be evaded, to fall back upon one's own powers, 
resources, and consciousness. 

Every thinker is obliged to feel his own feet and 
use them ; the moment he allows others to carry 
him to the end of his journey, he is deprived of 
his name, independency, and power. It is both a 
dignity and a high pleasure to be able to free our- 
selves from human opinions and fancies, and pur- 
sue the journey of thought with our independent 
resources and guidance. If philosophy did nothing 
else, this it promises and fulfils ; and this is more 
than a reward for its acceptance and cultivation. 

5. INIetaphysical study refines the thoughts and 
sympathies of the mind. The mind receives the 



AIETAPHYSICS. 127 

character of its feelings and moulding, from those 
objects it communes with. If the character of 
the objects with which the mind communes is 
corrupt, mean, or material, the mind in its sym- 
pathies, thoughts, and expressions, becomes the 
same : on the contrary, if the character of those 
objects is pure, lovely, spiritual, and great, the 
mind is so moulded accordingly. 

The objects presented to the mind in philosophy, 
are pure, true, great, and spiritual. In the pursuit 
of them, the mind loses its meanneos, and rises 
above material tendency, and becomes noble, pure, 
strong, true, conscious of some greater end than 
the body and matter. In the face of so much 
material tendency, and corrupt and mean in- 
fluences, it is comforting that there is one science, 
at least, whose tendency and education are spiri- 
tual, pure, true, and Divine. The thoughts of men 
govern and mould their subjects : hence, those who 
are students of philosophy, unless they are trea- 
cherous to their profession, cannot be mean, ma- 
terial, false to themselves, and unfaithful to the 
laws of being. It separates men from the dross of 
human opinion and party ; it gives them a calmer 
and happier region to reside in ; they are beyond 
the common world of storms and turmoils. It 
communes through self with greater power and 
higher things than self: hence the meanness, the 



128 PART III. 

shallowness, and the dross of common self are lost, 
by communion with this nobler counterpart of being. 
6. Metaphysical study increases the store of 
human knowledge ; and that quality of knowledge 
that no other form of study could. It makes the 
mind an object of its examination and researches : 
and the powers and the laws which govern the 
mind are thus explored, and made objects of know- 
ledge. The final laws and causes of universal being 
are perpetually before her attention ; she defines 
the boundaries between the unknown and the 
known, the finite and the infinite, the conditioned 
and the unconditioned. It teaches the limit of 
our powers ; it searches out the particular and the 
universal in knowledge. It gives men knowledge 
of self, and of the laws which are above and out- 
side self. If things are estimated according to the 
quality and quantity of their producing power, philo- 
sophy should be highly estimated ; for the quality 
is first in character, and the quantity real and true, 
and that in the degree of its earnestness and aim. 
7. The study of metaphysics imparts fortitude 
and comfort to the mind. It enables the mind to 
take a correct view of things ; it teaches the mind 
to accept things as they are, and submit calmly 
to tlieir laws and conditions. It teaches 
moderation in expectation, and submission in 
reverses. The mind is supplied with pure thought, 



METAPHYSICS. 139 

SO as to become absorbed in its object, and ob- 
livious to many of the minor sorrows of earth. 
The mind takes a large and comprehensive view 
of things ; so as to be able to compare on a large 
scale, and reason and conclude more correctly than 
others, who have not the same advantages ; and is 
calmer and comforted accordingly. 

There is a kind of pleasure in all toil ; but spe- 
cially so, in pure mental toil, when the mind is 
lost to all but to its own consciousness and the 
objects of its thought. In philosophy the objects 
are always pure and great ; and the soul is lost in 
an inconceivable infinitude. The soul is also com- 
forted in the consciousness of her lofty aspiration, 
and her true aim and motive, though the high end 
is not always realized. 

As no one but the pure knows the felicity of 
purity, and no one but the true knows the comfort 
and fortitude of truth, so no one but the philoso- 
pher knows the comfort of philosophy. 



130 



CHAPTER III. 

THE NECESSITY OF METAPHYSICS. 

The good, the true, the real, the pure, the safe, 
the useful, aud the happy, are needful as integral 
parts in the constitution of the universal order of 
being ; and as counterparts, to meet the wants of 
the created dependents of being. It is the most 
delightful thought that the opposite of these are 
not a necessity in the order of being, — namely, 
the bad, the false, the unreal, the corrupt, the 
dangerous, the useless, and the miserable. Two 
opposites cannot be needful ; indeed, they cannot 
consistently exist in one thought and order. If 
the infinite nature is absolutely good, the opposite 
of all goodness cannot have a necessity : if the 
order of being be the government of the absolute 
good, and if right in itself, the wrong cannot 
have a necessity in it. 

If this reasoning is conclusive, it follows, what- 
ever is wrong must be outside the thoughts of 
God and His order, — an outside needless intruder. 
It may be established as an axiom that whatever 
is needful is gcod, aud whatever is good is needful. 



METAPHYSICS. 131 

To prove the first is to establish the second, and 
to demonstrate the second is to show reason for 
the first. 

We estimate things in the degree we need 
them, or as we think we need them, because 
necessity is a test of value. Bread is more pre- 
cious than stones, because more needed ; water 
more prized than mercury, because every day's 
life is more dependent upon it ; labour is more 
needful than idleness, because the wealth and 
welfare of society depend upon one and not upon 
the other ; hence, it is held in higher esteem. 
There are two classes of necessary things ; — things 
which are made so by fancy and superficial 
thought and feeling, and those which from true 
want and relation are made so, and the last of 
these is referred to here. 

Necessity in itself is a kind of relational condi- 
tion, involving the existence of other beings and 
things, and apart from these can have no exist- 
ence. In its application to finite existence, it 
supposes limit and law. 

Necessity in its application to common and 
universal existence comprehends, 1. Quality of 
nature. 2. Mode of being. 3. The condition on 
which it exists. 4. The condition of finite beings 
involves a relation to time, space, higher cause, 
and the laws of life, and reason. 5. Cause and 
K 2 



182 PART III. 

effect; while finite being involves a cause above 
himself, the infinite supposes an effect below 
himself. 

Necessity is either absolute or conditional. In 
its relation to the Infinite and the All-perfect One, 
it is absolute ; but in its relation to finite beings 
and things, it is conditional. It is true that among 
finite beings and things, the existence of one 
being or condition, necessitates the existence of 
another as a matter of result or completeness ; but 
viewing things in their relation to their higher 
causes, they are only conditional necessity. But 
for higher will and power they could not have 
existed ; these are essential conditions of their 
very being. Whatever is dependent upon another 
cannot be an absolute necessity in itself, but a 
conditional one; it is conditioned by law, 
dependence, and source of being ; a higher will, 
power, and law, are conditions of its existence. 

Inasmuch as existence has different sides, 
necessity has various forms. As material sub- 
stance exists, physical necessity is the conse- 
quence. There is a necessity for physical laws 
and conditions to secure harmony and complete- 
ness. It is not the work of philosophy to show 
how things might be different in nature and rela- 
tions to what they are : her work is to explain 
existeuce as it is, and to show true causes, fit laws 



METAPHYSICS. 133 

and relations. Nature viewed as it is; her phy- 
sical forces, agencies, elements, means, and ends, 
are a necessity. 

Moral necessity is another kind which arises 
from the nature and relations of moral creatures. 
This necessity is not the necessity of force and 
passiveness, as that of the physical ; it is rather the 
necessity of rational and moral fitness, supposing 
a willing agent, and a rational object and end. 
Before man can be happy he must be true and 
pure ; this is a moral necessity arising from the 
fitness of things ; yet, man is made true by the 
sway of his free volition, and the exercise of his 
reason and conscience. 

In reasoning of moral necessity, we always base 
the consequences which follow, upon some ante- 
cedent conditions, which involve will and intelli- 
gence. It supposes the possibility of things being 
otherwise, because it involves will and fitness : it 
is a reasoning on the ground of possibility, proba- 
bility, volition, and moral fitness. 

There is also a religious necessity, which, though 
based upon and including the moral, yet has features 
different from it. There is a necessity in the rela- 
tion of beings of rational and moral nature for 
religion : whether we view this relation as existing 
between man and himself, his fellow man, universal 
law and creation, or between him and his lawgiver 



134 PART III. 

and God, it is alike needful. Religious necessity 
is deep in the nature of creatures with affections, 
like those of man. Man's nature demands a fit 
counterpart ; without it he would both be miser- 
able and incomplete. It is a necessity of Divine 
purpose, of fitness, of relation, of need, of nature, 
and of destiny. 

Metaphysical necessity is deep in the nature 
and relations of rational beings. A being like 
man surrounded with mystery ; being endued as 
he is with power of thought, and that without pre- 
vention or limit in its exercise ; having doubts 
and fears, as he has in every step and condition, 
cannot be prevented from trying to bridge the 
mystery of being, and sink into the deep secret 
and root of law and existence. It is as easy to 
destroy thought, blot out intelligence, or annihi- 
late existence, as to extinguish metaphysical ten- 
dency in rational nature. 

I. There is an objective necessity for the exist- 
ence of philosophy. The objects about which 
philosophy predicates, are a necessity both in 
themselves and in their relations. The compre- 
hensive and mysterious objects of metaphysics 
are existence in itself, with its various laws and 
relations. Existence is a necessary fact ; and to 
a finite mind a mystcrv. Universal existence 
necessitates the existence of the part ; and the 



METAPHYSICS. 135 

particular predicates the necessity of the universal. 
1. Existence is a necessity as an object of sense, of 
reason, of consciousness. 2. It is necessary in its 
cause. 3. In its governing and regulating laws. 
4. In its relational dependence and service. 5. 
In its relation to man. (1.) Man needs the com- 
plement of being as a creature. If existence in 
its most complete form did not exist, he could 
have had no existence as he has in its present 
form. (2.) It is needful for man in a higher 
sense as he is an intelligent being. Human 
intelligence proves an intelligent existence above 
and outside man; and that there are counter 
objects for that intelligence to spend its 
energies of thought, feeling, and action upon. 
Existence is the counterpart of rational nature; 
and it could never be complete, nor even exist 
without it. 

It is evident that existence in all its forms is 
intended to be an object of human thought and 
reason. It excites man's inquisitive curiosity ; it 
presents itself to his reason, inviting his examina- 
tion; it comes, in some of its multifarious forms, 
every moment in contact with his senses. His 
intellectual advancement and existence depend 
upon the examination and communion with 
universal being. 

II. There is a subjective necessity in the 



136 PART III. 

liuman mind for metaphysical science and deve- 
lopment. In vain will men speak of the danger 
and fruitlessucss of metaphysics, and discourage 
and prohibit its pursuit; the sympathy is deep 
in the nature of man, and it cannot be destroyed 
without impairing his nature. The pursuit of 
metaphysical study is nothing but the deep feeling 
in human nature, rising to the surface of life, the 
invisible coming to prominence, and the root 
appearing in the flower and fruit. This exists in 
the nature of men in the proportion of their mental 
stamina ; hence, it appears in actual thought, pro- 
portionately to the intellectual power at the root 
of man's nature, and in the degree that it is culti- 
vated. Intellectual giants will always, and have 
always, by the very powerful sympathies of their 
nature, enter into regions that common minds 
dare not and cannot go, and try their skill and 
strength with the deep and mysterious problems of 
being, and that of the infinite. 

We can trace the metaphysical necessity to 
some of its particular sources known to the com- 
mon consciousness of men generally. — 1. The first 
to be mentioned is, a love for knowledge, either 
for its own sake, or as means to some other end. 
2. A desire in men universally to remove or rise 
above the evil of life. The human mind carries 
with it in every state a dislike for the painful, and 



METAPHYSICS. 137 

a desire after the easy and the happy ; and those op- 
posed to universal feelings stimulate men in search 
of the new and the unknown. 3. There is an 
unaccountable curiosity in the mind, to pry into 
the mysterious and the unknown, and that in itself 
and for its own sake. Man dislikes secrecy, from 
Eden to the present hour ; he must try to solve or 
annihilate it. He fears the secret, and becomes 
anxious to search it out ; he has a kind of doubt- 
ing hope in the unknown, hence he is anxious to 
ascertain it by clear proof, and realize the sub- 
stance of it. 4. There is a wish in man to be 
beforehand in the knowledge of his future con- 
dition. From a desire thus to know and govern 
his own destiny man ever sighs after the unknown 
and the unknowable. 5. There is a law in the 
intellectual sympathy of man which leads him to 
inquire into final causes ; there is also a law in 
the same nature, which ever seeks after the law of 
unity and harmony. These laws are compre- 
hensible and powerful, they are the root and impulse 
of his philosophical nature and destiny. Man has 
not created his philosophical tendency, he can at 
best or worst but direct or modify it. If the 
philosophical tendency is not rightly cultivated 
and developed, it is to the detriment and injury 
of human nature. In this, as in other things in 
philosophy, what is first and deepest in the order 



138 PART III. 

of nature, is lowest and last in the order of human 
knowledge and practice. 

III. IMetaphysical study is a high educational 
power^ and as such it is necessary to the advance- 
ment of the humau mind and society at large. 
The human mind increases in strength and vigour 
by exercise ; it is preserved in health and power 
by constant vigorous activity. Philosophy is a field 
of intellectual gymnastics, which call into skilful 
and earnest play all the powers of the mind. If 
metaphysics was no longer an object of pursuit, 
society would grow tamer, feebler, more ignorant, 
and less independent. There is no other form of 
study that could supply the lack of this. Its 
objects are profound, numerous, and lofty ; yet it 
demands such nicety of sifting and analysis, that 
it imparts refineness to the mind, while at the 
same time it gives breadth, power, and profundity. 
It is not an evil, but an advantage to society, to 
have abundance of educational means and powers ; 
in this way all are revealed ; all parts and 
sides are thus touched, developed, and polished. 
The means of educational development should 
correspond with the objects of knowledge, the 
end of life, and the powers and resources of the 
mind : these ai'c counterparts in life, and go 
together. 

Society might dispense with some subsidiary or 



METAPHYSICS. 139 

circumstantial powers and means without suffering 
much loss ; but not so with an essential department 
at the root of natural existence, as metaphysics is. 
It may be said that society generally neither 
study nor care for metaphysics ; and what benefit 
can it be ? All are not growers of corn, but 
all must have bread ; the majority never plough, 
and would dislike it, yet there must be the plough- 
ing to keep alive society. Society lives in its 
various departments by the skill and toil of the 
few : and if those departments which the few 
carry on and manage were to stop, all would soon 
feel the loss. Only few produce mental food to 
society, and lead her on into intellectual advance- 
ment and triumph : if they failed, or gave up that 
high service, society at large would feel the need, 
and could not advance in her useful and happy 
progress. 



140 



CHAPTER IV. 

METAPHYSICS AND THE LIBT.E, 

The Bible among Christians is made the final 
authoritative criterion of every opinion and action. 
But there is nothing more common, than to make 
the Bible speak a language it never meant, and 
to utter dogmas it never contained. jMen are so 
blinded by their own opinions and party views, 
when they think and express themselves as defended 
and supported by the Bible, that it is often nothing 
more than the reflection of their own opinions, in 
their interpretation. The book which is intended 
to rectify human opinions and purify corrupt sen- 
timents and motives, is made the greatest support 
of false opinions, and scapegoat of groundless 
fancies, of any other. The loftiness of the book, 
and the greatness of its authority, make it a de- 
sirable thing to affect respect for and prize its 
testimony. 

The Bible is made by some the class-book of 
natural and general science, and whatever does not 
literally accord with it scientifically, is not in their 



METAPHYSICS. 141 

opinion correct. This is taking the Bible beyond 
its intended and professed boundaries ; it also con- 
tracts the path and liberty of science within too 
narrow a limit. If the Bible could be made the 
class-book of science simply as such, it would 
be a great misfortune to its authority ; for it is 
clear that it is not, by the clearest (jvidence and 
demonstrations. The Bible is a book of great moral 
truth, intended to govern the motives, the thoughts, 
the feelings, and the actions of men. It is a book of 
vital food for the spiritual nature of man, and a 
rule to regulate the relations and lives of men. 

It is enough for science to know, that the Bible 
does not flatly contradict and oppose its discoveries 
and detail ; and that the motives of its promoters, 
and its results relative to tlie common good and 
advancement of truth, are in accordance with its 
principles and laws. From the affinity of relation, 
the Bible stands in closer relation to some branches 
of knowledge than it does to others. It stands in 
nearer relation to the science of mind than it can 
to that of matter, because it is a moral book in- 
tended for man as a moral and intelligent being. 

A case cannot be made out that metapliysics is 
adverse to the Bible. It is easy to make a loose 
statement, that philosophy is contrary to the truth 
and spirit of the Bible, and that it undermines or 
opposes its authority, and such things; but when 



142 PART III. 

it is asked when and w here ? it cannot be defi- 
nitely and specifically shown and proved. To say 
that philosophers have been often against the Bible 
is nothing to the question; it may be that they 
would have been so, if they had not been philoso- 
phers quite as much in sympathy ; only their philo- 
sophy gave them more skill and power, hence their 
opposition more felt and dangerous. And it often 
happens that the views of philosophers, when con- 
sidered to be against the Bible, are much more 
against the conventional views of men and parties 
relative to the Bible, than they are against the 
book itself. When human arguments and party 
views are opposed, it is enough to raise tbe cry in 
many quarters, tbat the Bible is opposed, and 
religion is in danger; and without much of impar- 
tial examination, whether human opinions or the 
Bible is opposed, philosopby wholesale is anathe- 
matized as an execrable dangerous thing. Theolo- 
gians and commentatoi's often quote Scripture 
against Scripture, and that to disprove the assertions 
of one another ; and yet all this is in harmony with 
the Bible, whilst surely one of two contradictions 
is always against the Bible : but any thing under 
the name of philosopby daring half so much, would 
raise the ire of all the religious party scribblers of 
the land against it. Names sway the majority of 
mankind much more than principles and truth ; 



METAPHYSICS. 143 

there is mucli more of fighting for human opinions 
and conventions, under the sham of defending re- 
ligion and the Bible, than really there is for real 
truth and religion, as they are in themselves free 
from all party views and prejudice. 

Metaphysics existed in its germinal form 
before the Bible in its verbal form ; and has 
never been studied by any one of its true stu- 
dents from malice pi'epense to the Bible. If ever 
it appears to oppose the Bible, it is incidental 
and not intentional ; it may be an apparent opposi- 
tion more than real. If ever metaphysics becomes 
opposed to the truth, it is the fault of metaphy- 
sicians more than metaphysics ; and if ever it 
opposes the Bible, it is an opposition to something 
human about the Bible, and not the true and the 
Divine in it, or the wrong in the metaphysician 
himself, and not in the metaphysics. 

There is nothing in the Bible from which it 
can be shown, that it opposes metaphysics in 
itself, nor yet in its studious cultivation and 
use. The Bible speaks more about the use of 
things, than of things in themselves ; it lays down 
limits and conditions for the right use of all things, 
contrary and beyond which they become wrong 
and sinful. The Bible approves of beings and 
things in certain relations and conditions, whilst 
it disapproves of them in others, and the contrary. 



144) PART III. 

As it is possible to misuse and abuse the best of 
God's gifts, so tlie best intellectual instrument and 
power may be misapplied, and made the production 
of evil rather than good; and in that sense dis- 
approved of, whilst in its natural and best sense 
it would be approved of. The Apostle (Col. ii. 8) 
speaks of philosophy, tptKoa-ofla.;, in a bad sense, as 
a thing capable of being abused j and, when so 
misapplied, to be avoided by simple and unsus- 
picious Christians. 

Not only the Bible does not oppose metaphy- 
sical science, but the metaphysical element pervades 
it, and it cannot fully be understood and inter- 
preted without it. 1. Many of the terms used in 
the Scriptures are metaphysical, and cannot be 
thought of without metaphysical sympathy and 
reasoning being produced; and cannot be inter- 
preted without metaphysical power. God, spirit, 
creator, governor, creation, cause, effect, truth, 
thought, conscience, mind, soul, regeneration, in- 
fluence, power, eternity, everlasting , time, space, 
infi.nite, omnipresent, unchangeable, almighty, ever- 
lasting, these, and a large number besides, involve 
in their simplest meaning the metaphysical ele- 
ment, and caimot be thought of without it, 2. 
The objects-matter of the Bible are necessarily 
metaphysical in their character, notions, and sur- 
roundings. The infinite, the invisible world, reve- 



METAPHYSICS. 145 

lation, miracles, Divine government, the injluence of 
spirit upon spirit, redemption, the existence and 
cause of evil, the relation of things and beings, hap- 
piness and misery, man's immortality, faith, love, 
hope, and heaven : — these involve the metaphysical 
element, and cannot be approached without it. 
3. Some books and portions of the Bible are tho- 
roughly metaphysical in their tendency, sympathy, 
and reasoning. Is it possible to read the books of 
Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Isaiah, and the 
Prophets gerierally ,'withovLtheing convinced of this? 
The Gospels are pervaded by the same element ; 
the Epistle to the Romans, and all the Epistles of 
Paul, especially those to the Ephesians, Philippians, 
and the Colossians. Never was a more meta- 
physical writer than the Apostle Paul ; take the 
eighth chapter of Romans, and the fifteenth 
of 1st Corinthians as an example of this; and 
the same, more or less, pervades the whole of his 
writings. It was in the depth of the man, and it came 
out in every thing he said and wrote ; it was wor- 
thy his superior grandeur, without it he could not 
have been the great Apostle and the powerful writer 
he was. 4. The comprehensive principles and end 
of metaphysics are everywhere recommended in 
the Bible, even on the high grounds of need and 
duty. Reflection on the laws and works of God 
is recommended everywhere ; the search after 

L 



146 PART III. 

knowledge is constantly urged and encouraged ; 
the testing of things, and the seeking of truth, are 
applauded and shown as needful everywhere through 
the volume. The inquiry into the relations, the 
causes, the laws, and the results of beings and 
things, are involved indirectly in the truths incul- 
cated in the Bible, as well as directly and repeat- 
edly recommended verbally. 

It would be easy to quote pages from the Bible, 
to verify the foregoing remarks ; but this is diflS- 
cult from their number, and partially needless to 
all the readers that may look into these pages, 
for such passages will be known to them. Indeed, 
to enter into minute detail, would require both a 
longer time and a larger space than I can afford to 
it ; the intention of the chapter is suggestive, and 
not exhaustive. 



147 



CHAPTER Y. 

THE RELATION OF METAPHYSICS TO OTHER FORMS OF 
KNOWLEDGE. 

As every atom belongs to and serves the whole 
atomic universe ; as every particle of light is a 
part, and serves the whole body of light ; as every 
member is a part of a body, and helps to complete 
the whole, and no body can be complete without 
all its members ; so is one branch of knowledge 
connected with, and essential to the other. Some 
parts, on account of their relative position, or the 
variety or importance of the service they render, 
are greatly more important then others, hence 
more essential and needful. 

If the science of mind is at all any part of the 
great system of knowledge, it follows that it has 
its parts to play, and that the whole would not be 
complete without it. The degree of its service 
depends upon its comprehension, its position, and 
means of usefulness, and the variety and degree of its 
service. Every form of knowledge has its own spe- 
cial objects-matter, and must be specially adapted 
L 2 



148 PART III. 

for them ; it has also its universal relation as a part 
of the whole, which it serves indirectly, in the 
degree of its relation, means, and power. Every 
form of knowledge has its more particular and 
professed business : at the same time, every thing 
stands related to the whole, and helps to complete 
it. 

There are some particular branches of know- 
ledge to which the science of mind is specially 
connected. The relation between things is mediate 
or immediate, near or remote, common or special ; 
there is a relation between the most extreme 
things, but it is reacted and dependent upon 
various mediate links and conditions. While meta- 
physics stands related to the whole body of know- 
ledge, it stands nearer to some parts than it does 
to others. 

1. Metaphysics stands in intimate relation to 
theology. Theology reaches its systematic aim 
either through the objects and laws of nature, 
or through the truths and light of revelation ; 
hence it is called natural or revealed. 

The object- matter of theology is God, in His 
nature, and His design, will, and laws, towards 
men and the universe. Theology is absolutely a 
science of mind, and that in the loftiest and most 
sacred sense. It treats of the Divine mind, 
relative to human interest and destiny ; hence it 



METAniYSICS. 119 

comprehends universal intelligence, law, and order. 
Mental science opens the door and leads on theo- 
logy ; it strengthens the mind for il s successful 
pursuit, and feeds and supports its premises and 
bulwarks. It is difficult to think, how theology 
can exist and be defended, without some know- 
ledge of the laws of cause, of being, and of thought. 
Philosophy and theology are two sisters, having 
their origin in one source, their converse about 
common objects, and their aim and results in the 
same ultimate conclusions. They are intended to 
serve each other in their career, to rectify each other 
in their inadvertencies, and to support each other 
in their common and truthful conclusions. From 
the nature and order of things, theology is more 
dependent as a science upon philosophy, than 
philosophy is upon theology ; because it is wider 
in its range, freer in its action, richer in its means 
and resources of illustration and defence. Philo- 
sophy existed before systematic theology had any 
form ; it is based upon the fact of mind and some 
final cause behind its very first premises, and is 
defended by its skill and instruments. Theology 
and philosophy go a long way together, having 
common sympathy and end, — truth, and common 
happiness. Theology is more of a statement, 
according to certain formula? and supposed re- 
vealed truths ; philosophy is more of a search after 



150 Part hi. 

truth, ^yitllOut any assumption or prescription of 
infallible record whatever. Theology is limited 
within a wriiten record ; hence dogmatic and 
narrow, as interpreted by human system ; philo- 
sophy is bounded by no written record, it sinks 
into the deep, and ascends to the lofty places of 
the universe, searches out mysteries, and traverses 
the invisible and the unknown infinitude of mind 
and space. The Bible is the test of the theologian, 
consciousness that of the philosopher. 

Theology is more conservative in its spirit and 
tendency than philosophy, because the comple- 
ment of its truths is revealed ; hence the philoso- 
pher is more liberal in his views, and universal in 
his sympathies and researches, than the theolo- 
gian. The theologian believes himself as having 
found all ; the philosopher believes himself as 
having found nothing fully. The theologian is 
satisfied with the light and truths he has; the 
philosopher ever sighs and searches for more light 
and truth. The theologian is ever in danger of 
becoming narrow, illiberal, and despotic in thought 
and assumption; and the mere acquaintance with 
theology, and nothing else, will almost surely lead 
to such undesirable results. The metaphysician is 
in danger of becoming too speculative, sceptical, 
and confident in the power and light of reason. 
Theology may be of good service to the meta- 



METAPHYSICS. 151 

physician to modify his speculation, and show him 
that there is something higher than human reason 
in the universe : it may preserve from scepticism 
and despair. Philosophy may serve the theologian, 
by giving him broader and more catholic views 
of God, men, and truth; it may preserve from 
assumptions infallibility, the pharisaical boast of 
orthodoxy, and the loud anathemas against all 
views and things, except those of the narrow 
dogma or adopted party. 

One thing is certain that the Divine voice in 
words is not different from that in works ; and if 
they be rightly interpreted, the conclusion will be 
one. But true philosophy is often a very different 
thing from the opinions of philosophers; so is 
true theology, from theologians. It is not a 
discord between theology and philosophy that 
causes collision ; but a want of harmony of thought 
and feeling between theologians and philosophers. 
There is nothing in the nature, tendency, and 
intention of philosophy and theology antagonistic 
to each other : both perfectly agree in themselves, 
in their special functions, and yet in their common 
service and end. The echo of Divine reason must 
be the same in consciousness, as it is in true 
revelation : rightly read, they will harmoniously 
agree. 

2. Philosophy stands also nearly related to 



153 PART III. 

politics. In all walks of knowledge there are 
some thiujis common and alike to them all ; which 
cannot be acquired without the same qualificatit)ns. 
It is a condition in all alike, that the mind must 
a quire a certain acuteness and vigour before any 
ot them can be pursued with effective results. 
These, philosophy imparts to the mind, which is 
the one common power in the pursuit and dis- 
covery of all knowledge. But every form of 
knowledge has something peculiar to itself in it, 
which requires special qualification to its right 
performance. Politics has a common work and 
object ; it has also its special Avork, and the way 
of doing it. It views and deals with man as a 
rational responsible being ; it is true that it views 
man on his material side as well, but always 
through his higher nature — the mental. In 
enacting and administering laws, man is viewed as 
a being of intelligence, will, and conscience. 
Before laws of reason and equity, suitable to 
man as a being of reason, of limit, of conditions, 
and states, can be correctly enacted, and justly 
administered, it is needful to know something of 
the nature of such a being ; this mental science is 
the best instrument to impart. 

In order to carry out the work of politics 
rightly and faithfully, the politician is under the 
necessity to know something of causes and effects ; 



METAPHYSICS. 153 

of laws and relations; of the human intellect, 
passion, conscience, and will ; of mental idio- 
syncrasies ; of differences and likenesses ; of 
human motives and actions; of the nature of 
truth and falsehood ; the cause of happiness and 
misery ; and of human ability in certain conditions, 
and his inability in others. The want of knowing 
the human mind better is one reason that so many 
laws are enacted, so unnatural to the nature of 
man, and so unreasonable in their requirements 
and provision, hence opposed often by revolution, 
and repealed by force, or by higher reason. It 
will be a happy event for people and countries, 
when their legislators will study more, and under- 
stand better, the laws of mind ; then better laws 
will be enacted, and greater stability established. 
Before any man aspires to be a maker of laws for 
his fellow men, he ought at least to have this 
qualification in a superior degree, — the knowledge 
of mental science. If legislators made it their 
business to know themselves better, we should 
have fewer legislators, but far better in quality; 
juster laws ; happier countries ; more satisfied 
people ; and more stable institutions. Instead of 
the circumstantial and conventional qualifications, 
this would be both real, superior, and of universal 
advantage, 

3. General jurisprudence stands nearly related 



154 PABT III. 

and greatly indebted to the science of mind. All 
things which belong to man, are studied directly 
or indirectly in reference to him. They are thus 
studied in themselves, or in man himself; for a 
knowledge of him is to know the counterparts of 
his being. 

Jurisprudence has men in view, in certain rela- 
tions, and under special conditions ; if those rela- 
tions and conditions did not exist, there could be 
no such system as jurisprudence. (1.) It views man 
as subject of law. (2.) As free and capable of 
moral and responsible action. (3.) As a being of 
purposes and motives. (4.) As a being of various 
relations. (5.) As a being in a condition of 
doing wrong, and of being wronged. (6.) As a 
being of merit or demerit, according to the nature 
of his actions. Not only is mental philosophy an 
assistance to jurisprudence, but an essential 
necessity to its right understanding and practice. 
To study jurisprudence in theories apart from men, 
is often nothing better than legal dogmas, without 
either fitness, truth, or reason; but when the 
higher nature and relations of man are studied, 
true and righteous jurisprudence is understood ; 
for all are for him, and whatever answers his 
wants and relations is fit and true. No one can ad- 
vance or practise jurisprudence on an enlightened 
ground, without a knowledge of mental science. 



METAPHYSICS. 155 

4. There is a near relation between the science 
of mind, and that department of knowledge which 
treats of disease and remedy — the healing art. It 
is undeniable that there is a very near union be- 
tween the mind and the body, and many of the 
diseases of the body proceed from the influence of 
the mind over the material organism. It is needful 
for the medical student to understand something 
of the laws, emotions, and power of the mind, in 
order to know more accurately what kinds of dis- 
eases are more particularly produced by the power 
of the mind over the body, and the way and the 
degree they are thus produced. A knowledge of 
the laws of mind would often simplify and solve 
many perplexed and complicated cases, and be the 
means, in many instances, to suggest the true 
remedy, and, in all cases, of preventing many and 
injurious prescriptions. For the want of this 
power, the medical practitioner is deprived of the 
skill and power he might and ought to have ; and 
not unfrequently he mistakes and fails, where he 
might be right and successful. Ignorance of the 
laws of mind and their influence upon the body, 
misleads the medical practitioner often beyond his 
legitimate boundaries, to wander amidst strange 
rocks and bewildering paths; and this is all the 
more intolerable in a guide who should know 
something of the way, and that when life is in 



156 PART III. 

question. The importance of the function of the 
medical practitioner demands at his hands this 
knoAvledge, and all others which increase his skill 
and power : he has to do with health and affliction, 
with life and death. He owes this knowledge to 
himself, and to all those who put themselves in his 
hands. 

By the exclusive study of the bodily organs in 
their anatomical and physiological forms, no won- 
der that the medical student so often becomes a 
materialist. A knowledge of mental philosophy, 
would be a kind of equipoise and a preservative 
power, from that low and dull materialism so often 
complained of as prevalent among medical students. 
For the want of this knowledge, it is not unfre- 
quent that mental diseases are treated as physical 
ones: hence injury is done, and unhappy results 
follow. Mental philosophy to the medical student 
is a common benefit to society ; it increases his 
resources, skill, and power, and makes him more 
able to administer his important function to the 
good and happiness of all patients. 

5. Metaphysics stands related to history; and 
that in such a degree, that history cannot be 
successfully studied and fully written without it. 
If history has to' account for phenomena, actions, 
and revolutions, in their causes and results ; and if 
mind is involved in these, and is the leading 



METAPHYSICS. 157 

agent in all, then it is needful, in order to have a 
full and faithful record, to study the laws and 
phenomena of mind. Much of history is insipidly 
and superficially written; and one reason is, the 
want of profounder knowledo;e, on the part of the 
writers, of mental philosophy. History, if faithful, 
is more a history of thought and motives, than of 
mechanism and material forms and appearances. 
The historian has perpetually to trace things to 
their active and motive source ; he has constantly 
to analyse thoughts and motives, in order to dis- 
tinguish difference and draw right deductions : 
before all this can be done effectively, the mind 
must have acquired metaphysical training and 
power. 

The histor-,an constantly is thrown beyond the 
boundary of clear and common facts, to the ground 
of analogy and abstract reasoning; and if his- 
torians were more familiar with the laws of mind, 
history would be both more true and complete. 
No uuphilosophical mind can write an indepen- 
dent, true, and immortal history: there may be a 
pretty relation of events and external transactions 
written, which are pleasing to superficial readers ; 
but if unphilosophically written, it is not deep and 
faithful enough to be immortal. The most philo- 
sophic histories of the past live and are admired ; 
the shallow, the light, and the flippant ones, are 



lUO PART III. 

neither consulted nor respected. The present 
numerous superficial histories will become effete ; 
but the few philosophical ones will withstand the 
ravage and revolution of time, and Avill go down 
with honour and respect to futurity. Philosophy 
gives to history breadth, faithfulness, and truthful- 
ness, to universal law and being, which are the 
same in every age, and the sure qualities of immor- 
tality. 

6. There is a near relation between metaphysical 
science and logic. Logic is the production of me- 
taphysics, and dependent upon it for being and 
efficiency. Logic being the formal law of thought, 
is a natural offshoot of the science which makes 
mind the object-maLter of its study, which is 
philosophy. Logic again is an essential effective 
instrument in the pursuit of metaphysical science, 
and cannot be pursued efficiently without it. 
There is a partial dependence and service between 
the two ; metaphysics depends partially upon logic, 
logic depends entirely upon metaphysics. True 
metaphysics advances the interest of logic; true 
logic protects and guides the interest of meta- 
physics. ^Vhen the logic* of people is bad, their 
metaphysics cannot be good ; when their meta- 
physics is bad, their logic is the same. They go 
together ; as one fares, it shares with the other ; 
if one is well off, so is the other ; if one badly off, it 



METAPHYSICS. 159 

is the case with the other. They are twins pos- 
sessing one common sympathy, they were born 
only a little after each other, they live together, 
and if one dies the other will not long survive. 
Their source is one— mind ; their end is one— the^ 
advancement of mind and truth. 

7. Though metaphysical and m;fthematical 
science differ, yet there is a near alliance and 
sympathy existing between the two. These two 
great instrumental powers in the advancement of 
knowledge, have been perpetually set against each 
other. The mathematician has ever frowned philo- 
sophy down as vague and indefinite in its demon- 
strations and conclusions, and applauded mathe- 
matics as the only method of exact and pure 
knowledge. The metaphysician, again, has often 
denounced mathematics as a material, formal, and 
stiff thing, never able to transcend to the higher 
and nobler region of thought. Now these two 
sciences are needful and compatible with each 
other, so that the metaphysician and the mathe- 
matician may live on good terms with each other, 
and think themselves brothers, and co-workers in 
the advancement of the work and happiness of the 
universe. 

A difference does not necessitate a contra- 
diction; there are differences between these 
sciences^ but no contradiction. Some of the 



I GO TART III. 

points of differences are the following. (1.) They 
differ in their objects-matter. The objects-matter 
of matliematics are form and magnitude; those of 
metaphysics are cause, mind, existence, with their 
laws and relations. (2.) Mathematics deals with 
the tangible, the visible, and the material ; hence 
a material science: metaphj-sics deals with pheno- 
mena, the unseen, the supernatural ; hence a more 
spiritual and a superior science. (3.) ]\Iatberaatics 
is mechanical in its operation ; it has but one 
path, and all must do precisely as they are bidden, 
or they surely will get wrong : metaphysics is 
more free and rational; and allows her disciples 
greater range and liberty to seek truth and evi- 
dence. (1.) The tendency of matliernatics is to 
materialize, formulize, and stereotype thought ; 
the tendency of metaphysics is to spiritualize, 
liberalize, expand, and diversify thought. (5.) The 
work of mathematics is more limited ; it is to 
settle the material problems of the material uni- 
verse ; and, if that is ever done, its work will be 
over: but metaphysics deals in the infinite, it 
deals with dateless cause and being, and with end- 
less existence. Hence, its woi'k will never end, 
because its objects are illimitable. (G.) Philosophy 
existed before mathematics; and gave existence to 
the latter. I\Ien always philosophized, and their 
philosophical broodings about the material universe 



METAPHYSICS. 161 

gave existence to mathematics. Mathematics was 
created by philosophy as an instrument to be used 
for her service; but the child since has often 
raised its heels against its more venerable and 
worthy parent. 

But there are points of resemblance as well as 
of difference. (1.) The mental processes in the 
prosecution of both are very much alike ; — the 
analytical, and the synthetical. (2.) Both aim at 
common ultimate ends, — the education of the 
mind and the acquirement of truth and know- 
ledge. They reign over different empires, and 
have their individual function and business : but 
they may dwell and commune with each other in 
peace and harmony as mother and child ; and as 
the visible and the invisible do in our persons, and 
in the universe. (3.) They both require the same 
qualification of mind in strength and perfection to 
make any proficiency in their knowledge. The 
first metaphysician would be also the first mathe- 
matician, if he turned fully his attention that way ; 
so would the first mathematician in metaphysics : 
and no one but the first-class power of mind can 
be great and first in either. They are linked 
together and cannot be separated. They are the 
highest achievements of thought : they are com- 
mon servants of the one great universe. 

8. Painting and sculpture in their tlieory are 

M 



162 PART III. 

partially dependent and obligated to meta- 
physics. The end and aim of these in theoiy 
and practice in their relation to man is the perfect 
representation and delineation of the form and 
expressions of the mind and body natnrally, 
spontaneously, and perfectly. Inasmuch as the 
expressions and actions of the body are produced 
and governed by the thoughts, the volitions, and 
feelings of the mind, they never can be under- 
stood and delineated faithfully without some know- 
ledge of the invisible mind which directs and 
governs the whole. No art that is not faithful 
to the deeper being and laws of human nature, 
can stand the test of severe and true criticism, 
and the ravage and the forces of time, because 
deficient in truth, naturalness, and compre- 
hensiveness. 

9. Poetry owes much to metaphysics. The end 
of poetry is, to express things in their true nature, 
relation, and law, according to the harmony of 
sound and pleasing sensibility. It is the inspiring 
of true thought, with the fire of feeling, sponta- 
neity of expression, harmony of sound, and unity 
of design. Mind must always be the chief object- 
matter of poetry, as well as the mighty and skilful 
power which produces it. There are four things 
requisite to constitute real poetry, — true and 
comprehensive conception, harmony of sound. 



METAPHYSICS. 103 

purity of expression, and spontaneous, deep, and 
pure feeling. 

No one can express the various powers, re- 
sources, susceptibilities, processes, and actions of 
mind, without some knowledge of its nature, laws, 
and conditions. No one can please, nor hold a 
long and a mighty influence over the mind of 
others, unless he is faithful to its character and 
laws. Utility, power, and immutability, are in 
truth and faithfulness, and whatever has not these 
qualities, must ultimately die, though other things 
which possess these, may share the same mournful 
fate ; but the true and the faithful have a chance to 
live, and they have also truth on their side ; but the 
untrue and the unfaithful have law and all against 
their existence, which make it impossible for 
them to remain always. The order of God is 
against the untrue and the unfaithful in knowledge 
and art, as well as in life, which make it impossi- 
ble for them to remain in immortal acceptance and 
reverence. This is proved historically, as well as 
deductively on the ground of abstract truth, equality, 
and analogy. The great metaphysical poets have 
come down to us; at least those which have come 
down are most abstruse, and they are read and 
admired partially on that ground. Would Homer 
have retained his power ; would Virgil be fresh and 
virgin; would Dante still impress us with awful 
M 2 



161 PART III. 

grandeur, but for their metaphysical element? 
Abstract the metaphysics of Shakespeare, and all 
his life, eccentricity, beauty, and power, are for ever 
gone. Milton would never have written Paradise 
Lost, but for his metaphysical broodings and 
sympathy; and take away this element, and it will 
be no longer the splendid production of Milton, 
neither will it any longer sway universal mind. The 
chief power and charm of Wordsworth is in his 
philosophical sympathies and touches : so is it the 
case in a high degree in Tennyson. Many more, 
of somewhat less magnitude and grandeur, might 
be mentioned, both ancient and modern, who have 
gained and retained their power, because of their 
truthfulness and faithfulness to the nature and 
laws of mind. So long as man is faithful to him- 
self and the nearest and deepest laws of his 
nature, it cannot be otherwise ; as he advances in 
true knowledge of himself, he must accept what 
is faithful to his nature, and refuse and despise 
the contrary. 

It may appear as a paradox, to say, that true 
and great poetry grows in the soil of true philoso- 
phy, yet it is true both to the law of things and 
history. The superficial in thought can never be 
splendid in poetry ; the untrue and narrow in 
conception, can never be great and grand in poetry. 
Inspire the deep with poetical fire, it will be both 



METAPHY?,ICS. 165 

lofty and splendid ; give harmony of sound and 
beauty of form to the metaphysical sympathies 
and thoughts of the mind, there will flow out of it 
glorious and immortal poetry. 

10. The science of ethics stands in near relation 
and dependence to metaphysics. Ethics is a science 
of the mind in certain of its relations and sympa- 
thies. Ethics is a science of the human will and 
motives, in relation wdtli their expressions and 
actions. The science of ethics all through refers 
to a rational and accountable nature ; yet, its 
immediate objects are those powers which imme- 
diately produce and govern them. These powers, — 
the will, the motives, and the affections, are powers 
of the mind under certain conditions and modifica- 
tions, and are known through the expressions of the 
mind. Ethics can never be possible, but on the 
ground of mind ; it cannot be understood and 
enforced, but through the philosophy of mind. 
Things must be studied and understood through 
their laws, their relations, and their dependents : 
so must ethical science be understood through meta- 
physics, which is the science of mind and universal 
being. 

11. Mental science is nearly related to religion, 
and capable to render to it the greatest service. 
E/Cligion is a broader thing than theology : whilst 
theology views religion theoretically, and as such 



166 PART III. 

presented to the human intellect, religion com- 
prehends both the reason, the heart, and the life 
of its subjects. Religion does not exclude the 
theory, but is based upon it ; but it goes beyond 
and deeper, and is more real and powerful than a 
theory can be. 

Both the danger, power, and happiness of 
religion, is in the fact, that it unites with, and 
roots in human feeling. The chief danger in 
religion is, deception and delusion ; and this for 
want of higher and correcter knowledge of the 
mind, and its laws, and dependents. The dangers 
and extremes are of two kinds ; — fanaticism, 
depression : one is in aerial delusive region, the 
other is in the region of fog and doubt. Both of 
these conditions proceed from a want of higher 
knowledge of the mind; a more correct knowledge 
of the philosophy of the mind, would often cure 
both : it would be the means of comfort to the 
depressed, and undeceive the fanatist. So long 
as mental science is divorced from religion, and 
considered antagonistic to it ; so long will religion 
itself be a danger and in danger, and men deluded 
and depressed, ignorant of their privileges, rela- 
tions, and conditions. No one can fully understand 
the state of his mind, unless he knows something 
of the laws and phenomena of mind. 



167 



CHAPTER VI. 



MET.\PHYSIGAL DANGERS. 



To say that there are dangers around meta- 
physics, is the same as may be said of every other 
good thing. What is there without dangers in 
some way or other connected with it in this world 
of darkness, of wrong, and of folly ? Every form 
of knowledge has some particular forms of dangers, 
to which it may be pushed, or lead unto : even reli- 
gion itself has its various and great dangers 
around all its truths, duties, and blessings ; enough 
to testify the goodness and excellency of any- 
thing, if it is not inherently dangerous in itself, 
and naturally and unavoidably leads to dangers 
and ruin. 

No one can help many dangers that may sur- 
round his path : if the path be true in itself, and 
the motives and means used right ones, the path 
in itself is right, and no one should discourage the 
traveller from walking in it. Many good things are 
in danger from the imperfect relations and asso- 
ciations of this state of things, and the want of 



168 PART III. 

proper qualifications in the use of them, or the 
tendency to folly and error of the agent. 

The path of knowledge in this world is like a 
stranger iu a strange country without either map, 
finger-posts, or milestones to direct his path, and 
guard him on the right track. He is left very 
much to himself; he has to consult stars, and all 
he meets with ; and, after all his inquiries, he is left 
much to himself. Or it may be compared to a 
mariner on the sea, in constant danger from 
rocks, reefs, shoals, fogs, waves and tempests, and 
that without knowledge of the route, latitude, and 
charts, and the proper instruments for such a 
condition. The traveller and the mariner have to 
use all in their power to reach the end of their 
journey safely ; and if they succeed under such 
conditions, it is a matter of wonder and gratitude. 
But if they neglect the few means in their hands, 
no one blames the journey and the voyage, but 
their neglect, or the condition in which they were 
placed. Not only man is in a dangerous condi- 
tion, but there is a positive tendency in man in 
his career after truth, to neglect the true means, 
and go after the vain and the wrong. 

In the hand of man, the most innocent thing 
becomes dangerous ; and the most needful and 
beneficial in itself, the means of misery and of 
death. Fire is a good thing in itself; but it may 



METAPHYSICS. 169 

he made, in the hand of human nature and wick- 
edness, a most destructive instrument. Books are 
useful and needful things in themselves ; but 
often they are the channels of wrong impression 
and falsehood. A hundred things may be named 
as good and essentially needful in themselves, yet 
in the hand of man they become bad and dan- 
gerous ; and if philosophy were not capable of the 
same abuse, it would be both unaccountable and 
incredible. The better anything is, greater is its 
danger of being abused by man : because the sym- 
pathy and motives of men are often below the 
level of a very pure good thing ; and if abused at all, 
by the extreme contrast it appears all the greater 
evil, and is really so. A wise thing, if abused, is 
all the greater foolishness ; and a lofty thing, if it 
falls, has a greater fall and crash, than a lower 
and a meaner thing. Philosophy, if it is made an 
instrument of abuse at all, becomes more danger- 
ous because of its superior power ; and appears all 
the more visible and extreme, on account of its 
inherent excellency and superiority of power. 

Philosophy must be viewed in two ways, — as a 
thing which influences the minds and lives of 
men, and as a thing acted upon and moulded 
by men. It is a thing developed and re- 
duced into system by human minds. On the 
other hand, it is an instrument which developes 



170 PART III. 

and perfects the human mind in skill and power 
in the search after truth. The danger of philo- 
sophy may be either to itself, or to others, as 
we view and consider it. As an object, it may 
be misconceived, maltreated, wrongly formed and 
corrupted ; as a power, it may mislead, deform, 
and injure those whom it thus moulds and 
governs. These are two different inquiries ; yet 
they bear an intimate necessary relation to each 
other. If philosophy is corrupted as an object, it 
cannot but injure as an instrumental power: 
again, if its influence upon its subjects is naturally 
and necessarily an evil one, the same influence has 
a reflex upon itself. 

First, What are the dangers philosophy is 
exposed to as an object, if any ? In this respect 
philosophy does not escape the lot of all things in 
this life. All good and innocent things are in 
danger from some source, in one way or other. The 
happiest prospect may be blighted, the purest 
flower may be destroyed, the noblest organism 
may be deformed, and the most useful life may be 
spoiled and maltreated. For this an object is not 
responsible itself, others must answer for the mis- 
doing. Perhaps in no department of knowledge 
is the famous saying of Pope, that a little learning 
is a dangerous thing, more applicable than in that 
of philosophy ; for the reasons that its powers are so 



METAPHYSICS. 171 

great ; the resources required to understand and 
appreciate it so various ; and no one can be a com- 
petent judge of its truth and value, unless he grasps 
the whole, and that from all points in all possible 
relations. 

There are various ways in which it is possible tl 
inflict injury upon the purity and simplicity of all 
forms of knowledge, so upon philosophy the same. 
1. One way is, by mixing with its truths mere 
human opinion, so that in the long run traditional 
elements are established, and become more pro- 
minent and powerful than the demonstrative and 
true. 2. It is possible to make it the end of 
human thought and purpose, rather than the 
means and condition to advance and cultivate the 
human mind : making it a kind of an absolute 
idea, rather than the path to the true altar, and 
the ladder to the one God and truth. 3. Or 
making it the shelter of prejudice or sectarianism ; 
for there may be party and dogmatical theories in 
philosophy as there are in religion. When party 
views and dogmatical theories are grafted on pre- 
tended philosophy, and sheltered by its name and 
power, they become invulnerable ; and human 
advancement an impossibility. Such are a few of 
the ways mental science is in danger, viewing it 
objectively, and has even thus suffered at the hand 
of men repeatedly. 



172 PART III. 

Secondly, Is pliilosophy in danger as an instru- 
mental power? if it is, in what way, and what is 
it? Philosoi)hy is a great power wielded by the 
human intellect ; intended to advance the interest 
of man, but capable of being abused into au 
instrument of deformity and injury. In order to 
avoid this dan";er and to the right use of this 
splendid instrument, it is needful to know the cha- 
racter of the danger, and v.here it lies. It is not 
an unconditional necessity, but a thing that may 
be avoided and cured by knowledge of the wrong 
and right; and practise one, and avoid the other. 

The danger of philosophy is common to all sub- 
lunary things. Money is made to facilitate the com- 
fort and advancement of mankind ; but often by the 
use which is made of it, the advancement and 
happiness of the race are obstructed by it. Light 
is good, and intended to serve virtue, and in all 
â– ways increase the happiness and advance the inter- 
ests of the whole universe ; but in the hand of 
man it is made to serve his selfish cupidity, and 
corrupt and mean purposes. 

1. One of the dangers of philosophy is, of being 
made an instrument in the hand of man to spread 
and support human creeds and opinions, so that by 
its assistance they become more potent and invulne- 
rable. Often has philosophy been thus degraded 
into a mean instrument to perpetuate darkness 
and wrong, instead of carrying out her original 



METAPHYSICS. 173 

and natural mission, discovering truth, spreading 
light, knowledge, and liberty, in her train every- 
where among men. The moment philosophy is 
thus degraded to support and spread human creeds 
and opinions, it is deprived of its liberty, dignity, 
and high end and position, and is no longer 
worthy of the name. 

2. Philosophy may be also in danger of devoting 
her energy, or amusing herself on trivial questions 
which are in themselves of little or of no import- 
ance to mankind ; or spending her energies over 
questions which are not within the province of 
human knowledge to understand in this v/orld ; and 
if known would not promote man^s usefulness or 
happiness. The history of philosophy in the 
Middle Ages, and of the Alexandrian Schools of 
Philosophy, shows without a doubt the possibility 
at least of this result. 

3. It may be mentioned as another possible 
result which philosophy may fall into, the mag- 
nifying of human reason above its true level. 
Philosophy is a system of reason; it begins and 
ends with reason. There is a tendency in the zeal 
of men to push opinions and theories to extremes. 
The objects of our pleasure and ambition are in 
danger of being magnified at the expense of other 
things, — such is reason with the philosopher. Some 
religious systems depreciate human reason, and 



174 PART III. 

make it a worse and a feebler thing than it is. 
Now, of the two extremes, it is better and more 
hopeful for mankind to magnify human reason, 
than always to depreciate its power, and discourage 
its action. To depreciate human reason is dis- 
couraging and enfeebling ; to magnify it is both 
encouraging and strengthening. Reason is the 
best thing we have ; it should be fed and encou- 
raged, directed and cultivated, for the advancement 
of the universe, the good of man himself, and the 
honour of God. 

It is an unwarrantable conclusion to say, that 
philosophy, even in her extreme magnifying of 
human reason, leads to direct and necessary infi- 
delity. The magnifying of reason in man does not 
logically lead to the conclusion, that there is no 
higher reason; it rather exalts our view of the 
infinite reason in the Divine. Unless philosophy 
deifies human reason and makes it absolute and 
final, it cannot lead to infidelity, but the contrary. 
Nothing but unnatural and strained conclusion 
can assert, that a system of human reason leads 
necessarily to infidelity. It may lead to rationalism, 
and rationalism criticize the religious systems of 
men, and find them wanting; but the rationalist may 
be as devout and sincere in his attachment to truth, 
God, and His government, as the most religious 
zealot, and that, in his own view, on a higher and 



METAPHYSICS. 175 

more reasonable ground. It may become a system 
of pure reason, hence of pure criticism : it may 
criticize the Bible, and even find it, according to 
its own standard, wanting : it does not follow even 
then that it is really infidel; it may even under 
that condition be true in its faith and allegiance 
to God, the infinite Source of truth and reason. 
There is an infinite tendency in the religious sys- 
tems of men of every age and party, to make all 
men who dare to criticize the common dogmas of 
hereditary beliefs, infidels ; hence philosophers 
will be always liable to be thus accused, because 
they dare to think independently, and criticize 
freely the opinions of men. So long as men will thus 
narrowly and uncharitably accuse one another of 
infidelity, because they think and reason above 
their fellows, it will never go well with human 
reason, religion, and society. 

But the danger in magnifying human reason too 
highly is, to refuse brighter light, which is higher 
and beyond the province of reason to discover, which 
withal may agree with human reason, as the beast 
agrees with man, only different in the scale of degree. 
To make human reason the absolute test of belief, is 
as unphilosophical as it is incorrect in logic and ex- 
perience : we every day in life meet things which we 
cannot understand and explain, and philosophy it- 
self ends her journey in enlightened ignorance. 



176 PART III. 

4. From the fact of the sovei'eign superiority of 
philosophy, she is iu danger of becomiug too in- 
fallible in tone, and absolute in her conclusions. 
It is in the nature of all things, as they rise in 
power and resources, to exercise, unless checked, 
an absolute sway and indisputable right to dictate 
and govern. Philosophy requires always to re- 
mind herself, that human reason is at best a 
fallible thing, and the best conclusions in human 
reasoning may be at fault. She will always need to 
exercise much patience and pity over the common 
dulness of maukiud generally. She must be hum- 
ble on one hand, and patient and forbearing on 
the other. 

Philosophy may become dogmatical as v/cU as 
theology ; when that is the case, it forgets its 
function, and is no longer philosophy ; and becomes 
injurious in its education upon man, instead of 
beneficial to his powers, happiness, and usefulness. 
The vocation of philosophy is to strengthen, ex- 
pand, and correct the human intellect, and that by 
exercise in true and lofty subjects, and enlightened 
and faithful guidance. AMien philosophy makes 
systems synonymous with truth, definitions as in- 
fallible axioms, and conclusions as true beyond 
doubt and improvement ; it shuts up the path 
of progress, makes reasoning useless, and settles 
down in ease as if all the work were done. In 



METAPHYSICS, 177 

such a condition, her influence would be enfeebling 
and disastrous, upon all her disciples. Such a 
pass is only possible, not probable, to fall upon the 
whole to the lot of philosophy ; it is adverse to its 
very nature and intention, and there will be al- 
ways some splendid spirits, who will break through 
human conclusions, and test truth by a higher law 
and surer criterion. There will be always some 
Minerva in philosophy to test and lead the human 
intellect to some olivelike freshness, progress, and 
victory. 



178 



CHAPTER YII. 

THE ENCOURAGEMENTS AND DISCOURAGEMENTS WHICH MEET 
THE STUDENT OF METAI'HYSICS. 

Things viewed indifferent relations and aspects, 
affect us variously and differently ; they often 
present themselves discouragingly and encourag- 
ingly to our view at the same time ; viewing the 
spiritual, the heavenly, and the eternal, in the 
light of the earthly, the material, and present 
pleasures, they appear in a discouraged light and 
aspect. Goodness appears discouragingly to the 
selfish and bad ; labour is without attraction, and 
a trouble, to the idle ; culture and knowledge have 
their discouraging aspects to the sensualist, the 
materialist, and the slothful ; whilst to others, of 
different views and sympathies, they appear 
encouraging and attractive. 

The true and the right, when viewed through 
their true mediums and in their natural relations, 
have no discouraging aspects. When the true 
appears discouragingly to us, there is something 
M'rong in our views, sentiments, or in our ground 



METAPHYSICS. 179 

and medium of spectation. The true and the 
false never correspond ; the Divine and the human 
do not always agree ; some things appear en- 
couraging to-day, but in their relation with the 
future discouraging ; others full of encouragements 
in the light of the future, but discouraging in their 
present aspects and relations. There are things 
which appear full of encouragements in relation to 
earth and time, but otherwise in relation to 
heaven and eternity ; there are others which 
appear attractive and glorious in the light of 
heaven and eternity, but not so in time and 
the world. As men and relations differ, and as 
the wrong in character and relation exists as well 
as the right, what is discouraging to some in 
certain place and relation is encouraging to others, 
in different place and relation. 

There is no form of knowledge without its 
aspects of discouragement to some, and from cer- 
tain conditions and relations in life ; indeed, the 
best and brightest thing in the world, is full of 
discouragement to some. The discouragements 
which the true and right have, is either senti- 
mental, or conventional, blind, or selfish, which can- 
not stand the test of light, nor bear to be weighed 
in an even balance. Things must be tested in 
their characters and results, and not according to 
the discouragements which they present to many. 
N 3 



380 fART III. 

In this world the good as well as the bad has its 
discouragements to many, and even much more. 
Discouragement is a test of nothing but of the 
different sentiments and views which govern 
individuals. When viewed iu reference to meta- 
â–  physical knowledge, it only shows the different 
views and feelings of persons relative to it : its 
character and utility must be tested elsewhere. 

In order to understand things correctly, the 
character and source of the encouragements and 
discouragements must be understood. If the 
source is good and the motive right, the encourage- 
ment is good in nature, and the object of it cannot 
be wrong. Truth and reason encourage the same 
in character as themselves; the false and the 
blind encourage their kind alike. It is an evidence 
of goodness that it is encouraged by the good, and 
that in the degree of the knowledge and perfection 
of the source of encouragement : so with the bad 
and the wrong. If the encouragement is rational 
and true, the thing thus encouraged cannot be 
unreasonable and false ; on the contrary, if the 
encouragement be groundless and feint, the thing 
thus encouraged cannot be strong and well 
grounded. 

It is beyond the limit and purpose of this 
chapter to speak of discouragements particularly, 
and in detail; the object is to point out simply 



METAPHYSICS. 181 

some of the leading discouragements and en- 
couragements, connected with mental science ; and 
this more as matter of suggestion than of detail. 

Encouragements and discouragements are either 
material, intellectual, political, moral, or religious. 
All are in the object or in the agent ; or in the 
relations and circumstances which are between the 
two. In their character they are either absolute 
or conditional : in relation they are either personal 
or relative. Every form of encouragement or 
discouragement, in its intrinsic character is natural 
or conventional, circumstantial or real, in the 
nature and relation of things as they appear in 
themselves, or in the thoughts, habits, prejudices, 
and superficial conditions of men. These various 
forms of encouragements and discouragements, 
though possessing something in common, have 
withal their own peculiar features and character, 
which cannot here be fully developed into their 
legitimate detail. 

It is shown in some of the preceding pages, that 
mental science is a necessity ; hence all the discou- 
ragements which may appear against it are conven- 
tional, proceeding from habits and prejudices, which 
men have wrongly acquired. If mental science be 
a necessity, it also follows, that it must have real 
encouragement for its prosecution ; for every thing 
true has encouragements both in itself and results. 



183 PART III. 

Indeed, it is a sufficient encouragement to the 
true in conviction and motive, to be convinced of 
the truth of a thing, to pursue it with pleasure and 
earnestness. His aim is loftier than human pleas- 
ing; his conviction is deeper than men's opinion. 
He does not pursue things because they are ap- 
proved of by the majority, neither does he relin- 
quish his perseverance because the multitude 
happen to be against him. He perseveres under a 
conviction of the need, the truth, and importance 
of the thing in view ; and if he relinquishes the task, 
it is because he has received more light and dif- 
ferent convictions, or his resources and powers have 
failed him, hence the object unattained and hopeless. 

It may be mentioned as one discouragement in 
the view of many, it requires stronger powers and 
greater application in its pursuit, than in other 
branches of knowledge. The easy is pleasing to 
natural feeling, whilst the hard is irksome and 
avoided. Men prefer the surface to the depth, the 
smooth to the hard, the easily attained to the 
arduous and the difficult. In the pursuit of know- 
ledge, quality is not considered so much as quantity ; 
real value is not desired so much as ease and 
pleasure in the pursuit; ultimate results are not 
so much a matter of calculation and motive, as 
the ease of the means and the sacrifice required in 
the acquisition. 



METAPHYSICS. 183 

The details of life in the small biographies of the 
day are read extensively with avidity ; political 
and commercial daily occurrences are looked for 
and read by the million ; general history, which 
never requires high powers of intellect to read, has 
its numerous class of readers and students ; the 
religious, sentimental, and dogmatical literature of 
every age and country, have had a large place in 
the minds and hearts of men. Most branches in 
material science do not require the highest mental 
powers and application to advance, and in some de- 
gree at least to succeed in them. Not so in mental 
science : in order to succeed in any degree, there 
are required high power and long and great appli- 
cation. There are required piercing insight, pa- 
tient concentration, acute analysis, comprehensive 
grasp, independent thought, and high confidence in 
the laws of being and human powers. Not so in 
material science and other forms of knowledge : 
hence they attract more attention and admirers 
than this their superior sister. Mental science 
requires earnest thinking, whilst other forms of 
knowledge are acquired with moderate and leisurely 
toiling : hence many give it up in discouragement 
and despair, and turn to others more easy and 
congenial with their views and feelings. 

The result in metaphysical study is not so 
visible and immediate as in most other depart- 



184 PART III. 

inents of la];our : hence a source of discourage- 
ment to the faint and timid student. In physical 
science, and other paths of literary toil, the re- 
sults generally are immediate and visible to all; so 
the reward is sure, and something equal to the 
effort and sacrifice made. Not so with the student 
of mental science : he has to toil without being 
recognised as a common benefactor ; he has to 
spend his efforts Avithout seeing tangible results 
clear and distinct, as in physical science, to his 
efforts. The result of metaphysical science ope- 
rates directly upon the mind itself, and that is not 
seen and acknowledged by men generally, accord- 
ing to its real value. Metaphysics labours deeper 
and anterior to other forms of knowledge, so 
science in general is more indebted to it than it 
will acknowledge ; for men generally concern them- 
selves about tangible results, and are careless and 
blind to the invisible operative causes behind the 
scenes. In this world the material and the tangible 
are ever appreciated above the mental and the in- 
visible ; so religion and mental science are estimated 
lower than those things which directly concern the 
material of life. 

The end and value of metaphysics are in the 
fact that they are indirect and slow in their 
result ; thus their real usefulness is accom- 
plished : but this demands at the hand of 



METAPHYSICS. 185 

the student greater patience, fortitude^ and per- 
severance. 

There is another discouraging aspect in the path 
of the metaphysical student ; he has to pursue his 
work in greater isolation than most other stu- 
dents. Men generally like to work and travel in 
company, and that specially when the toil is hard 
and discouraging, and the journey far and dilGfi- 
cult. Men require in all the hard and needful 
toil of life, mutual encouragement and support ; 
which they are able to give one to another. When 
toiling and travelling together, they possess the 
same aim and aspiration, and are conscious of the 
same doubts and difficulties ; whilst the lonesome 
traveller and worker are deprived of them. The 
paths to other sciences are not so difficult, and the 
work not so hard ; the devotees are found in 
larger companies ; hence, have more mutual 
intercourse and encouragement. The metaphy- 
sical student has to travel often an unknown path 
alone ; and pursue a hard work single-handed : 
he has not many companions to encourage, no 
multitude of admirers to cheer him on. To pur- 
sue his work with diligence and success, he 
requires no ordinary measure of self-posses- 
sion, determination, earnestness, and devoted 
perseverance. 

Not only has the student of metaphysics to 



186 



PART III. 



travel much alone, but he has perpetually to 
meet the suspicion and the stream of opposite 
sympathy. The vulgar generally have neither 
conception of the end and meaning of the science, 
nor any sympathy and attachment for it ; the 
leading devotees of material science, and other 
branches of learning generally, have a kind of sus- 
picion and aversion to it which they do not fail to 
show when occasion serves. No one needs such 
independence of conviction, indomitable courage, 
and single and lofty aim, as the student of meta- 
physics. The science has fewer patrons and more 
opposition, because less understood and more 
neglected than others : for these and other reasons, 
there are higher qualifications necessary to pursue 
it successfully. 

The science of mind has peculiar encourage- 
ments to offer, as well as her discouragements to 
all her sincere and faithful students. All true 
objects of pursuit have attractions and encourage- 
ments in common ; but there are peculiar attrac- 
tions and inducements offered by some, either in 
magnitude, quality, or some peculiar advantages 
and usefulness, which encourage and support the 
toil of study. Men view different objects from 
their own standpoint of spectation, and through 
the medium of their own sympathies and senti- 
ments, so that often what is peculiarly encouraging 



METAPHYSICS. 187 

and attractive to one is the reverse to the other. 
So long as men differ in powers, positions, 
interests, and feelings, and the influences which 
mould and govern their lives are so widely differ- 
ent, the views and conclusions of men will be 
widely at variance, relative to certain objects of 
ambition and pursuit. 

As the advantages of metaphysics have been 
already partly shown in a chapter of this volume, 
it is all the less needful here to dwell at great 
length on the encouragements of the study. But 
it is not intended here, more than just to intimate in 
a few sentences the encouragements of the sub- 
ject, more as a matter of consistency and harmony 
of plan, than of absolute necessity and exhaustive 
reasoning. 

The science of metaphysics has attraction to a 
class of minds, because it deals with the highest 
and most difficult objects and laws of thought; 
which is in the inverse to the discouragements it 
presents to most minds. There is a class of minds 
everywhere, that is impatient of the ordinary 
routine of life ; they live in different regions ; 
they seek new paths, and travel in a way peculiar 
to themselves ; and are never satisfied but among 
the difficult, the lofty, and the unknown ; like spi- 
rited boys, more venturesome than their comrades, 
climbing to dizzy places, or carrying their sports 



188 



PART III. 



beyond their sympathies and capabilities : or like 
enterprising men in different departments of the 
business of life, who extend their lines of opera- 
tions beyond the daring and even the thought of 
common-place men. So are certain miuds ; they 
rise to dizzy altitudes; they diverge from the 
ordinary path ; they sink deeper than ordinary 
thinkers ; they want to know something that has 
not been found out and known before. The force of 
their genius and the majesty of their power push 
them forward : their restless energy, their daunt- 
less spirit, their indomitable courage, their bound- 
less resources, their lofty aim, piercing thought, 
and great power, make them unfit companions for 
the majority in life, and of necessity, because of 
their great superiority, they are obliged to walk 
the path of science alone. In vain you tell them 
it is dangerous, useless, prohibited by mandates 
and decrees, and waste of strength and resources. 
You cannot prevent them by all threatening or 
persuasion; they consult no plan of prudential 
etiquette ; they adhere to no circumstantial influ- 
ences ; they break through all prohibition and 
associational difficulties. They follow the deep 
law of their nature ; they submit to their own 
inward mighty power; the current stream of their 
thoughts breaks over all artificial boundaries. 



METAPHYSICS. 189 

The inexhaustible character of the study is suit- 
able and an inducement to an immortal aspiration 
to pursue it. Many other forms of knowledge, 
either on account of their limit, or because of 
their character, may be superseded and left behind, 
as unfit any longer for thought and pursuit : but 
the science of mind, of cause, of being, and of 
the infinite, will never be superseded. It is 
boundless in its object-matter ; inherent in the 
human mind ; and the spirituality of its character 
makes it fit for the higher nature, and the endless 
condition and relations of man. In this study, 
man always carries with him a consciousness of the 
inexhaustible, of the boundless, of the absolute, 
and of the infinite ; which are befitting conditions 
as counterparts of his need and nature. 

The study in its results gives peculiar advantage 
to the mind of its students. It teaches the limits of 
human thought ; hence it preserves from presump- 
tion, checks pride, and teaches humility. As it has 
already been intimated in a former page ; it 
expands and strengthens the powers of the mind, 
by communion with pure and lofty thoughts, 
vigorous activity, and reflex influence. On this 
ground as well as on others, it oflers peculiar 
attractions to all who aspire after the development 
of their highest nature. 

It is a natural study suitable to the rational 



190 PART 111. 

nature of man. There can be nothing more 
congenial and natural than the study of ourselves, 
the laws, the relations, and cause of our being ; 
and the laws and causes of universal phenomena 
of mind. The study does not depend upon the 
superficial conditions of life ; it can be pursued 
under all the conditions of life, for all carry with 
them always their consciousness ; they have ever 
around them the phenomena of mind. 

Piually, in this study there are peculiar charms 
and interests, and that within the reach of all 
devoted students. It produces a deep impression 
of the individual identity of the mind ; of the 
superiority of our spiritual nature ; of the 
high purpose of our being ; and of the power 
and resources of our nature. It brings the mind 
into constant communion with the spiritual and 
the higher condition of being; it impresses the 
mind with the existence, the wisdom, the goodness, 
and the designs of the Infinite. It raises the 
mind to a world above the present ; and to a 
sublimer and a happier condition of being. The 
transient is lost in the constant ; the material for- 
gotten in the spiritual ; the soul forgets the mean 
and small things of common value, in her reflec- 
tion upon and communion with the glorious, the 
infinite, and the endless. Who then can depreciate 
a study so natural, beneficial, lofty, and happy? 



METAPHYSICS. 191 

Let its records be read correctly, its objects and 
aim be considered impartially, and its teaching 
be applied rightly ; and it will advance man in 
virtue, knowledge, power, truth, usefulness, and 
happiness.